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Abstract 
It is consistently found that heightened anxiety leads to poorer performance in 
sport environments, with the majority of research reporting that disrupted 
attentional mechanisms explain the negative anxiety-performance relationship. 
However, there has been little exploration of why sports performers might 
become anxious in the first instance. Additionally, the effect these different 
interpretations of pressure might have on attentional control and performance 
has not been explored. These two issues drove the main aims of the current 
thesis, which sought to test the predictions of a new theory developed by 
researchers in the anxiety-performance area.  
First, the thesis systematically collated the evidence in regards to the attentional 
mechanisms underpinning the anxiety-performance relationship to determine 
the consensus in the sporting literature, including the challenges and areas of 
emergent or current research. Second, the thesis addressed the research 
challenges highlighted in the review by exploring the Attentional Control Theory 
Sport (ACTS; Eysenck & Wilson, 2016) with the aim to understand what initiates 
the anxiety response in individuals, in particular through the interpretation of 
pressure.  
The first experimental study examined the cognitive biases element of ACTS 
and investigated whether attention and interpretive bias as moderating 
variables of state anxiety are related to trait anxiety and attentional control, with 
the intention of better understanding what pre-empts experiencing cognitive 
biases. The second experimental study examined the perception of failure by 
determining whether perceived probability and cost of failure influenced the 
experience of state anxiety. Finally, the third experimental study built upon the 
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aims from the previous studies and examined the hypothesised relationships 
between cognitive biases, perception of failure and state anxiety, attentional 
control and performance. This work is the first to empirically examine the 
theoretically derived predictions of ACTS, through exploring attentional and 
interpretive biases, perceived probability and cost of failure and the influence on 
momentary state anxiety, attentional control and performance.   
 
 
 4 
Acknowledgments 
There are a lot of people who deserve a huge thank you for their support during 
this PhD.  
Firstly, to my supervisors, Dr Sam Vine and Professor Mark Wilson, thank you 
for your invaluable support, guidance and wisdom throughout the course of this 
PhD, particularly in the final completion stages where I demanded more of your 
time.  
Second, to Nadine and David, the psychology #dreamteam, you’ve both kept 
me going throughout this entire process and I’ll always be grateful. I must also 
thank Rosanna and Paola for the many tea breaks and chats. Special thanks 
must also go to Nat, your endless friendship and support during this process will 
never be forgotten.  
The biggest thank you must go to my family who are incredible. I will be forever 
indebted to my dad and momma, without your support I would never have been 
able to undergo this amazing opportunity. I would like to dedicate this thesis to 
you both.  
Finally, to Craig, my fiancé, who has been there through it all and kept everyday 
life going so I can focus on my PhD. You are one of a kind and I’m forever 
grateful. I love you! 
 5 
Contents 
Abstract ............................................................................................................. 2 
Acknowledgments ............................................................................................ 4 
List of Tables .................................................................................................... 7 
List of Figures ................................................................................................... 8 
Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................. 12 
1.1. Performance under pressure ........................................................................ 12 
1.2. Structure of the thesis ................................................................................... 19 
Chapter 2: A systematic review of the anxiety-attention relationship in far-
aiming skills .................................................................................................... 25 
2.1. Abstract .......................................................................................................... 25 
2.2. Introduction .................................................................................................... 26 
2.2.1. The role of attention .................................................................................. 26 
2.2.2. Theoretical accounts of the anxiety-performance relationship ................... 28 
2.2.3. Assessment of attention ............................................................................ 32 
2.2.4. Objectives ................................................................................................. 35 
2.3. Methods .......................................................................................................... 36 
2.3.1. Search strategy and inclusion criteria ........................................................ 36 
2.3.2. Data extraction and quality assessment .................................................... 37 
2.4. Results ............................................................................................................ 39 
2.4.1. Search result ............................................................................................. 39 
2.4.2. Quality Assessment ................................................................................... 40 
2.4.3. Characteristics of included studies ............................................................ 44 
2.5. Discussion ...................................................................................................... 53 
2.5.1. Quality Assessment ................................................................................... 53 
2.5.2. Narrative of findings from included papers................................................. 55 
2.6. Synthesis and implications ........................................................................... 60 
2.7. Limitations ...................................................................................................... 64 
2.8. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 64 
2.9. Future research .............................................................................................. 65 
Chapter 3: Sport trait anxiety and cognitive bias in competitive state 
anxiety ............................................................................................................. 69 
3.1. Abstract .......................................................................................................... 69 
3.2. Introduction .................................................................................................... 70 
3.2.1. Hypotheses ............................................................................................... 75 
3.3. Method ............................................................................................................ 77 
3.3.1. Participants ............................................................................................... 77 
3.3.2. Measures .................................................................................................. 77 
3.3.3. Apparatus .................................................................................................. 83 
3.3.4. Procedure ................................................................................................. 83 
3.3.5. Data Analysis ............................................................................................ 85 
3.4. Results ............................................................................................................ 85 
3.5. Discussion ...................................................................................................... 90 
3.5.1. Attention Bias ............................................................................................ 91 
3.5.2. Interpretive bias ......................................................................................... 95 
3.6. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 99 
3.7. Future research .............................................................................................. 99 
Chapter 4: Antecedents of competitive state anxiety: the role of perceived 
probability and cost of failure ..................................................................... 101 
4.1. Abstract ........................................................................................................ 101 
4.2. Introduction .................................................................................................. 101 
4.3. Methods ........................................................................................................ 105 
 6 
4.3.1. Participants ............................................................................................. 105 
4.3.2. Measures ................................................................................................ 106 
4.3.3. Procedure ............................................................................................... 108 
4.3.4. Data Analysis .......................................................................................... 109 
4.4. Results .......................................................................................................... 109 
4.5. Discussion .................................................................................................... 111 
4.6. Conclusion ................................................................................................... 115 
4.7. Future research ............................................................................................ 116 
Chapter 5: Cognitive biases and the perception of failure as antecedents 
of competitive state anxiety. ....................................................................... 117 
5.1. Abstract ........................................................................................................ 117 
5.2 Introduction ................................................................................................... 117 
5.2.1. Hypotheses ............................................................................................. 121 
5.3. Methods ........................................................................................................ 122 
5.3.1. Participants ............................................................................................. 122 
5.3.2. Measures ................................................................................................ 122 
5.3.3. Procedure ............................................................................................... 128 
5.3.4. Data analysis ........................................................................................... 130 
5.4. Results .......................................................................................................... 130 
5.4.1. High and Low pressure conditions ........................................................... 130 
5.4.2. State Anxiety ........................................................................................... 131 
5.4.3. Performance errors ................................................................................. 132 
5.4.4. Quiet eye duration ................................................................................... 133 
5.5. Discussion .................................................................................................... 134 
5.5.1. Cognitive bias .......................................................................................... 135 
5.5.2. Perceived probability and perceived cost of failure .................................. 137 
5.6 Conclusion .................................................................................................... 140 
Chapter 6: General Discussion ................................................................... 141 
6.1 Summary of key findings .............................................................................. 141 
6.2. Significance and implications of findings .................................................. 145 
6.2.1. The anxiety-attention-performance relationship ....................................... 145 
6.2.2. Attentional Control Theory: Sport ............................................................ 147 
6.2.2.1. Role of cognitive biases ........................................................................ 148 
6.2.2.2. Role of perception of failure .................................................................. 152 
6.3. Applied implications.................................................................................... 155 
6.4. Limitations and directions for future research ............................................. 158 
6.5. Conclusion ................................................................................................. 165 
Chapter 7: References ................................................................................. 167 
 7 
List of Tables 
Chapter 2: A systematic review of the anxiety-attention relationship in far-
aiming skills 
Table 2.1. Database search strategy for PsycINFO 1806 to June Week 4 2017 
Table 2.2 Quality assessment items 
Table 2.3. Quality assessment scores  
Table 2.4. Summary of reviewed studies that performed a manipulation of 
attention 
Table 2.5. Summary of reviewed studies that did not perform a manipulation of 
attention 
Chapter 3: Sport trait anxiety and cognitive bias in competitive state 
anxiety 
Table 3.1. Correlations among the variables 
Table 3.2. Regression results for interpretations in sport scenarios 
Chapter 4: Antecedents of competitive state anxiety: the role of perceived 
probability and cost of failure 
Table 4.1. Correlations among the variables 
Table 4.2. Regression results 
Table 4.3. Number and percentage of statements obtained from the content of 
worries 
 
 
 8 
List of Figures 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Figure 1.1. A schematic representation of the bi-directional pressure-
performance relationship studied within this thesis, as proposed in the 
Attentional Control Theory: Sport (ACTS; see bold lines). Cognitive biases 
influence the perceived probability of failure (“How am I doing?”), as do errors 
on previous performance attempts. Biases also influence the perceived cost of 
failure (“What’s at stake?”), which is also influenced by the inherent pressure in 
the situation. Together, it is predicted that these combine to influence anxiety, 
which will influence performance via attentional mechanisms as outlined 
originally in ACT (see dashed lines). It is important to note that pressure does 
not necessarily lead to increased anxiety, it is the influence of cognitive biases 
and the individuals’ perception of probability and cost of failure that determine 
whether anxiety is experienced.   
Chapter 2: A systematic review of the anxiety-attention relationship in far-
aiming skills 
Figure 2.1. Stages and results of the search process using the four-phase 
PRISMA flow diagram. Adapted from Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff, Altman and 
group (2009).  
Chapter 3: Sport trait anxiety and cognitive bias in competitive state 
anxiety 
 
Figure 3.1.  A basic schematic representation of ACTS, including the sport trait 
anxiety, attentional control and cognitive biases relationship to be examined 
within this study (black, solid lines). Sport trait anxiety and attentional control 
are suggested to influence attentional and interpretive biases. Attentional and 
 9 
interpretive bias influence perceived probability and cost of failure, which in turn 
influences state anxiety (see grey, solid lines). Subsequently, state anxiety will 
influence performance via attentional mechanisms as outlined originally in ACT 
(see dashed, grey lines).   
 
Figure 3.2. Diagram of the dot-probe task for a congruent-threat trial. 
Participants are presented with a fixation cross for 500 ms. They are then 
presented simultaneously with a pair of stimuli, one emotionally salient (e.g. 
threatening) and one neutral (e.g. non-threatening) for 500 ms. A probe then 
replaces one of the two stimuli (in this case the threatening stimulus) and the 
participant is required to respond as accurately and quickly as possible to the 
probe. An attentional bias towards emotional (threat/happy) stimuli is inferred 
when participants preferentially attend to emotional cues, resulting in decreased 
reaction times to probes replacing the emotional stimuli compared to the neutral 
stimuli.  
 
Figure 3.3. Mean attentional bias scores indicating a bias towards threat on the 
threat trials (positive score) and a bias away from happy faces on the happy 
trials (negative score). 
 
Figure 3.4. Mean eye movement attentional bias scores indicating no 
attentional bias on the threat trials or the happy trials (scores must be greater 
than 0.5 to display a bias).  
 
Figure 3.5. Mean number of interpretations in both sport and non-sport 
scenarios.  
 
 10 
Chapter 4: Antecedents of competitive state anxiety: the role of perceived 
probability and cost of failure 
 
Figure 4.1. A schematic representation of the pressure-performance 
relationship, as proposed in the Attentional Control Theory: Sport (ACTS). Trait 
anxiety and attentional control influence cognitive biases (as tested in chapter 
3), which in turn influence the perceived probability of failure (“How am I 
doing?”), as do errors on previous performance attempts. Biases also influence 
the perceived cost of failure (“What’s at stake?”), which is also influenced by the 
environmental pressure inherent in the situation. Together, it is predicted that 
these combine to influence anxiety (see black text for relationship explored in 
the current study), which will influence performance via attentional mechanisms 
as outlined originally in ACT (see grey, dashed lines).   
Figure 4.2. Number of participants playing different types of sports and the level 
at which each sport was played at, e.g. 3 individuals played football (1) at 
county level.  
Chapter 5: Cognitive biases and the perception of failure as antecedents 
of competitive state anxiety 
Figure 5.1. A schematic representation of the pressure-performance 
relationship, as proposed in the Attentional Control Theory: Sport. Sport trait 
anxiety and attentional control are suggested to influence cognitive biases 
(chapter 3, grey lines, not examined in the present study). Cognitive biases 
influence the perceived probability of failure (“How am I doing?”), as do errors 
on previous performance attempts. Biases also influence the perceived cost of 
failure (“What’s at stake?”), which is also influenced by the environmental 
pressure inherent in the situation. Together, it is predicted that these combine to 
 11 
influence anxiety, which will influence performance via attentional mechanisms 
as outlined originally in ACT (see black, dashed lines).   
Chapter 6: General Discussion 
Figure 6.1. The schematic of ACTS, showing all the relationships examined 
within the thesis, including the influence of sport trait anxiety and attentional 
control on cognitive biases (Chapter 3); the influence of perceived cost and 
perceived probability on state anxiety (Chapter 4); and the influence of cognitive 
biases on perceived cost and probability and the subsequent influence on state 
anxiety, alongside the influence of errors on probability of failure and pressure 
(Chapter 5).  
 
 
 12 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Performance under pressure 
The topic of pressure and the effects on sport performance is prominent in the 
sport psychology literature and is continuously expanding (Eysenck & Wilson, 
2016; Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2012; Roberts, Jackson, & Grundy, 2017; 
Wilson, 2008, 2012). Given that athletes in competitive sports need to perform 
to their optimal standard under pressure, sporting competitions can be 
considered as potentially threatening situations and can lead to heightened 
levels of anxiety (pressured). As such, it is unsurprising that researchers and 
applied psychologists have been focused on understanding the effect of anxiety 
on performance. In sport settings, anxiety is usually related to the ego-
threatening nature of the competitive environment and, “refers to an unpleasant 
psychological state in reaction to perceived threat concerning the performance 
of a task under pressure” (Cheng, Hardy, & Markland, 2009, p. 271).  
The effects of pressure have been examined across a number of sports 
(Wilson, 2012), with the majority of research focusing on its negative effects on 
performance. An early meta-analysis of 48 studies found high levels of 
competitive anxiety to be a predictor of decreased sport performance 
(Woodman & Hardy, 2003). These performance disruptions have been termed 
‘choking’, defined as “an acute and considerable decrease in skill execution and 
performance when self-expected standards are normally achievable, which is 
the result of increased anxiety under perceived pressure.” (Mesagno & Hill, 
2013, p. 273). This definition suggests that poor performance via choking 
occurs when performance is expected to be of a high standard and furthermore 
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identifies the mediating role of increased anxiety in the pressure-performance 
relationship.  
Pressure is typically associated with elevated levels of anxiety in sport 
performers (Causer, Holmes, Smith, & Williams, 2011; Cooke, Kavussanu, 
McIntyre, & Ring, 2010; Williams, Vickers, & Rodrigues, 2002; Wilson, 
Chattington, Marple-Horvat, & Smith, 2007). Anxiety is a complex phenomenon; 
it is an emotional reaction in response to environmental stimuli. Defined as an 
aversive state, competitive state anxiety is a specific negative emotional 
response to competitive stressors, i.e. environmental demands associated with 
competitive performance (Mellalieu, Hanton & Fletcher, 2008). The term anxiety 
is also used to refer to the individual differences in anxiety as a personality trait. 
Individuals who are high in trait anxiety are more predisposed to manifest 
heightened anxiety states than are non-anxious individuals (Eysenck, 1992; 
Spielberger, 1966). Both trait and state anxiety can present as cognitive and 
somatic anxiety characteristics. Cognitive anxiety forming as worries and 
concern about oneself and the situation, and somatic anxiety forming as 
physiological symptoms such as sweaty palms and a faster heart rate.   
Over the past century, psychologists have tried to identify common mechanisms 
to explain how anxiety influences performance. In particular, these 
investigations are with respect to perceptual-motor behaviour in high-pressure 
sport contexts (e.g. a basketball player taking a decisive free-throw). The 
sporting literature has adopted an attentional processing perspective, 
suggesting that the ability to pay attention to, and process visual information are 
key determinants of successful motor execution (Williams, Singer, & Frehlich, 
2002). Research proposes that high levels of anxiety induce changes in 
attention that make it more difficult to focus on task-relevant information and 
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efficiently coordinate movement, thereby often causing decreases in 
performance (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016; Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2012, 2017). 
The most acknowledged theories attempting to explain this anxiety-attention-
performance relationship are those that investigate performance disruptions 
from a self-focus or distraction perspective (see Roberts et al., 2017, for a 
review). The majority of this research focuses on the negative effects of 
pressure on performance and as such, examines state anxiety as the mediator 
in the pressure-performance relationship.  
However, research examining success and thriving in high performance 
environments has become prominent (Brown, Arnold, Reid, & Roberts, 2018) 
and there have been recent suggestions that as common as choking during 
performance is, there appears to be just as many examples of ‘clutch’ 
performance (Otten, 2009). Defined as “any performance increment or superior 
performance that occurs under pressure circumstances” by Otten (2009, p. 
584), clutch performance, as well as choking, is determined by individual 
differences in how pressure is interpreted (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016; 
Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2012). Jones and colleagues introduced the idea 
that interpretation is important, albeit in the case of ensuing anxiety (Jones, 
1991, 1995; Jones & Swain, 1992; Jones, Swain, & Hardy, 1993), and 
suggested that performers may not always interpret their anxiety symptoms as 
being debilitative toward performance, but may in fact feel they are necessary 
(i.e. facilitative). Successful balance beam performances have been associated 
with gymnasts interpreting cognitive anxiety as more facilitative than debilitative 
(Jones et al., 1993), whilst elite rugby union players report more facilitative 
interpretations of competitive anxiety symptoms (Neil, Mellalieu, & Hanton, 
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2006). Although since this approach, there have been fewer theoretical 
developments, specifically in regards to the interpretation of pressure. 
Furthermore, alternative views suggest that Jones and colleagues’ model is 
confusing facilitative anxiety and mislabelling it with other positive emotions, 
e.g. self-confidence or challenge (Burton & Naylor, 1997). Instead, the authors 
propose that pressure can be felt but individuals do not necessarily get anxious. 
For example, whether anxiety, as a negative emotion, is experienced is 
proposed as a two-stage process. First, individuals determine what is at stake 
for them in an encounter; second, they interpret whether they can handle the 
encounter (Burton & Naylor, 1997; Folkman, 1992; Lazarus, 1991). Thus, 
anxiety is likely to occur when individuals believe the environmental demands 
outweigh their coping capabilities. Attentional Control Theory: Sport (ACTS; 
Eysenck & Wilson, 2016), a sport-relevant theory attempts to build on this two-
stage process, similarly suggesting that anxiety is debilitating to performers. 
However, the theory also seeks to address how and why competitive pressure 
leads to anxiety in the first place.  
ACTS extends the predictions of Attention Control Theory (ACT; Eysenck, 
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007), maintaining that cognitive anxiety 1) 
impairs processing efficiency more than performance effectiveness; 2) reduces 
the efficiency of the inhibition function; and 3) reduces the efficiency of the 
shifting function (Eysenck et al., 2007). In summary, ACT suggests that anxiety 
leads to disrupted attentional control through an imbalance between the goal-
directed and stimulus-driven attentional systems. In turn, attention is 
increasingly directed towards threatening cues, attentional processing is less 
efficient and drops in performance occur. However, ACTS is also more explicit 
than ACT about the initial determinants of anxiety; the role of the feedback 
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loops based on performance failure and errors; the role of motivation in 
moderating the deployment of effort or processing resources; and the sporadic 
nature of attentional disruptions in trained sporting performers. To be more 
concise, ACTS considers variations in performance under pressure and the 
causal individual differences which influence the interpretation of pressure and 
the initial experience of state anxiety. 
ACTS (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016) postulates that when under pressure, cognitive 
biases determine whether individuals are likely to experience increased anxiety 
and successful or unsuccessful performance. Cognitive biases have been 
theorised to play a critical role in the onset and maintenance of anxiety (Bar-
Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; 
Hallion & Ruscio, 2011) and the most important present in the form of attention 
and interpretive biases. Attentional bias occurs when an individual attends 
disproportionately to a threat-related stimulus rather than a neutral one (Bar-
Haim et al., 2007), whereas interpretive bias occurs when an individual 
interprets an ambiguous situation as threatening (Haller, Raeder, Scerif, 
Kadosh, & Lau, 2016). Cognitive biases are also likely to increase the extent to 
which error monitoring occurs in sport. An increased attentional bias might 
cause a performer to pay more attention to threat cues (e.g., difficult challenges 
ahead, errors they have made, good performance from an opponent) and an 
interpretive bias might cause a performer to interpret errors as having an impact 
on how they will perform subsequently (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016). 
Heightened error monitoring and cognitive biases influence perceptions of 
threat, leading to the experience of anxiety (see Figure 1.1.). ACTS implements 
Berenbaum’s two-phase model of worry and suggests that anxiety (and its 
cognitive component worry) are influenced by the perceived probability and 
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perceived costs of undesirable outcomes (Berenbaum, 2010). Losing is 
characterised as an undesirable outcome in a sporting context, and costs of 
losing are greater in high-pressure situations because more is at stake. 
Furthermore, perceived probability of losing increases as a function of the 
number of failure experiences in a competition, and decreases as a function of 
the number of success experiences (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016).  
Moreover, ACTS proposes the pressure-performance relationship as bi-
directional in nature (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016). It is suggested that cognitive 
biases and perceptions of threat often increase state anxiety in competitive 
sport situations. However, it is also predicted that because of feedback loops 
based on performance failure and errors, enhanced by error monitoring, failure 
is anxiety provoking and causes negative effects on performance. In sum, 
previous performance failure can increase the pressure on subsequent 
performance attempts and therefore pressure influences performance, and 
performance also influences pressure (see Figure 1.1.).   
 
Anxiety 
Performance 
Attention 
Pressure 
Errors 
(Failure) 
Cognitive Biases 
Probability of failure 
How am I doing? 
Cost of failure 
What’s at stake? 
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Figure 1.1. A schematic representation of the bi-directional pressure-
performance relationship studied within this thesis, as proposed in the 
Attentional Control Theory: Sport (ACTS; see bold lines). Cognitive biases 
influence the perceived probability of failure (“How am I doing?”), as do errors 
on previous performance attempts. Biases also influence the perceived cost of 
failure (“What’s at stake?”), which is also influenced by the inherent pressure in 
the situation. Together, it is predicted that these combine to influence anxiety, 
which will influence performance via attentional mechanisms as outlined 
originally in ACT (see dashed lines). It is important to note that pressure does 
not necessarily lead to increased anxiety, it is the influence of cognitive biases 
and the individuals’ perception of probability and cost of failure that determine 
whether anxiety is experienced.   
The study of performance under pressure has primarily focused on disrupted 
attentional mechanisms to explain the negative anxiety-performance 
relationship, however, there is still limited understanding regarding the 
antecedents of state anxiety and successful and unsuccessful performance, as 
well as the exact mechanisms involved in the pressure-anxiety relationship in 
sport. Whilst applied interventions are reported to aid the experience of anxiety 
for competitive athletes, they are being used without full understanding of the 
causal mechanisms.  
Consequently, the goal of this thesis is to examine performance under pressure 
and contributes to the extant literature in two main ways. First, the thesis will 
systematically collate the evidence in regards to the anxiety-performance 
relationship and underlying attentional mechanisms to provide a sense of where 
the sporting literature stands in regards to this relationship, including the 
challenges in the research and areas of emergent or current research. There is 
 19 
yet to be an encompassing systematic review conducted on the anxiety-
attention relationship in performing far aiming tasks under pressure. Second, 
the thesis will attempt to address the research challenges highlighted in the 
review, in particular exploring the moderators proposed by the ACTS framework 
to influence the pressure-anxiety relationship and the interpretation of pressure 
during successful and unsuccessful sporting performance. The theoretically 
derived predictions of ACTS need to be experimentally tested and this research 
is the first to empirically examine the predictions proposed in ACTS. The aim is 
to understand what initiates anxiety responses in individuals, an approach few 
researchers in sport have considered, for the purpose of providing athletes with 
a means to recognise and control anxious symptoms during competitive 
performance.  
1.2. Structure of the thesis  
There is an extensive scope of research examining the anxiety-performance 
relationship and a wide range of theories and supporting empirical evidence 
that contributes to the anxiety-attention-performance literature. These 
theoretical frameworks pose different mechanisms of skill failure when 
performing under pressure and attention is a consistent variable within the 
research suggested to underpin the anxiety-performance relationship. Despite 
this long period of research, and numerous narrative reviews, there is yet to be 
a systematic inquiry into the anxiety-attention-performance relationship to 
advance our understanding of the impact of anxiety on attention and 
performance, the consistency of findings in regards to this debate and important 
directions for future research.  
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The aim of study 1 in the thesis was to examine the current state of the 
literature exploring attentional mechanisms underpinning the anxiety-
performance relationship. In order to do this effectively, a systematic review was 
conducted to examine existing research for the proposed attentional 
mechanisms responsible for motor skill decrements whilst anxious. 
Furthermore, the review assessed the efficacy of different theoretical 
perspectives of the anxiety-performance relationship that implicate attention.  
It is noted that in many instances performance failure does not emerge in 
pressure filled contexts. The ability to perform successfully under pressure is a 
crucial aspect of sport performance (Mesagno & Mullane-Grant, 2010) and the 
majority of research considering successful performance under pressure 
examines potential moderating variables in the anxiety-performance relationship 
(e.g. Carson & Collins, 2016; Cheng et al., 2009; Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 
2012). However, to determine the cause of successful performance under 
pressure, it has emerged that it is important to consider varied research designs 
and methods in order to be able to test hypotheses proposed by contemporary 
theories (see chapter 2). The antecedents of state anxiety are still relatively 
under researched in the sporting literature and ACTS draws from the clinical 
and mainstream anxiety literature to present assumptions based on a bi-
directional relationship between pressure and performance (see 1.1). Whilst 
maintaining the predictions from ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007; see chapter 2), 
ACTS adds to the pressure-anxiety relationship by suggesting state anxiety is 
influenced by perceived probability and perceived costs of future undesirable 
outcomes (i.e. performance failure). In addition, the perception of failure is 
further influenced by attention to and interpretation of threatening stimuli, e.g. 
performance errors. However, research is yet to examine these predictions in 
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their intended context, sport, and thus this provides the basis of the present 
thesis.  
ACTS focuses on two issues; first there is the issue of how pressure (based on 
the context and performance level) influences the individual’s levels of anxiety. 
Second, there is the issue of how those levels of anxiety influence performance 
(see Figure 1.1. for complete schematic of ACTS). The majority of research 
examined and synthesised within the systematic review focused primarily on the 
second issue. The second part of the thesis (study 2-4) considered the first 
issue through step-by step examination of the predictions presented in the 
ACTS framework, with the aim of exploring the proposed relationships between 
trait anxiety, attentional control, cognitive biases, perception of failure and state 
anxiety. The first empirical study of the thesis addressed cognitive biases, 
specifically attentional and interpretive biases, and whether sport-specific trait 
anxiety and attentional control influences sports performers to display cognitive 
bias. The second stage of the thesis addressed the perception of failure tenet of 
ACTS, in the context of perceived probability and perceived cost and whether 
they influence state anxiety, and finally the thesis investigated ACTS as a whole 
by examining the influence of cognitive biases and perception of failure on state 
anxiety in a golf putting task under pressure. As ACTS has yet to be examined 
experimentally, it was important to test the tenets in stages to establish that the 
proposed hypotheses and predictions are accurate, in order to then contribute 
to the literature and produce new knowledge with regards to the theory as a 
whole. 
Study 2 examined cognitive biases, in the form of attentional and interpretive 
biases. ACTS suggests that cognitive biases alter the perceived probability and 
perceived costs of poor performance. Cognitive biases have been theorised to 
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play a critical role in the onset and maintenance of anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 
2007; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). However, whilst ACT was developed to explain 
the processes of high trait anxious individuals, ACTS is less precise. Therefore, 
the aim of study 2 was to determine what pre-empts the experience of cognitive 
biases, specifically whether sport trait anxiety and attentional control influence 
attentional and interpretive biases. It has been suggested threat perceptions are 
likely to be influenced by elevated levels of trait emotionality (Berenbaum, 
Thompson, & Pomerantz, 2007). Additionally, good attentional control is 
suggested to control the dominant attentional bias (Derryberry & Reed, 2002). 
An important challenge is to determine the nature of cognitive biases, as a 
better understanding of these factors can elucidate and inform in regards to the 
consequences of a bias i.e. state anxiety. 
Study 3 examined the perception of failure, one tenet of ACTS, to determine 
whether the interpretation of the environment (through thoughts, errors or 
performance) influences state anxiety. Cognitive biases are suggested to alter 
the perceived probability and perceived cost of failure, which in turn influences 
the experience of state anxiety. However, there is limited examination of the 
perception of failure within sporting contexts and the resultant influence on state 
anxiety. Past research in social anxiety has shown that individuals who believe 
undesirable outcomes are more likely to occur, and believe the outcomes will be 
more costly, tend to have higher levels of worry (state anxiety; Berenbaum, 
Thompson, & Bredemeier, 2007; Berenbaum, Thompson, & Pomerantz, 2007; 
Butler & Mathews, 1983). Therefore, the aim of study 3 was to examine the role 
of perception of failure on the experience of competitive state anxiety in a 
sporting context. 
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Study 4 built upon the aims of studies 2 and 3 by examining the hypothesised 
relationships between cognitive biases (attentional and interpretive), perception 
of failure (perceived probability and cost) and state anxiety in an ecologically 
valid golf putting task, performed under conditions of artificially induced 
pressure. In competitive environments, individuals will perceive pressure in 
different ways and this is likely to vary throughout an event (Eysenck & Wilson, 
2016). As such, the aim of study 4 was to examine whether these 
interpretations of pressure, measured through attentional and interpretive 
biases and perceived probability and cost of failure predict state anxiety during 
a pressurised golf putting task.  
Finally, chapter 6 brings together the four studies and their findings. The thesis 
has shown that cognitive processes are crucial to understanding the pressure-
performance relationship. In particular, although a consensus is lacking, 
attentional mechanisms are vital in explaining the anxiety performance 
relationship. Furthermore, with respect to the antecedents of state anxiety, 
cognitive biases and the perception of failure are suggested to influence 
anxiety, however the exact processes in which these interpretations occur still 
require investigation. Indeed, the thesis provides the first empirical support for 
an account of the pressure-performance relationship geared towards explaining 
choke and clutch performance under pressure. Furthermore, the findings 
indicate the importance of examining performance failure and its consequences 
in sporting contexts. Support for one of the main tenets of ACTS, perceived 
probability and cost influence state anxiety, was demonstrated. The combined 
influence of perceived probability and perceived cost and performance errors 
(physical or mental) is suggested to have severe consequences for subsequent 
performance, such as performance breakdowns and increased perceived 
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pressure. However, future research is still necessary in order to advance and 
extend the findings on ACTS, and this is discussed along with implications, 
including the application to ‘real world’ sporting competition, of the findings in 
chapter 6. 
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Chapter 2: A systematic review of the anxiety-attention relationship 
in far-aiming skills 
Study 1 published as: Payne, K. L., Wilson, M.R., & Vine, S. J. (2018). A 
systematic review of the anxiety-attention relationship in far-aiming skills. 
International Review of Sport and Exercise Psychology. Doi: 
10.1080/1750984X.2018.1499796. 
2.1. Abstract 
Theoretical accounts of the anxiety and motor performance relationship cite 
disruptions to attention as a critical mediating factor. The aims of this paper 
were to (1) systematically review published research examining attentional 
mechanisms underpinning the anxiety–performance relationship in targeting 
skills, and (2) subsequently discuss these findings in relation to contemporary 
theoretical perspectives. Adhering to PRISMA guidelines, three electronic 
databases (PubMed, PsycInfo, and SPORTDiscus) were searched from 
inception until June 2017. Thirty-four articles satisfied the inclusion criteria. 
Overall, the research is of high methodological quality; however, there is a 
tendency to focus on the historical dichotomy between self-focus and distraction 
accounts, whereas empirical support for more contemporary theoretical 
perspectives is lacking. Whilst this review provides further support for the role of 
attentional disruptions in anxiety-induced performance degradation, the exact 
mechanisms still lack consensus. In addition, more innovative experimental 
designs and measures are required to progress our understanding of 
moderating variables. 
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2.2. Introduction 
High-level sport requires individuals to perform at their best when it matters 
most. However, athletes do not always meet these demands, and impaired 
performance is often attributed to the associated pressure and anxiety of 
competition. Within the competitive sporting environment, state anxiety is a 
common occurrence (Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, & Smith, 1990), and is 
defined as an aversive emotional and motivational state that can develop during 
potentially threatening, evaluative circumstances (Eysenck et al., 2007). It is 
characterised as having a mostly negative effect on motor performance (Wilson, 
2012), although the processes underpinning the anxiety-performance 
relationship are still poorly understood (Cheng et al., 2009). Most prevailing 
theoretical accounts of anxiety and performance make reference to attentional 
processes, even if a consensus on the role of the specific attentional 
mechanisms involved is lacking. While numerous opinion pieces and reviews 
have been written on the topic, we intend to provide a timely systematic review 
of the literature, to (1) examine the proposed attentional mechanisms 
responsible for motor skill decrements whilst anxious that have been tested in 
the existing research, and (2) assess the efficacy of different theoretical 
perspectives of the anxiety and performance relationship that implicate 
attention.  
2.2.1. The role of attention 
Attention has been defined as the cognitive system that facilitates the selection 
of some information for further processing while inhibiting other information from 
receiving further processing (Smith & Kosslyn, 2007). In explaining the 
relevance of attention for the performance of sporting skills, two perspectives of 
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attention have been proposed. Filter theories of attention (see Broadbent, 1958) 
utilise a ‘bottleneck’ metaphor to explain that multiple stimuli cannot be 
processed at the same time, so information not selected for processing is 
filtered out. Meanwhile, capacity theories of attention (i.e. Kahneman, 1973; 
Pashler, 1998) suggest that while the availability of the attentional system is 
limited, multiple tasks can be performed so long as attentional resources are 
available. Indeed, both theories propose attention is a selective process and 
stimuli compete for limited resources (Broadbent, 1958; Treisman, 1960).  
However, despite more than a century of research in this field, there is still a 
great deal of confusion about the nature of, and cognitive mechanisms 
underlying, attention (Moran, 2009). 
As such, while it is challenging to define and explicitly measure the construct of 
attention, there is a general agreement that attention involves selectively 
processing information; prioritising some aspects of what we are presented with 
whilst ignoring others (Carrasco, 2011). As research has developed, attention 
has been deemed to interact with working memory. In particular, research 
suggests the attentional system determines the information that gains access to 
working memory and reflects the combined contribution of four processes: 
working memory, competitive selection, top-down sensitivity control, and 
automatic bottom-up filtering for salient stimuli (Knudsen, 2007). The top-down 
system influences bias processing to goal-relevant stimuli and directs the 
voluntary allocation of attention. In contrast, the stimulus-driven (bottom-up) 
system triggers shifts in attention by stimuli that are unexpected and initially 
unattended (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). 
It is suggested that anxiety disrupts the efficiency of this attentional system, 
leading to impaired performance (Eysenck et al., 2007). In particular, anxiety (in 
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the form of worry) interferes with the mental processes that support 
performance and adequate attention cannot be directed to task-relevant 
information (Kahneman, 1973; Sarason, 1984). Consequently, researchers 
have developed theoretical frameworks in an attempt to explain the anxiety-
performance relationship and the underpinning role of attention.  
2.2.2. Theoretical accounts of the anxiety-performance relationship 
Early research on the relationship between anxiety and performance was 
dominated by descriptive models such as the inverted-U hypothesis (Yerkes & 
Dodson, 1908) and the catastrophe model (Hardy, 1990). These models lacked 
a mechanistic focus and subsequent explanations for the negative effect of 
anxiety on motor performance borrowed heavily from the cognitive psychology 
literature. For example, distraction theorists (e.g. Eysenck, 1991; Sarason, 
1984, 1988; Wine, 1971) propose that anxiety serves as a distractor, drawing 
attention away from task-relevant information needed for task performance. 
Processing efficiency theory (PET; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) is an early 
distraction-based account that has received support in the sport psychology 
literature (see Wilson, 2008, for a review). Processing efficiency is based on the 
relationship between performance effectiveness (the quality of performance as 
measured against an outcome standard) and the resources used to achieve 
that performance (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). Processing efficiency can be 
reduced by task-irrelevant thoughts such as worries or performance concerns 
and crucially, is impaired to a greater extent than performance effectiveness. 
While individuals can compensate for reduced processing efficiency with 
increased effort in the short-term, this impairment may be an early warning sign 
of a subsequent drop in performance (Wilson, 2008).  
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Attentional control theory (ACT; Eysenck et al., 2007) is an extension and 
development of PET that is more explicit about the detrimental effect of anxiety 
on processes related to attention. Specifically, a diversion of processing 
resources from task-relevant stimuli toward task-irrelevant (and particularly 
threatening) stimuli is predicted to occur due to the disrupted balance between 
goal-directed and stimulus-driven attentional systems (Corbetta & Shulman, 
2002). ACT also relates this disruption to specific functions of the central 
executive of working memory that are impaired; namely, the inhibition and 
shifting functions (based on Miyake et al., 2000). As with PET, the predictions of 
ACT have received support in the sporting literature (see Eysenck & Wilson, 
2016; Wilson, 2012 for reviews). 
Whereas distraction theories can apply to the performance of any task with 
cognitive demands, explanations have been developed specifically to reflect 
anxiety’s effect on automated movement control. These explanations have 
been termed self-focus theories and propose that under pressure anxiety 
increases one’s self-consciousness, directing attention towards one’s self and 
one’s movements (Baumeister, 1984; Beilock & Carr, 2001; Masters, 1992; 
Masters & Maxwell, 2008). The theory of reinvestment (also known as the 
conscious processing hypothesis) suggests that by attempting to consciously 
control the mechanics of automated skilled behaviour, the fluency associated 
with expert performance is disrupted (Masters, 1992; Masters & Maxwell, 2008). 
The explicit monitoring hypothesis (EMH; Beilock & Carr, 2001) proposes a 
subtly different mechanism and states that when anxious, performance is 
disrupted by consciously monitoring the step-by-step execution of skill, 
interrupting proceduralised motor programmes. As with the distraction theories, 
there has been much support for the predictions of both these self-focus 
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accounts in the sport psychology literature (see Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, & 
Starkes, 2002; Masters & Maxwell, 2008). 
The self-focus versus distraction theory dichotomy has been a feature of the 
competitive anxiety-sport performance literature (Roberts et al., 2017). Beilock 
and Carr (2001) suggest that both groups of theories are relevant to different 
tasks and domains, with self-focus theories being more applicable to sport 
because of the focus on disruptions to previously automated movements. 
However, this may be a false dichotomy for a number of reasons. First, even 
well-practised skills may not be fully automatic and a characteristic of expertise 
is the ability to flexibly deploy attention to where it might be most useful at that 
moment (Burke & Yeadon, 2009; Nyberg, 2015). Second, self-focus and 
distraction perspectives may not be entirely mutually exclusive. For example, a 
‘double whammy’ effect (Beilock & Gray, 2007) has been suggested, whereby 
anxiety initially reduces attention directed towards task-relevant information by 
overloading working memory, and then encourages performers to consciously 
attend to skill execution step-by-step. Third, it has also been suggested that 
self-focus effects may simply reflect increased distractibility. Movement cues 
may become paradoxically salient when anxious due to interpretational biases, 
and as such self-focus effects could potentially be subsumed within distraction 
accounts like ACT (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016).  
Furthermore, researchers have sought to develop new frameworks that seek to 
go beyond this dichotomy that has grounded the anxiety-sport performance 
research over the last 30 years. For example, there have been recent attempts 
to extend Eysenck and colleagues’ ACT to reflect the specific demands of sport. 
First, Nieuwenhuys and Oudejans (2012) propose an integrated model of 
anxiety and perceptual-motor performance and suggest that disruption to 
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attentional processes by anxiety not only affects attentional control, but also 
interpretational processes and emotion-specific behavioural responses. 
Second, Eysenck and Wilson (2016) consider the individual differences that 
might determine whether someone experiences anxiety in a pressurised 
environment. Whilst maintaining the attention disruption element of ACT, 
attentional control theory: sport (ACTS) suggests that whether increased 
pressure leads to increased anxiety depends on how cognitive biases alter both 
an individual’s perceived probability of poor performance and the cost of poor 
performance (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016). Finally, Englert and Bertrams (2015) 
attempt to integrate ACT with the strength model of self-control (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998) to reflect the potential influence of self-
control on attentional control. Low self-control strength is suggested to 
determine the degree to which an individual pays attention to threatening stimuli 
(e.g. anxiety-related worries; Englert & Bertrams, 2012). Englert and colleagues 
have demonstrated that depleting mental resources (i.e. self-control) with a 
preceding cognitive activity can affect an individual’s ability to resist distraction 
when performing a sporting task (Bertrams, Englert, Dickhäuser, & Baumeister, 
2013; Englert & Bertrams, 2012; Englert, Zwemmer, Bertrams, & Oudejans, 
2015). 
Alternatively, other models have sought to build upon the two-dimensional 
approach to anxiety (Martens et al., 1990) that included cognitive and 
physiological (somatic) components. The three-dimensional model of 
performance anxiety (Cheng et al., 2009) maintains a cognitive dimension that 
consists of distraction and self-focus effects, as well as a physiological 
dimension that includes autonomous hyperactivity and somatic tension. The 
authors propose that a third, regulatory dimension reflecting perceived control is 
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critical in understanding an individual’s perception of their capacity to cope 
under pressure. Carson and Collins (2016) suggest that a fourth dimension - 
skill establishment - should also be considered. Skill establishment refers to the 
level and consistency of movement automaticity, and the specific confidence a 
performer has in automaticity during stressful situations. It is important to note 
that while all these contemporary frameworks consider additional mediating and 
moderating variables (e.g. perceived control, cognitive biases, skill 
establishment, and self-control) they still acknowledge the importance of 
attention in understanding the anxiety-performance relationship.   
2.2.3. Assessment of attention 
There is no single gold-standard approach to assessing attention in order to 
explore the attentional mechanisms highlighted in each of the theoretical 
approaches described. Several different methods have been used to examine 
whether attention is disrupted in response to pressure, and these methods can 
be defined as (1) manipulations of attention and (2) measurements of attention.  
Manipulation of attention 
Focus of attention is sometimes manipulated to mimic attentional disruptions 
under pressure (Beilock & Carr, 2001; Beilock et al., 2002; Wilson, Chattington, 
et al., 2007). A self-focus is often induced using explicit instructions relating to 
skill execution, whilst distraction is often created through a dual-task paradigm 
(e.g. performing a cognitively demanding task concurrently with the motor task). 
In this sense, careful experimental manipulation causes subjects to focus on 
task irrelevant stimuli (i.e. the body or explicit sources of information).   
Attention has also been manipulated via the depletion of self-control strength 
(i.e. the ability to override the automatic tendency to pay attention to threatening 
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stimuli) using transcription tasks, to reflect disrupted attentional control under 
anxiety (Bertrams et al., 2013; Englert & Bertrams, 2012; Englert et al., 2015). 
In this research, participants are instructed to transcribe a story and omit certain 
letters, in an attempt to override writing habits and deplete self-control strength. 
Self-control strength is required to regulate attention and navigate it from 
anxiety-related worries (Bertrams et al., 2013). However, it appears to be a 
limited resource (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007) and when depleted, attention 
can no longer be regulated, information is processed in a bottom-up manner 
and as a result, performance is impaired . 
Measurement of attention 
Direct measures 
Advances in eye-tracking technology allow for the more direct, objective 
measurement of visual attention. It is suggested, by tracking eye movements on 
tasks where it is possible to specify where visual attention should be directed 
and how it might shift over time, attentional control can be assessed (Corbetta 
et al., 1998; Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011). In addition, retrospective self-
reported measures (Englert & Oudejans, 2014; Oudejans, Kuijpers, Kooijman, & 
Bakker, 2011) allow for a direct measurement of attention following task 
performance. These self-report methods are beneficial on occasions when it is 
challenging to directly measure focus of attention during competitive sports 
settings (Oudejans et al., 2011).  
Indirect measures 
Probe reaction times (Lam, Masters, & Maxwell, 2010; Lam, Maxwell, & 
Masters, 2009) reflect the orientation of attention during task performance. The 
idea being, if attentional resources are taken up by anxiety-related worries and 
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task-irrelevant information, reaction times on the task will be much slower, i.e. 
longer probe reaction times. As such, measurement of probe reaction time 
concurrently with task performance can be an indicator of inefficient or disrupted 
attentional control. Furthermore, performance process measures examine the 
inferred effect of anxiety on attention. Objective measures of movement control, 
such as kinematic measures (Mullen & Hardy, 2000) and muscular activity 
(tension; Cooke, Kavussanu, McIntyre, Boardley, & Ring, 2011; Cooke et al., 
2010) have been shown to reflect changes in the focus of attention; with less 
efficient movement patterns reflecting less automated movement control 
(Masters & Maxwell, 2008), i.e. an inward focus of attention on movement.  
Finally, changes in heart rate variability (variations in the inter-beat interval; 
Wilson, Smith, & Holmes, 2007) reflect changes in mental effort and attentional 
processing (Mulder, 1992), and have also been used to indirectly assess 
attentional changes when anxious (Mullen, Hardy, & Tattersall, 2005; Wilson, 
Smith, et al., 2007). The influence of mental effort on performance differs 
considerably between the self-focus and distraction approaches. From a 
distraction perspective, increasing mental effort on a task is suggested to be a 
compensatory mechanism for the distracting effects of anxiety whereby 
performance is maintained (Eysenck, 1992). From a self-focus perspective, 
increased effort is suggested to lead to performance decrements as attention is 
transferred to effortful, controlled processes (Mullen & Hardy, 2000; Mullen et 
al., 2005).  
All of the aforementioned methods for examining attentional mechanisms have 
been employed to investigate the effects of anxiety across a range of sporting 
tasks; including, free throws in basketball (Wilson, Vine, & Wood, 2009), golf 
putting (Beilock & Carr, 2001; Cooke et al., 2010), dart throwing (Englert et al., 
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2015; Nibbeling, Daanen, Gerritsma, Hofland, & Oudejans, 2012; Nibbeling, 
Oudejans, & Daanen, 2012), shooting (Causer et al., 2011; Nieuwenhuys & 
Oudejans, 2010; Vickers & Williams, 2007), penalty taking (Wilson, Wood, & 
Vine, 2009), baseball (Gray, 2004; Gray & Allsop, 2013), table tennis (Williams, 
Vickers, et al., 2002) and archery (Behan & Wilson, 2008). A pattern amongst 
these experimental studies is the use of self-paced, non-interactive and 
attentionally demanding sporting tasks that rely heavily on the goal-directed 
attentional system (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016). In general, performance in aiming 
tasks is more easily measured, and from a cognitive perspective, the tasks 
provide sufficient thinking time for worry and disruptions to goal-directed 
attentional control to impair performance under pressure. Consequently, the 
current systematic review focuses on the influence of anxiety on these self-
paced targeting and aiming perceptual-motor tasks. 
2.2.4. Objectives 
The common factor among even the more contemporary frameworks is that 
attentional disruptions are a critical component of the anxiety-sport performance 
relationship and both self-focus and distraction elements may play their part. 
Furthermore, the field lacks an updated encompassing and systematic review 
that draws together the body of empirical evidence in support of anxiety’s 
influence on attention. As such, the aim of this paper is to systematically review 
the available evidence that investigates the key attentional mechanisms 
involved in the anxiety-performance relationship. This will provide a better 
understanding of the current evidence, and the relative efficacy of the different 
theoretical perspectives described in section 2.2.2. We aim to review the 
methodological approach to examining anxiety and attention (how anxiety and 
attention are measured or manipulated) as well as the broader methodological 
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rigour of the studies (e.g. generalisability, control groups, statistical approach). 
We will then synthesise this new information into a discussion of how the results 
relate to the anxiety-performance theories tested. In doing so, we hope to 
encourage further research that will advance understanding of the relationship 
between anxiety, attentional mechanisms and performance. 
2.3. Methods 
2.3.1. Search strategy and inclusion criteria 
An electronic search of the PsycInfo, PubMed, and SPORTDiscus databases 
was conducted for relevant research related to anxiety and attention, up to and 
including June 2017. The search was initially conducted in the PsycInfo 
database (see Table 2.1) and adapted accordingly to the other databases. The 
researchers independently assessed the eligibility of each retrieved record on 
the basis of title and abstract. If any information was unclear, the full-text article 
was screened. The researchers followed the Preferred Reporting of Items for 
Systematic Reviews and Meta-analyses (PRISMA) guidelines.  
 
Table 2.1. Database search strategy for PsycINFO 1806 to June Week 4 2017 
 
 
 
# Searches Results 
1 
anxiety.sh. OR anxiety.mp. OR performance 
anxiety.mp. OR competitive anxiety.mp. OR 
pressure.mp. OR competitive pressure.mp. OR 
performance pressure.mp. OR threat.mp. 
266043 
2 
attention.sh. OR attention.mp. OR attention$ 
control.mp. OR attention$ disruption.mp. OR 
attention$ regulation.mp. OR attention$ focus.mp. 
OR attention$ mechanism.mp. 
240641 
3 1 and 2 19558 
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Studies included in the review were required to meet the following selection 
criteria: the research needed to (1) use adult populations in studies which either 
measured anxiety (i.e. high vs. low state or trait anxiety) or manipulated anxiety 
(i.e. creating high vs. low pressure conditions); (2) engage participants in a form 
of target and aiming motor performance task; (3) manipulate attention, or 
measure attention (directly or indirectly as defined in 2.2.3), and (4) report 
original research. Studies were excluded from the review on the basis of the 
following criteria:  (1) the study design did not involve a target or aiming motor 
performance task; (2) there was no measure or manipulation of anxiety or 
attention; (3) they were focused on training interventions; (4) they were written 
in a language other than English; (5) they included a clinically anxious 
population or they tested child populations; (6) they were unpublished material 
(dissertations, theses, conference proceedings); (7) they were a review paper or 
commentary. Any discrepancies in the reviewers’ decisions to include or 
exclude a paper were discussed until a consensus was reached.   
2.3.2. Data extraction and quality assessment 
After all relevant articles were obtained, their quality was assessed and data 
extracted. The data extraction form retrieved the following information from the 
included studies: article; sample; sport; anxiety manipulation (yes/no); 
measures taken; type of theory (self-focus or distraction); and findings. 
Following data extraction, studies were divided into those that manipulate 
attention (Table 2.4) vs. those that measure attention (Table 2.5; see section 
2.3). To ensure accuracy and consistency, discussion and crosschecking of 
included studies was carried out amongst the authors.  
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The quality of a study was determined by examining the internal and external 
validity. No quality assessment instrument has been standardised for 
laboratory-based observational studies (Uiga, Cheng, Wilson, Masters, & Capio, 
2015). However, the current systematic review adapted the Quality Index 
(Downs & Black, 1998), the checklist for the evaluation of research articles 
(Durant, 1994) and the appraisal instrument (Genaidy et al., 2007) to assess 
the quality of the included studies. The maximum score available for the quality 
assessment was 25, as summarised in Table 2.2, and presented as both a 
percentage and absolute score, in Table 2.3. The first author performed the 
quality assessment, and discussed queries in the assessment with the 
remaining authors.  
Table 2.2 Quality assessment items 
Item Number Item 
1 Is the hypothesis/aim/objective of the study clearly described?  
2 Are the main outcomes to be measured clearly described? 
3 Have the authors established a theoretical framework for the study? 
4 
Is the study design clearly described and appropriate to test the 
hypotheses? 
5 Are the characteristics of participants in the study clearly described? 
6a Is there evidence of attention to ethical issues? 
7 Are the anxiety conditions clearly described? 
8b Is the target and aiming motor task clearly described? 
9 Are the main findings of the study clearly described? 
10 
Does the study provide estimates of the statistical parameters (e.g. 
regression coefficients)?  
11 
Have actual probability values been reported for the main outcomes 
except where the probability value is less than 0.001? 
12 
Are conclusions substantiated by the data that are presented in the 
results? 
13 Are results adequately compared to previous studies and in relation 
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to theoretical frameworks? 
14 
Are the subjects asked to participate in the study representative of 
the entire population from which they were recruited? 
15 
Are those subjects who were prepared to participate, representative 
of the entire population from which they were recruited? 
16 
Were the statistical tests used to assess the main outcomes 
appropriate? 
17 
Do the operational definitions of the variables match the theoretical 
definitions? 
18 Are the methods of assessing the outcome variables valid? 
19 
Is the control group/condition comparable to the exposed 
group/condition? 
20 Are the methods of assessing the exposure variables valid? 
21 Is the manipulation of the exposure variable successful? 
22 
Are the methods of assessing the outcome variables direct 
measurements? 
23 Are the outcome data reported by levels of exposure? 
24 Can the study results be applied to the eligible population? 
25 Can the study results be applied to other relevant populations? 
Note: Items were taken from the evaluation checklist for research articles (Durant, 1994), the 
Quality Index (Downs & Black, 1998) and the Epidemiological appraisal Instrument (Genaidy et 
al., 2007), unless otherwise specified. 
a Additional item to verify attention to ethics (Spencer, Ritchie, Lewis, & Dillon, 2003). 
b Additional item to verify task  
2.4. Results 
2.4.1. Search result  
In the first stage of database searching, the search strategy resulted in the 
retrieval of 736,186 citations. After removing duplicates and screening titles, 
575 abstracts were identified. These abstracts were examined against the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria, resulting in 215 papers identified for full-text 
review. Full-text articles were examined with respect to the objectives of the 
systematic review. Reference lists were inspected for further citations and 
suggestions were accepted should they match the criteria (n=3). A final list of 
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34 articles was identified as appropriate for the review (see Figure 2.1). 
2.4.2. Quality Assessment 
Quality assessment results ranged from 76-100%, with a mean score of 92.7% 
(see Table 2.3). Two of the included papers scored in the high (61%-80%) 
methodological quality range and 32 papers scored in the very high (81-100%) 
methodological quality range. Overall, studies scored highly in items relating to 
reporting of study design, the task used, reporting main findings, and 
substantiating conclusions. The lowest scoring item was direct measurement of 
outcome variables (item 22), which was only achieved in 10 studies (29.4%). 
Additionally, the generalisability of findings (item 25) was addressed by only 23 
of 34 studies (67.6%). Finally, only 24 of 34 studies (70.6%) reported actual 
probability values (item 11).  
Figure 2.1. Stages and results of the search process using the four-phase 
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PRISMA flow diagram. Adapted from Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff, Altman and 
group (2009). 
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Table 2.3. Quality assessment scores  
Article Items 
                  
   Total 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Raw % 
Behan & Wilson (2008) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 22 88 
Beilock & Carr (2001) 
(Exp. 3 & 4) 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 23 92 
Causer, Holmes, Smith & Williams (2011) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 25 100 
Cooke, Kavussanu, McIntyre & Ring (2010) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 23 92 
Cooke, Kavussanu, McIntyre, Boardley & Ring (2011) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 24 96 
Englert & Bertrams (2012) 
(Exp. 1 & 2) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 22 88 
Englert, Bertrams, Furley & Oudejans (2015) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 19 76 
Englert & Oudejans (2014) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 25 100 
Englert, Zwemmer, Bertrams & Oudejans (2015) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 25 100 
Gray (2004) 
(Exp. 3) 
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 18 72 
Gray & Allsop (2013) 
Exp. 2 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 24 96 
Gray, Allsop & Williams (2013) 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 19 76 
Gucciardi & Dimmock (2008) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 23 92 
Kinrade, Jackson & Ashford (2010) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 25 100 
Lawrence, Khan & Hardy (2013) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 24 96 
Liao & Masters (2002) 
(Exp. 2) 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 24 96 
Malhotra, Poolton, Wilson, Uiga & Masters (2015) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 25 100 
Mullen & Hardy (2000) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 23 92 
Mullen, Hardy & Tattersall (2005) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 22 88 
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Nibbeling, Daanen, Gerritsma, Hofland & Oudejans 
(2012) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 25 100 
Nibbeling, Oudejans & Daanen (2012) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 25 100 
Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans (2010) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 24 96 
Otten (2009) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 25 100 
Tanaka & Sekiya (2010a) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 24 96 
Tanaka & Sekiya (2010b) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 24 96 
Tanaka & Sekiya (2011) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 24 96 
Vickers & Williams (2007) 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 21 84 
Vine, Lee, Moore & Wilson (2013) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 25 100 
Wang, Marchant, Morris & Gibbs (2004) 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 23 92 
Whitehead, Taylor & Polman (2016) 
(Exp. 2) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 22 88 
Williams, Vickers & Rodrigues (2002) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 24 96 
Wilson, Smith & Holmes (2007) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 23 92 
Wilson, Vine & Wood (2009) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 25 100 
Wilson, Wood & Vine (2009) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 25 100 
Item percentage  
 
100 85.3 97.1 97.1 100 100 100 94.1 100 100 70.6 100 94.1 100 97.1 100 100 100 97.1 88.2 88.2 64.7 94.1 97.1 67.6 
  
Average total score                           23 91.9 
Note: 1 – yes; 0 – no/ unknown; 
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2.4.3. Characteristics of included studies 
The main findings of the systematic review are presented in Table 2.4 and 2.5. 
Out of the 34 studies included in the review, nine studies manipulated attention 
(Table 2.4); whilst 25 measured attention, either directly or indirectly (Table 2.5). 
Additionally, a total of twelve studies considered their findings in regards to the 
distraction approaches (i.e. PET and ACT). A total of eight studies considered 
their findings in regards to the self-focus approaches (i.e. CPH, EMH and 
Theory of Reinvestment) and fourteen studies either purposefully compared the 
difference between self-focus and distraction theories or retrospectively 
discussed the relevance of their findings to this debate. In thirteen studies 
participants were male and/or female students or novices, while in eighteen 
studies participants specialised in the respective tasks (e.g. golfers, baseball 
players, skeet shooters). Furthermore, in three studies there were two groups of 
participants; a novice or student group and a trained group who were 
experienced in performing the respective tasks.  
 45 
Table 2.4. Summary of reviewed studies that performed a manipulation of attention 
Article Sample Sport Anx. Measures SF/D Findings 
Beilock & 
Carr (2001) 
(Exp. 3 & 4) 
108 (Exp3) 
undergraduate students 
 
 32 (Exp4) 
undergraduate students 
Golf Yes 
Alphabet arithmetic 
performance (Exp. 
3 only) 
 
Shot accuracy 
 
SF/D 
Exp. 3: Single-task and distraction group significantly declined in putting 
accuracy, t(17)= -2.21, p< .04; t(17)= -3.24, p< .005. Self-conscious group 
significantly improved in putting accuracy, t(17) = 1.81, p< .09. All 3 groups 
improved in high-pressure post-test. 
Exp.4: Distraction and self-conscious group, performance accuracy 
increased following 1st low- to high-pressure post-test. Distraction group 
significantly declined in putting accuracy from 2nd low-pressure post-test to 
high-pressure, t(15)= -2.79, p< .014. Self-consciousness group improved in 
putting accuracy, t(15)= 4.84, p< .001.  
Skill-focused training can reduce choking under pressure.  
Findings support predictions of Explicit Monitoring Theory.  
Englert & 
Bertrams 
(2012) 
Exp. 1 & 2 
64 (Exp. 1) amateur 
male basketball players 
(22.92 ± 6.11yrs) 
 
79 (Exp. 2) university 
students (22.27 ± 3.39 
yrs) 
Basketball 
 
 
 
Darts 
Yes 
Self-control 
strength depletion 
(transcription task) 
Free throw 
success rate  
SAS-2 
STAI-SKD 
 
Self-control 
strength depletion 
(transcription task) 
Average score 
SAS-2 
PANAS  
Anxiety 
thermometer 
PANAS-X 
D 
Exp. 1: Self-control strength (e.g. selective attention) manipulation was 
successful.  
State anxiety significantly predicted free throw success rate (lower) at Time 
2 in the depletion condition.  
State anxiety did not significantly predict free throw success rate at Time 2 in 
the non-depletion condition.  
Participants low in anxiety did not differ between the two conditions in 
relation to performance.  
Effect of ego depletion on performance was stronger as state anxiety 
increased. Without anxiety, ego depletion did not affect performance. 
Exp. 2: Self-control strength manipulation was successful. 
Successful anxiety manipulation. 
Depleted participants dart performance was significantly lower in anxiety 
condition.  
No difference between anxiety and no-anxiety dart performance in non-
depleted participants. 
No main effect of ego-depletion on performance; without anxiety ego 
depletion did not affect performance. 
Findings in support of distraction approaches and strength model of self-
control.  
Englert, 
Bertrams, 
Furley & 
Oudejans 
(2015) 
31 basketball players Basketball Yes 
Self-control 
strength depletion 
(transcription task) 
Free throws 
WAI-T (German 
SAS-2) 
4-item 
manipulation check 
D 
Significant mean differences in manipulation of available self-control 
strength. 
Depleted participants paid more attention to distracting stimuli and worse 
performance in the free throw task – support for assumption that 
performance differences were caused by differences in momentarily 
available self-control strength.  
Distraction mediated the effect of self-control strength on performance.  
Non-depleted were better able at ignoring distracting stimuli and displayed 
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PANAS superior performance. 
Findings support an integration of ACT and strength model of self-control.  
Englert, 
Zwemmer, 
Bertrams & 
Oudejans 
(2015) 
28 Dutch right-handed 
students (23.4 ± 2.5 yrs) 
Darts Yes 
Self-control 
strength depletion 
(transcription task) 
Gaze behaviour 
Average score 
STAI-T 
Anxiety 
thermometer 
RSME 
Heart Rate 
D 
Baseline: depletion did not differ significantly from non-depleted in state 
anxiety, mental effort, and average HR or dart scores. 
Significant main effect for ego depletion.  
Percentage of errors significantly higher in depletion group. 
Anxiety scores were significantly higher in high anxiety condition.  
Mental effort scores were significantly higher in high anxiety condition and 
for depleted group.  
Higher average HR in high anxiety. 
Depleted group scored significantly lower in high anxiety, whereas non-
depleted did not.  
Depleted group had a shorter final-fixation in high anxiety, shorter final 
fixation duration than non-depleted in high anxiety. 
Gray (2004)  
Exp. 3 
12 college division 
baseball players 
Baseball Yes 
Judgement errors 
Batting 
performance  
Movement 
kinematics 
SF 
High pressure: drops in performance  
Lower % of judgment errors pre-test to post-test in skill-focused pressure 
group, no substantial effect on judgment errors in extraneous dual task 
group.   
Changes in batting kinematics, timing variability in swing.  
Findings support Reinvestment and Explicit Monitoring theories.  
Gucciardi & 
Dimmock 
(2008) 
20 golfers (25.3 ± 12.89 
yrs) 
Golf Yes 
Absolute error 
CSAI-2 
Cue manipulation 
check 
SF/D 
No significant effects for anxiety or putting condition and no significant 
interaction effect. 
No significant difference between explicit knowledge and task-irrelevant 
conditions. Significant difference between swing thought condition and both 
explicit knowledge and task-irrelevant conditions.  
Support for the principles of CPH. 
Liao & 
Masters 
(2002) 
Exp. 2 
12 male & 28 female 
university students 
Basketball Yes 
Reinvestment 
scale 
CSAI-2 
Performance score 
SF 
Significant performance decrement in self-focus group post-stress, F(1,19)= 
8.93, p< .01. The more technical rules participants had, the worse their 
performance under stress. 
Findings support predictions of Reinvestment Hypothesis.  
Mullen & 
Hardy (2000) 
18 male golfers 
(36.3 ± 16.3 yrs) 
Golf Yes 
Absolute errors 
CSAI-2 
RPE 
SF 
Absolute error in low-anxiety (irrelevant and relevant) and high-anxiety 
(relevant) conditions was significantly higher than in the low-anxiety control 
condition.  
High anxiety: expended more effort 
Better putters invested more effort 
Support for Conscious Processing hypothesis and some support for 
Processing Efficiency theory 
Mullen, 
Hardy & 
Tattersall 
(2005) 
24 male golfers 
(36.3 ± 16.3 yrs) 
Golf Yes 
HR variability 
Error scores 
CSAI-2 
Self-reported effort 
SF 
Putts were significantly less accurate in high anxiety tone counting and 
shadowing conditions.  
No significant effects of anxiety on self-reported effort and HRV. 
Findings support an attentional-based distraction interpretation of anxiety 
effects, with some conscious processing support.  
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Note: Anx. – Pressure situations introduced to manipulate anxiety conditions (yes or no); Measure – measures taken (including measures of attention); SF/D– type 
of theory (SF= self-focus based theory; D= distraction based theory) 
 
Table 2.5. Summary of reviewed studies that did not perform a manipulation of attention 
Article Sample Sport Anx. Measures SF/D Findings 
Behan & Wilson 
(2008) 
20 university students  
(26.4 ± 5.5 yrs) 
Archery Yes 
Gaze behaviour 
CSAI-2 
Shot accuracy 
D 
QE period significantly shorter under high pressure (mean 50.4%) 
and before inaccurate shots (mean 49.6%). Findings in support of 
Processing Efficiency Theory.  
Causer, Holmes, 
Smith & Williams 
(2011) 
16 elite-level skeet 
shooters  
(24.5 ± 4.4 yrs)  
Skeet 
shooting 
Yes 
Gaze behaviour 
MRF-3 
RSME 
% target hits 
Gun barrel 
kinematics 
D 
Performance was lower under high (M=62.9 ± 6.8%) compared 
with low (M= 74.6 ± 8.2%) anxiety conditions.  
In high anxiety condition: shorter QE duration (M= 403.0 ± 
40.4ms), significantly longer QE durations on successful trials 
(M=417.3 ±29.1ms), later onset of QE (M=276.3± 23.9ms) and 
earlier QE onset on successful trials (M=245.3 ± 18.9ms).  
Findings support predictions of Attentional Control Theory.  
Cooke, Kavussanu, 
McIntyre & Ring 
(2010) 
23 male & 35 female 
undergraduate 
students  
(19.6 ± 1.2 yrs) 
Golf Yes 
Successful putts  
RSME 
CSAI-2 
Radial error 
Heart Rate 
HR Variability 
EMG 
Kinematics 
D 
High pressure: Performance was lower (and in medium pressure), 
anxiety and effort were greater, increased HR, greater muscle 
activity.  
Findings not in support of Processing Efficiency Theory. 
Reinvestment and Explicit Monitoring Theories could explain 
findings. 
Cooke, Kavussanu, 
McIntyre, Boardley 
& Ring (2011) 
44 male & 6 female 
expert golfers 
(20.3 ± 1.5 yrs) 
Golf Yes 
Movement specific 
reinvestment scale 
CSAI-2 
RSME 
Heart Rate 
HR Variability 
EMG 
Grip force 
Kinematics 
SF/D 
High pressure: smaller radial error (and in medium pressure), 
anxiety and effort increased as pressure did, high conscious 
processing (and in low pressure) and HR increased.  
No effects of pressure evident for HRV or muscle activity and 
significant effects of pressure on impact velocity and Z-axis 
acceleration. Support for conscious processing and reinvestment 
theory.  
Englert & Oudejans 
(2014) 
34 males & 19 
females  
(29.90 ± 9 yrs) 
Tennis Yes 
Serve accuracy 
Retrospective 
measures of 
attention 
WAI-T (German 
sport anxiety 
scale) 
Serve accuracy 
SF/D 
Significantly negative relationship between anxiety and serve 
accuracy. Effect of anxiety on tennis serve was fully mediated by 
distraction. 
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Anxiety 
thermometer 
 
Gray & Allsop 
(2013) 
Exp. 2 
20 baseball players 
(m = 21.7 yrs) 
Baseball Yes 
Secondary task 
accuracy: bat, 
frequency and ball 
judgement 
SF 
Anxiety significantly increased between pre-pressure and pressure, 
and significantly decreased from pressure to post-pressure.  
Hot and cold streak groups performed significantly better than 
normal group under pressure.  
Bat judgement: task accuracy significantly decreased for hot streak 
group between equalisation and pre-pressure phases. 
Frequency judgement: non-significant effects 
Ball judgement: task accuracy significantly increased for hot streak 
group between equalisation and pre-pressure phases. Normal 
groups accuracy remained the same until decreased between pre-
pressure and post-pressure phases. 
Post-pressure phase: players who failed – significantly greater 
accuracy for bat secondary task, lower accuracy in frequency and 
lower accuracy in ball secondary task, compared to successful 
players. 
Findings support explicit monitoring theories and attentional self-
focus assumptions.  
Gray, Allsop & 
Williams (2013) 
11 male & 2 female 
golfers 
Golf Yes 
Putting accuracy 
Kinematics 
IAMS 
SF 
Putting errors were significantly larger under pressure for 
participants 1, 3 and 7 and significantly lower under pressure for 6, 
8 and 11.  
Significant negative correlation between backswing movement time 
and putting error. Significant positive correlation between velocity 
impact and putting error.  
Under pressure: smaller range of stroke amplitudes. Findings 
support Explicit Monitoring theories.   
Kinrade, Jackson 
and Ashford (2010) 
40 males & 23 
females (22.87 ± 3.99 
yrs) 
Golf Yes 
Reinvestment 
scale 
CSAI-2R 
Perceived 
pressure 
Mean score 
SF 
Significant effect of pressure. 
Mean number of points did not differ significantly between low and 
high pressure conditions.  
Reinvestment score was negatively correlated with points scored 
from low to high pressure. 
High re-investors scored fewer points under pressure. 
Significant relationship between public self-consciousness and 
performance change under pressure.  
 
Lawrence, Khan & 
Hardy (2013) 
15 male university 
students (18-35 yrs) 
Target-
directed 
aiming 
task 
Yes 
Directional 
variability 
MRF-3 
RSME 
Movement time 
Constant error 
SF/D 
Exp. 1: Transfer anxiety (high) was significantly greater than 
acquisition blocks (low). 
Effort transfer was significantly greater than acquisition blocks. 
Variable error was significantly greater in transfer. 
Anxiety negatively affected automatic component of information 
processing supporting principles of CPH. 
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Variable error Exp. 2: Transfer anxiety (high) was significantly greater than 
acquisition blocks (low).  
Effort transfer was significantly greater than acquisition blocks. 
No significant difference in movement time or constant error 
between acquisition and transfer.  
Variable error significantly increased from acquisition to transfer.  
Variability was significantly lower at movement end in low 
compared to high anxiety condition (i.e. accuracy decreased).  
Findings lend more support to the principles of CPH.  
Malhotra, Poolton, 
Wilson, Uiga & 
Masters (2015) 
Exp. 1 
16 male & 14 female 
undergraduate 
students 
(20.48 ± 1.38 yrs) 
Golf Yes 
Movement specific 
reinvestment scale 
STAI 
Kinematics 
Successful putts 
NASA task load 
index 
SF 
High anxiety: high state anxiety scores and perceived effort 
increased.  
Low anxiety: movement self-consciousness positively correlated 
with putting proficiency 
Anxiety had no effect on putting proficiency 
Findings do not support Reinvestment Hypothesis, findings support 
Attentional Control Theory 
 
Nibbeling, Daanen, 
Gerritsma, Hofland 
& Oudejans (2012) 
11 female & 8 male 
students 
(21.6 ± 1.2 yrs) 
Darts Yes 
Self-reported 
attentional focus 
STAI (Dutch 
version) 
Anxiety 
thermometer 
RSME 
RPE 
Heart Rate 
Kinematics 
Dart score 
Dart time (to throw 
all 12) 
 
D 
High anxiety: perceived mental effort was significantly higher, 
worry and distracting thoughts mentioned significantly more often, 
higher stride frequency, shorter stride length and longer contact 
time, higher heart rate, lower dart scores and time taken to throw 
all 12 darts was significantly longer.  
Findings support Attentional Control theory.  
Nibbeling, 
Oudejans & 
Daanen (2012) 
11 male experienced 
dart players (34.2 ± 
9.6 yrs) 
 
4 female & 5 male 
students (22.9 ± 1.7 
yrs) 
Darts Yes 
Gaze behaviour 
STAI (Dutch 
version) 
Anxiety 
thermometer 
Heart Rate 
Average score per 
dart 
Dart times (time to 
throw all 6) 
RSME 
RPE 
D 
Higher anxiety in dual task condition, HR higher in dual task 
condition, dart times significantly longer in high anxiety condition, 
dart times did not differ between two groups in dual task condition 
Students: higher anxiety scores than dart players, lower dart 
scores in high anxiety condition 
Dart players: higher HR than students, dart scores did not differ 
between anxiety levels, at all levels dart players performed better, 
dart times were longer in single task condition than dual task and 
students 
Less counts per minute in high anxiety, response rates did not 
differ between groups, % of correct counts did not differ 
significantly between groups 
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Secondary task:  
% of right answers 
Response rate 
Findings provide support for Attentional Control Theory 
Nieuwenhuys & 
Oudejans (2010) 
6 male & 1 female 
police officer 
(23.8 ± 2.0 yrs) 
Shooting Yes 
Gaze behaviour 
Anxiety 
thermometer 
RSME 
Heart Rate 
Mean % of hits 
Response time 
Total performance 
time 
Head/body 
orientation 
D 
High anxiety: anxiety, HR and effort scores were significantly 
higher, average response and performance times were significantly 
shorter, participants turned away more, vertical head orientation 
showed tendency to be lower, participants blinked significantly 
more often. 
Findings provide support for Attentional Control Theory 
Otten (2009) 
90 female & 153 male 
undergraduate 
psychology students 
(20.13 ± 2.44 yrs) 
Basketball Yes 
Reinvestment 
scale 
Implicit knowledge 
questionnaire 
Modified sport 
confidence 
inventory 
CSAI-2 
Private self-
consciousness 
scale 
Performance 
measures 
SF 
Under pressure, self-focus did not lead to improved performance 
under pressure, reported ‘perceived control’ did help performance. 
Participants performed better under pressure, on average. 
Reinvesting attention in the task led to greater anxiety.  
Tanaka & Sekiya 
(2010a) 
6 male professional 
golfers (24.7 ± 1.1 
yrs), 5 male novices 
(21.2 ± 0.2 yrs) 
Golf Yes 
Retrospective 
measure of 
attentional focus 
STAI Y-1 
Heart Rate 
Total putting score 
Movement 
kinematics 
SF/D 
HR showed a significant main effect of block. State anxiety showed 
no significant main effects or interaction.  
No significant decrease in putting score from last block of trials to 
test.  
No significant main effects or interactions of attention 
Arm and club movements became slower for expert and novices 
under pressure 
Kinematic changes were the same for experts and novices under 
pressure 
Neither conscious processing nor distraction scores change for 
experts or novices from acquisition to test trials.  
Findings suggest other mechanisms (e.g. strategy modification, 
emotional responses) in addition to attention factors should be 
furthered examine to develop understanding of choking 
phenomena 
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Tanaka & Sekiya 
(2010b) 
16 male university 
students (19.6 ± 0.5 
yrs) 
Golf Yes 
Retrospective 
measure of 
attentional focus 
STAI Y-1 
PANAS 
Heart Rate 
Movement 
kinematics 
EMG 
SF/D 
State anxiety, negative affect and HR increased significantly from 
the 15th block to test. 
No significant changes in putting score from last block to test trials. 
No change in the degree of attention to movement from the last 
block of acquisition trials to the test. 
Results suggest both increased attention to movements and 
increased attention to distractors played a role in attentional focus 
in the task. 
Tanaka & Sekiya 
(2011) 
20 university students 
(19.7 ± 0.5 yrs) 
Golf Yes 
Retrospective 
measure of 
attentional focus 
STAI Y-1 
PANAS 
Heart rate 
Grip Force 
Movement 
analysis (putting)  
Mean scores 
 
SF/D 
HR increased significantly during the 15th block and test block; 
however state anxiety, positive and negative affect showed no 
significant change. Significant kinematic changes observed in the 
pressure condition. No change in grip force during pressure test 
was observed. Participants’ attentional focus was directed to the 
distracters in the test. Some support for ACT, however distracter 
and kinematic changes could have occurred under relatively low 
pressure that doesn’t result in performance decrements (T-tests for 
all performance variables showed no significant changes). Putting 
scores decreased under pressure in participants whose Q1 
(attention to movements) score was relatively high, plus changes in 
variability of movements, supporting the CPH. 
Vickers & Williams 
(2007) 
7 male & 3 female 
Canadian national 
biathletes 
(23.3 ± 4.74 yrs; 22.1 
± 1.01 yrs) 
Shooting Yes 
Gaze behaviour 
CSAI-2 
RPE 
Cognitive worry 
Shooting accuracy 
Heart Rate 
SF/D 
High pressure: cognitive anxiety was higher.  
No differences were found in cognitive worry due to pressure.  
Highest level of accuracy occurred in 55% power output in both the 
low-pressure and high-pressure conditions. No significant 
difference in HR due to pressure. A significant difference in RPE 
for power output. Mean QE duration was longer on hits than 
misses 
Findings support predictions from distraction and self-focus 
approaches.  
Vine, Lee, Moore & 
Wilson (2013) 
50 expert golfers 
(29.34 ± 14 yrs) 
Golf Yes 
Gaze behaviour 
MRF-3 
Movement phase 
durations 
D 
Preparation was significantly longer in first compared to 
penultimate putts. QE duration was significantly shorter for final 
putts. QE component occurring during putting stroke was 
significantly shorter in final putts. Significantly shorter fixation 
duration on ball location after contact on final putts.  
Findings provide support for Attentional Control Theory  
Wang, Marchant, 
Morris & Gibbs 
(2004) 
88 student basketball 
players (19.3 ± 1.7) 
Basketball Yes 
Self-
consciousness 
scale (SCS) 
CSAI-2 
Number of 
successful shots 
SF 
Manipulation of pressure was successful.  
Significant decline in performance from LP to HP condition.  
Private S-C contributed to 24% of variance in performance, 
somatic A-trait significantly increased the proportion of explained 
variance. Social anxiety did not significantly contribute.  Private S-
C with somatic trait anxiety contributed 35% of variance in 
performance.  
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Whitehead, Taylor 
& Polman (2016) 
(Exp. 2) 
8 male high-skilled 
golfers (17.5 ± 1.19 
yrs; handicap: 2.25) 
 
8 moderate-skilled 
golfers (17.25 ± 0.46 
yrs; handicap: 9.62) 
Golf Yes 
Decision specific 
reinvestment scale 
Think Aloud 
protocol 
Number of putts 
SF 
HS golfers: verbalised more shots. Decision reinvestment had a 
strong positive relationship with technical instruction verbalisations 
(technical thoughts) when putting. Thought process regressed to 
less automatic, more technical step-by-step process in putting. 
Moderate skill: decision reinvestment had a strong positive 
relationship with technical instruction verbalisations (technical 
thoughts) during wood/iron shots. Less planning of shots.  
Strong positive relationship between conscious motor processing 
and self-consciousness for both high and moderate skill golfers. 
Findings support reinvestment.  
Williams, Vickers & 
Rodrigues (2002) 
8 male & 2 female 
table tennis players 
(28.9 ± 8.2 yrs) 
Table 
tennis 
Yes 
Gaze behaviour 
Modified CSAI-2 
Kinematics 
Performance 
accuracy 
PRT 
RSME 
D 
High anxiety: high cognitive anxiety and perceived as less 
facilitative, decrease in self-confidence and perceived as less 
facilitative and altered gaze more frequently. 
High performance scores on LWM compared with HWM and under 
LA. Longer PRT values on HWM and under HA. More mental effort 
under HA and HWM.  
Participants spent more time tracking the ball than other areas, and 
more so in HA than LA in HWM.  Shorter movement times were 
observed in LWM.  
Findings provide some support for the Processing Efficiency theory 
Wilson, Smith & 
Holmes (2007) 
18 golfers  
(38.6 ± 16.61 yrs) 
Golf Yes 
RSME 
HR variability 
SAS 
MRF-L 
Absolute error 
Time to initiate 
backswing 
SF/D 
HTA golfers reported significantly higher effort in the competitive 
condition. Significant difference between resting HRV and high 
pressure HRV and low pressure HRV. HTA golfers took 
significantly longer to initiate backswing in the high-pressure 
condition. HTA performance was significantly worse in high-
pressure condition.    
All golfers made significantly more glances at target hole in high-
pressure condition.  
Findings provide more support for predictions of Processing 
Efficiency theory than Conscious Processing hypothesis 
Wilson, Vine & 
Wood (2009) 
10 male university 
basketball players 
(20.3 ± 0.9 yrs) 
Basketball Yes 
Gaze behaviour 
MRF-L 
Free-throw % 
D 
High threat: higher cognitive anxiety, free throw % accuracy was 
lower, shorter QE periods, more fixations, shorter fixation durations   
Long QE period, earlier onsets, less fixations, longer fixation 
durations for successful shots compared with misses.  
Findings provide support for Attentional Control Theory 
Wilson, Wood & 
Vine (2009) 
14 male university 
standard football 
players  
(20.4 ± 1.1 yrs) 
Football Yes 
Gaze behaviour 
MRF-3 
Target accuracy 
Time to prepare 
shot 
D 
High threat: increased cognitive anxiety, shots placed significantly 
closer to the centre of goal, significantly more fixations, significantly 
longer periods of time fixating on both conditions, longer total 
fixation duration to goalkeeper, significantly quicker to fixate on 
goalkeeper 
Findings provide support for Attentional Control Theory 
Note: Anx. – Pressure situations introduced to manipulate anxiety conditions (yes or no); Measures – measures taken (including attention measures); SF/D– type of 
theory (SF= self-focus based theory; D= distraction based theory)
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2.5. Discussion 
2.5.1. Quality Assessment 
The scores from the quality assessment have highlighted a number of particular 
concerns regarding the included studies. Eleven out of 34 studies 
recommended caution when generalising findings to other relevant populations 
(item 25), identifying an issue with the extent to which results obtained can be 
used to make predictions about other situations and populations. As a result, 
future research may need to consider varied groups of populations and possibly 
larger sample sizes if findings are to be more generalisable. Furthermore, it is 
important to recognise that the lab-based nature of the experimental research 
reviewed means that generalisability of findings to real-world environments (i.e. 
ecological validity) is also somewhat problematic. For example, while an 
experimental manipulation designed to cause a self-focus may impair 
performance, it does not mean that this mechanism actually occurs when 
sporting performers are anxious (Oudejans et al., 2011). 
Moreover, item 22 (direct measures of attention) identified a methodological 
issue with objectively measuring attention during performance, in particular 
when examining focus of attention on ‘the self’ in relation to self-focus theories. 
Twelve studies failed to objectively measure focus of attention. Generally, 
objective measures consisted of eye tracking variables and self-reported 
retrospective measures and were mostly evident in research testing distraction-
based assumptions (see Tables 2.4 and 2.5). While gaze disruption might 
reflect distractibility, it is less relevant when trying to determine covert changes 
in attention (e.g. an individual focusing inappropriately on the mechanics of their 
movement). Furthermore, although self-reported measures allow the 
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measurement of an internal focus of attention, the extent to which individuals 
are able to accurately recall and report thoughts and attentional focus is still 
questioned (Oudejans et al., 2011). Research testing self-focus approaches is 
therefore more inclined to use indirect measures, such as kinematic and muscle 
activity measures that may reflect this form of disruption (Masters & Maxwell, 
2008). This discussion of the findings from item 22 highlights differences 
between the designs and methods of the included studies, and consequently 
the difficulties in comparing tests of the self-focus and distraction accounts.  
A number of papers did not present actual p values when reporting statistical 
analyses (item 11). The American Psychological Association (APA, 2010) 
suggests "when reporting p values, report exact p values (e.g. p = .031) to two 
or three decimal places. However, report p values less than .001 as p < .001” 
(p.114). Reporting actual p values (rather than in comparative form; e.g. p < 
.05) as well as reporting effect sizes, should provide greater transparency and 
enable readers to form their own opinion of the findings based on the evidence 
provided (Sullivan & Feinn, 2012).  
On a more positive note, anxiety was successfully manipulated in 30 studies, 
with measures of state anxiety in the high-pressure condition significantly higher 
than those found in a baseline, or low-pressure condition. Multiple methods 
tended to be employed, including the use of incentives, ego-threatening 
instructions, and non-contingent negative feedback. Although unlikely to be 
representative of the high levels experienced during sporting competition, the 
significant differences in reported anxiety between conditions are sufficient to 
allow examination of the role of attention when anxious. However, trait anxiety 
measures were seldom taken (see Englert & Bertrams, 2012, 2015; Englert & 
Oudejans, 2014; Englert et al., 2015; Wilson, Smith, et al., 2007, for some 
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notable exceptions) and therefore less is known about how individual 
differences influence the experience of pressure and levels of state anxiety. 
High trait anxious individuals are more likely to experience higher levels of state 
anxiety and to worry more in pressured and threatening situations than low trait 
anxious individuals (Spielberger, 1966). An examination of trait anxiety and 
other individual differences in how threat is attended to and interpreted is 
therefore important if we are to better understand variations in performance 
under pressure (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016; Vine, Moore, & Wilson, 2016).  
2.5.2. Narrative of findings from included papers 
2.5.2.1. Studies performing a manipulation of attention 
Out of the 34 reviewed studies, nine studies placed participants in groups and 
manipulated attentional focus in an attempt to replicate the attentional 
disruptions proposed by the relevant theoretical frameworks being tested (see 
Table 2.4).  
Dual task performance 
In six of the studies, a self-focus was manipulated by providing instructions 
relating to skill execution, whilst distraction was implemented through 
concurrent task loading (e.g. a counting task while putting). Individuals 
performing under self-focus instructions were susceptible to performance 
decrements (Gray, 2004; Liao & Masters, 2002), and in distraction conditions, 
effort increased in order to complete the task (Mullen & Hardy, 2000) and there 
was evidence of less accurate performance(Mullen et al., 2005). 
Self- control strength  
 
Additionally, three of the nine studies manipulated attention through the use of a 
transcription task with the aim of depleting self-control. Under anxiety there was 
evidence of poor attentional control and disrupted performance in ego-depleted 
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individuals (low self-control; Englert & Bertrams, 2012, 2015; Englert et al., 
2015). These three studies examined predictions from the distraction approach, 
implicating reduced self-control strength as a reason for disrupted attentional 
control during performance. However, as highlighted through the quality 
assessment (see 2.5.1), whilst results may demonstrate impaired performance, 
experimentally manipulating attention cannot be used to comparatively assess 
the distraction and self-focus predictions or how anxiety spontaneously affects 
attention during task performance under pressure.  
2.5.2.2. Studies measuring attention 
Out of the 34 studies reviewed, 25 of these studies did not manipulate 
attentional focus (see Table 2.5) and instead used measured attention. 20 
studies used either measures of gaze behaviour or self-report, the remainder of 
the studies (5) used performance accuracy measures (i.e. successful putts, 
directional variability) to assess changes in attentional control under pressure.  
Gaze behaviour 
Nine of the 25 studies included gaze behaviour measures to assess attentional 
mechanisms under anxiety. Gaze behaviour provides a more direct, objective 
measure of attentional control during performance and was used in studies 
where attentional focus was not explicitly manipulated (i.e. in studies 
investigating predictions from distraction theories only; Vine, Lee, Moore, & 
Wilson, 2013). The disrupted attentional processes presented as less stable 
attentional focus, including shorter quiet eye durations (the final fixation towards 
a relevant target prior to the execution of movement; Behan & Wilson, 2008; 
Englert et al., 2015; Vine et al., 2013); an increased number of fixations (Wilson, 
Vine, et al., 2009; Wilson, Wood, et al., 2009); and longer gaze allocations 
towards less relevant areas (Causer et al., 2011; Nibbeling, Daanen, et al., 
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2012; Nibbeling, Oudejans, et al., 2012; Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2010; 
Williams, Vickers, et al., 2002). 
Self-report 
Furthermore, five of the 25 studies included retrospective, self-report measures 
of attentional focus whilst six employed reinvestment (or self-consciousness) 
scales to examine the inferred effect of anxiety on attention. Retrospective 
reports mentioned distracting thoughts significantly more often (Englert & 
Bertrams, 2012; Nibbeling, Daanen, et al., 2012; Tanaka & Sekiya, 2011), 
however, there were reports of increased attention to movements as well as 
distractors (Tanaka & Sekiya, 2010a, 2010b). Reinvestment scales were 
presented as the movement specific reinvestment scale, the decision specific 
reinvestment scale and the self-consciousness scale. Under high pressure, 
there was evidence of more conscious processing (Cooke et al., 2011), 
including a greater amount of reinvesting (Kinrade, Jackson, & Ashford, 2010; 
Otten, 2009), a greater amount of self-consciousness leading to greater 
performance variance (Wang, Marchant, Morris, & Gibbs, 2004), and disrupted 
fluency leading to less automatic, step-by-step processing (Whitehead, Taylor, 
& Polman, 2016).  
2.5.2.3. Studies using performance measures 
All 34 studies included performance measures to assess the potential outcome 
of anxiety-induced attentional disruptions whether attention was manipulated or 
not. Findings from studies examining a self-focus approach sought to test the 
assertion that movement should be less automatic when attention focuses on 
the step-by-step processes of performance (Whitehead et al., 2016). Increased 
attention towards one’s self and the mechanics of performance resulted in 
disrupted performance, as well as increases in mental effort and disrupted 
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kinematics (Gray, 2004; Gray & Allsop, 2013; Gray, Allsop, & Williams, 2013; 
Kinrade et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2004). Furthermore, there was support for 
distraction-based theories as evidenced by decreased accuracy and response 
times, as well as increases in mental effort (Causer et al., 2011; Lawrence, 
Khan, & Hardy, 2013; Williams, Vickers, et al., 2002), changes in heart rate 
variability (Wilson, Smith, et al., 2007), and decreases in information processing 
efficiency (via gaze measures; Vine et al., 2013; Wilson, Vine, et al., 2009; 
Wilson, Wood, et al., 2009). However, while results tended to support the 
theories being tested, one study (Otten, 2009) - out of the 34 included in the 
review - found that participants performed better under pressure as a result of 
increased perceptions of control (Cheng et al., 2009).  
2.5.2.4. Manipulation of anxiety 
One of the inclusion criteria for the review was that participants must perform 
under low and high-pressure conditions. Nine of these studies also manipulated 
attentional focus (see 2.5.2.1) to examine the influence of anxiety and attention 
on performance. The remainder of the studies (25) only used manipulations of 
evaluative threat and/or incentives to increase state anxiety and examine 
naturally occurring attentional changes when performing. Thirty studies in the 
review successfully manipulated anxiety (see Table 2.3), whereas in the 
remaining four studies, the lack of manipulation check between the low and 
high-pressure conditions meant that changes in anxiety could not be assessed. 
The most frequently used (twelve times) measure of anxiety was the 
Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2; Martens et al., 1990). The 
Mental Readiness Form-3 (MRF-3; Krane, 1994), the State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) and the anxiety 
thermometer (Houtman & Bakker, 1989) were used in six, seven and six 
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studies, respectively. Furthermore, heart rate was used as an objective 
measure of state anxiety in ten of the 30 studies. Taken together, the review 
demonstrates the effectiveness of an experimental approach to examining the 
anxiety-performance relationship and potential attentional disruptions, even if 
the reported levels of anxiety are unlikely to be as high as in real, sporting 
competition.  
2.5.2.5. Theoretical stance of the included papers 
Despite newer theories being proposed in the literature (Carson & Collins, 
2016; Cheng et al., 2009; Eysenck & Wilson, 2016; Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 
2012, 2017), the majority of studies reviewed only considered attentional 
mechanisms in regards to the existing self-focus and distraction dichotomy. 
Although some studies made reference to the newer frameworks (see Englert & 
Bertrams, 2012, 2015; Englert et al., 2015; Otten, 2009), results were still 
discussed in terms of the dominant self-focus or distraction approaches.  
In particular, the review has highlighted a tendency for the self-focus and 
distraction approaches to employ measures of attention and performance that 
are biased towards their respective theoretical assumptions. For example, 
papers examining a distraction approach tailor the objective measures of 
attentional control (e.g. gaze behaviour) towards these predictions (Vine et al., 
2013; Wilson, Vine, et al., 2009; Wilson, Wood, et al., 2009). Similarly, in 
research examining self-focus predictions, measures of muscle activity and 
kinematics (Cooke et al., 2011, 2010; Gray, 2004; Gray et al., 2013) provide 
indirect support of detrimental self-focused attention when anxious. However, 
Williams, Vickers, et al. (2002) is a notable exception, using both gaze 
behaviour and kinematics, alongside probe reaction time data in a test of the 
distraction-based PET (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). This study aside, notable 
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differences between the designs and methods of the included studies hinder 
comparisons of the self-focus and distraction accounts.   
Moreover, whilst the effects of anxiety on performance were suggested to be 
wholly mediated by distraction in some cases (Englert & Oudejans, 2014; 
Wilson, Vine, et al., 2009; Wilson, Wood, et al., 2009), eight of the reviewed 
papers supported predictions that underpin both the distraction and self-focus 
approaches (Cooke et al., 2011; Mullen & Hardy, 2000; Mullen et al., 2005; 
Tanaka & Sekiya, 2010a, 2010b, 2011; Vickers & Williams, 2007; Wilson, 
Smith, et al., 2007). Five other studies rejected support for one theory’s 
assumptions (Beilock & Carr, 2001; Cooke et al., 2010; Gucciardi & Dimmock, 
2008; Lawrence et al., 2013; Malhotra, Poolton, Wilson, Uiga, & Masters, 2015) 
and supported the other (for example, supporting ACT over the reinvestment 
theory). An over-riding weakness of the literature reviewed was that few studies 
examined potential inter-individual variables that might mediate the anxiety-
attention-performance relationships. 
2.6. Synthesis and implications  
As demonstrated in the narrative above (2.5.2.) it is difficult to draw conclusions 
as to the specific attentional mechanisms influenced by anxiety in sport settings. 
Tests of the competing self-focus and distraction-based accounts of this 
relationship have produced equivocal findings. In particular, it is difficult to 
compare and contrast findings between studies adopting very different 
measurement approaches and experimental designs, as well as between 
studies employing methods that are biased towards authors respective 
theoretical assumptions; something that holds back our ability to better 
understand the relative strengths and weaknesses of each approach in 
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explaining the attentional mechanisms underpinning the anxiety-performance 
relationship. 
Attempts at a more fine-grained approach to examining the anxiety-
performance relationship may help clarify the current state of knowledge. 
Specifically, some of the newer models (outlined in the Introduction; Carson & 
Collins, 2016; Cheng et al., 2009; Eysenck & Wilson, 2016) have started to 
explore relevant mediating and moderating variables (e.g. perceived control or 
cognitive biases) which determine how likely it is that an individual will become 
anxious, and suffer attention and performance disruptions. However, there have 
been limited attempts at actually trying to test the main tenets of these 
contemporary frameworks. This may be due to a number of practical factors, 
including; the complexity of the new models, which make them more suited to 
opinion pieces as opposed to testable hypotheses and the need for innovative 
methods to test the proposed moderating variables.  
The current review also emphasised the difficulty in objectively measuring focus 
of attention during performance, and in particular, examining focus of attention 
on ‘the self’ in relation to self-focus theories. Consequently, research may need 
to move beyond manipulated focus conditions and self-report variables taken 
alongside movement kinematic measures when making inferences about 
attention disruptions when anxious. For example, more central measures of 
attention derived from electroencephalography (EEG) recordings (e.g. high-
alpha left temporal-frontal connectivity) have been used to assess performance 
differences during movement tasks under pressure (Cooke et al., 2015, 2014) 
and have been shown to reflect increased reinvestment in investigations of 
implicit motor learning (Zhu, Poolton, Wilson, Maxwell, & Masters, 2011), and 
under high pressure conditions (Gallicchio, Cooke, & Ring, 2016). There is 
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therefore an opportunity for future research to combine objective measures of 
reinvestment with gaze behaviour measures to test both self-focus and 
distraction predictions in a way that overcomes some of the difficulties with 
interpretation between the studies included in this review.  
Out of the studies reviewed, only Otten (2009) revealed a performance-
improving influence of competitive pressure. While this potential positive 
outcome is explicitly considered in the contemporary frameworks, the 
experimental designs of the studies reviewed perhaps did not provide the 
opportunity to test these newer predictions or the individual variations in 
response to pressure. Indeed, a limitation of the anxiety-performance research 
to date has been the use of blocked conditions and grouped data (see Eysenck 
& Wilson, 2016). In real competitive environments, not only may there be 
differences in the ways in which individuals perceive pressure, but this is likely 
to vary during an event. ACTS (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016) suggests that a key 
factor of the anxiety-performance relationship is its bi-directional nature and the 
fact that performance errors will likely influence momentary state anxiety. As 
such, it is important that future studies take a more fine-grained approach to 
assessing performance and anxiety under pressure; as trying to relate 
measures of anxiety taken prior to performing a block of trials with the 
aggregated performance in those trials does not take into account this bi-
directional relationship. Whilst research has begun to consider the differences 
between successful and unsuccessful performance attempts when under 
pressure (Cooke et al., 2015, 2014; Gallicchio et al., 2016) changes in anxiety 
are not assessed with the same precision.  
Despite the concerns identified above, the findings from the review do suggest 
that increased anxiety in response to competitive pressure is related to impaired 
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attentional control and degraded performance. Interventions designed to 
improve performers’ attentional control therefore have merit, as they are likely to 
limit both unwanted attention to the self, and/or irrelevant (and especially 
threatening) stimuli. For example, there is an existing evidence base to support 
the use of quiet eye training to protect performance of targeting skills under 
pressure for novices (Moore, Vine, Cooke, Ring, & Wilson, 2012; Vine & Wilson, 
2010, 2011) and for experienced performers (Causer et al., 2011; Vine, Moore, 
& Wilson, 2011; Wood & Wilson, 2011). While quiet eye training requires task-
specific knowledge about relevant targets of attention, it might also be possible 
to train generic functions of working memory to protect performance. Ducrocq 
and colleagues recently revealed that practicing a computer task designed to 
train the inhibition function of working memory can improve sport-specific visual 
attentional control, and subsequent performance, in a high-pressure tennis task 
(Ducrocq, Wilson, Smith, & Derakshan, 2018; Ducrocq, Wilson, Vine, & 
Derakshan, 2016).  
There are other interventions designed to improve attention in sport, which may 
also help to mitigate the negative impact of anxiety on performance in targeting 
tasks (see Moran, 2012). For example, pre-performance routines can help to 
regulate attentional focus through a sequence of consistent behaviours and 
thoughts (Cotterill, 2010; Wilson & Richards, 2011). Mental imagery may also 
improve focus, and has been shown to lessen the impact of competitive 
pressure on shooting performance (Colin, Nieuwenhuys, Visser, & Oudejans, 
2014). Finally, simulation (or habituation) training that replicates key aspects of 
an impending challenge may also help improve attentional control when 
anxious. Oudejans and colleagues have demonstrated that training with anxiety 
can help to improve subsequent performance under pressure in both expert and 
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novice athletes (Oudejans & Pijpers, 2010, 2009) and in police officers 
(Oudejans, 2008). Importantly, there is early indication that these positive 
training effects are durable over time (Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2011). While 
the specific impact on attentional control is less explicit in these interventions, 
compared to quiet eye training or working memory training, future research is 
warranted. 
2.7. Limitations 
While this systematic review adopted PRISMA guidelines, the quality 
assessments commonly used are developed for randomised controlled trials 
and therefore many items were not applicable to current sport psychology 
literature. The quality assessment included in this review was adapted from 
relevant quality assessments (Downs & Black, 1998; Durant, 1994; Genaidy et 
al., 2007), but there is no overall consensus as to criteria and therefore other 
researchers may have made different decisions. For example, our decision to 
exclude studies where target or aiming tasks were not adopted meant that 
those studies adopting continuous tasks (e.g. flying, Allsop & Gray, 2014; 
climbing, Nieuwenhuys, Pijpers, Oudejans, & Bakker, 2008; driving, Wilson, 
Chattington, et al., 2007), which might otherwise have scored highly on the 
quality assessment criteria, were left out of the current review. However, as the 
majority of experimental research has used self-paced, non-interactive tasks, it 
is recommended that the implications discussed (section 2.6.) and conclusions 
drawn from the systematic review are considered within this context.   
2.8. Conclusion 
The aim of this review was to systematically examine the available evidence 
with the intent of investigating the key attentional mechanisms (and supporting 
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theory) explaining the anxiety-performance relationship. Overall, the review has 
established that the most pertinent theoretical accounts of anxiety and sporting 
performance make reference to attention, even if there is still no shared 
consensus as to the precise mechanisms, or associated moderating variables. 
Limitations in the objective measurement of attention and the use of different 
research designs depending on whether predictions of self-focus or distraction 
theories were being examined, make comparisons between studies difficult. 
Future research needs to address these methodological issues, especially if the 
more complex, contemporary frameworks are to be empirically tested. This 
research is important if evidence-based interventions and training programmes 
are to be promoted for athletes seeking to thrive under the pressure of sporting 
competition.  
2.9. Future research 
Attentional mechanisms play a key role in the anxiety-performance relationship, 
a statement reinforced by the systematic review. Despite the accumulation of 
work in this area, a full understanding of the precise attentional mechanisms in 
the anxiety-performance relationship has been restricted by the lack of 
consistency in measurement approaches and experimental designs, and a 
limited opportunity to test the newer predictions. Furthermore, as highlighted in 
the review there is little to no consideration for differences in individuals’ 
interpretation of pressure, which may play a role in whether an individual 
becomes anxious and suffers drops in performance. Previous descriptive works 
have examined the interpretation of anxiety (see Jones, 1995, for an early 
review) suggesting that it was important to consider whether the intensity of 
symptoms experienced were interpreted as positive or negative toward 
upcoming performance. Should an individual feel they’re able to cope with the 
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task ahead, facilitative anxiety is likely to occur, however should an individual 
feel they can’t cope with the task, debilitative anxiety is likely to occur (Jones, 
1995).  
The facilitative view of anxiety adopted by Jones and colleagues is problematic 
in that it is somewhat contrary to the definition of anxiety as an aversive state, 
and may instead reflect a different interpretation of pressure (see Burton & 
Naylor, 1997, for a discussion). ACTS (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016) adopts this 
view that anxiety will only occur if situational pressure is interpreted in a way 
that means perceived costs and probability of failure are high. As such, the next 
study in the thesis will begin to examine moderating variables which may 
determine how likely it is that an individual will become anxious under pressure, 
and suffer attention and performance disruptions.  
The aim of study 2 was to investigate cognitive biases and specifically whether 
it is possible to determine which sport performers are more inclined to display 
biases. ACTS (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016) suggests that the initiation of state 
anxiety is a result of individuals’ cognitive biases altering the perception of 
failure. As such, it is important to determine who may be more likely to 
experience biases in an attempt to inform interventions for individuals struggling 
to control anxiety symptoms when performing under pressure. Whilst the 
existence of cognitive biases as an initiator of anxiety is well established within 
mainstream psychology (Bar-Haim et al., 2007, for a meta-analysis), it has been 
largely ignored in sport settings.  
Researchers have considered individual differences in the response to stress in 
the form of the Biopsychosocial model (BPSM; Blascovich, 2013). The BPSM 
postulates that challenge and threat states stimulate different physiological and 
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behavioural responses in potentially stressful situations. These specific states 
are a result of an evaluative process in which situational demands (demand 
evaluations) are weighed against personal resources (resource evaluations). 
When resources are perceived to outweigh demands a challenge response 
occurs, while a threat response occurs when demands are perceived to 
outweigh resources (Blascovich, 2008). In a similar manner, ACTS postulates 
that cognitive biases alter individuals’ perceptions of failure. If perceived 
probability and cost of failure is high, anxiety is heightened (Berenbaum, 2010; 
Berenbaum, Thompson, & Pomerantz, 2007; Eysenck & Wilson, 2016). 
However, whilst individual differences in the response to stressors have been 
studied, this individual approach is not really considered in most anxiety-sport 
performance research. Examining the moderating variables (i.e. cognitive 
biases) in a sporting context enables researchers to understand the process 
resulting in individuals becoming anxious initially when performing under 
pressure. 
Consequently, study 2 used methods from social anxiety research in an attempt 
to test the newly proposed ACTS and uncover individual differences in the 
experience of anxiety. The study examined differences in sport-specific trait 
anxiety and attentional control and the resultant influence on cognitive biases. 
Individuals’ trait characteristics are assumed to influence which information they 
process (Bishop, 2009), therefore it is likely high trait anxious individuals have 
facilitated detection of threat (Eysenck & Byrne, 1994). Furthermore, the ability 
to maintain attentional control may mediate difficulties in disengaging attention 
from threatening stimuli (Eysenck et al., 2007), therefore individuals with good 
attentional control may be less inclined to process threatening stimuli and suffer 
performance disruptions. Accordingly, the next experimental study in the thesis 
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examined individuals’ sport trait anxiety and attentional control as variables that 
influence the display of cognitive biases. 
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Chapter 3: Sport trait anxiety and cognitive bias in competitive state 
anxiety 
3.1. Abstract 
There is a large amount of evidence supporting the notion that anxiety is 
characterised by biases towards threat related stimuli. ACTS suggests that 
cognitive biases, in the form of attention and interpretive bias, influence state 
anxiety when performing under pressure (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016). However, 
an important challenge is to determine the nature of these biases, as a better 
understanding of these factors informs our understanding of their 
consequences, mainly increased state anxiety and drops in performance. The 
aim of the present study was to explore cognitive biases, specifically attention 
and interpretive bias, to determine whether sport-specific trait anxiety and 
attentional control inform the experience of these biases. Research has 
suggested that elevated levels of trait anxiety are likely to influence threat 
perceptions (Berenbaum, Thompson, & Pomerantz, 2007) and furthermore, 
attentional control may be the possible mechanism that mediates difficulties in 
disengaging attention from threat (Eysenck et al., 2007). Individuals appeared 
to be vigilant towards threat, and sport trait anxiety and attentional control 
influenced negative and positive interpretations, respectively. These results 
suggest sport trait anxiety and attentional control play a small causal role in the 
initiation of cognitive biases, however the results do little to elucidate why 
individuals become anxious in the first place. Therefore, future research is 
necessary to consider the role of other performance factors in instigating state 
anxiety.  
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3.2. Introduction 
Given that competitive sport is characterised by high-pressure situations in 
which individuals are expected to perform at their best, it is unsurprising that 
researchers and applied psychologists have focused on understanding the 
effect of anxiety on performance (e.g. Cheng et al., 2009; Eysenck et al., 2007; 
Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2010, 2017). However, the systematic review 
(chapter 2) identified a number of gaps within the anxiety-performance 
literature, including limited experimental examination of newer theoretical 
predictions. In attempts to consider issues not covered by past theoretical 
frameworks, these newer theories consider moderating variables that may 
influence the pressure-performance relationship (see chapter 2, 2.6). In 
particular, as individuals do not always suffer from performance decrements 
under pressure (e.g. Otten, 2009) it may be these moderating variables that 
determine successful or unsuccessful performance. 
One such theory is the Attentional Control Theory: Sport (ACTS; Eysenck & 
Wilson, 2016), which is more explicit about the mechanisms involved in the 
interpretation of pressure. One aim of the theory is to better understand what 
initiates state anxiety responses in individuals performing under pressure. 
ACTS (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016) postulates that when under pressure, cognitive 
biases determine whether individuals are likely to experience increased anxiety 
and successful or unsuccessful performance. Cognitive biases have been 
theorised to play a critical role in the onset and maintenance of anxiety (Bar-
Haim et al., 2007; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011) and the most important of these 
present in the form of attentional and interpretive biases. Attentional bias occurs 
when an individual attends disproportionately to a threat-related stimulus rather 
than a neutral one (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) and may cause a performer to pay 
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more attention to threat cues when performing (e.g. difficult challenges ahead, 
errors they have made, good performance from an opponent). Interpretive bias 
occurs when an individual interprets an ambiguous situation as threatening 
(Haller et al., 2016) and may cause a performer to interpret errors as having an 
impact on how they will perform subsequently. By understanding these 
cognitive biases we might be able to predict who might choke and under what 
circumstances. 
ACT suggests that it is anxious individuals that have a bias to threat-related 
stimuli (Eysenck et al., 2007). Beck (1976; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1986) 
proposed that individuals who are vulnerable to anxiety are characterised by a 
high level of activation of the cognitive structures (schemata) that are concerned 
with processing danger-relevant information. According to this view, a 
processing bias favouring threat stimuli may be a cognitive marker of anxiety 
vulnerability (i.e. high trait anxiety). Given the prevalent nature of biases in 
anxiety disorders, it is imaginable that sport trait anxiety would play a role in the 
occurrence of cognitive biases. Research has suggested that trait 
characteristics influence information processing (Bishop, 2009) and elevated 
levels of trait anxiety are likely to influence threat perceptions (Berenbaum, 
Thompson, & Pomerantz, 2007). Furthermore, there is evidence that high trait 
anxious individuals exhibit a bias that selectively favours the processing of 
threat related information (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Broadbent & Broadbent, 1988; 
MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992), as well as consistently detect threatening stimuli 
more rapidly than low trait-anxious individuals (Byrne & Eysenck, 1995).  
In a meta-analysis of 33 eye tracking experiments (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012), 
anxious individuals initially oriented gaze towards threat more frequently than 
non-anxious individuals, as revealed by a significant combined effect size for 
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group differences in orienting bias for threat (g = .47, p < .001). This effect size 
is consistent with the effect size observed for anxious vs. non-anxious 
individuals in Bar-Haim et al.’s review (2007) of reaction time measures of 
attentional bias for threat (d = .41). Interestingly, in these two meta-analyses 
comparing anxious and non-anxious individuals (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; 
Bar-Haim et al., 2007) it has also been found that anxious individuals do not 
significantly differ from non-anxious individuals in orienting towards pleasant 
(happy) stimuli (g = .11, p = .38). Eye movement measures have several 
advantages over other methods of measuring attentional biases, including 
being directly observable and ecologically valid (Mogg, Bradley, Field, & De 
Houwer, 2003). In particular, measurement of first fixations provides a means to 
examine where anxious individuals may initially attend when faced with 
threatening stimuli (e.g. Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 2000; Gamble & Rapee, 2010; 
Mogg et al., 2003).  
Moreover, elevated anxiety vulnerability is associated with a tendency to 
interpret ambiguous stimuli as threatening (Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, & 
Rutherford, 2006) and individuals with higher levels of social anxiety rate 
negative interpretations of ambiguous social situations as more likely to come to 
mind than less anxious individuals (Miers, Blöte, Bögels, & Westenberg, 2008). 
In sport, Oudejans and colleagues have produced some initial research on the 
effect of pressure on interpretation of action possibilities (see Nieuwenhuys & 
Oudejans, 2012, 2017). Even when there is no difference in the effective 
availability of visual information, state anxiety may alter how visual information 
is interpreted (e.g. Gotardi et al., 2019, driving under pressure; Nieuwenhuys, 
Cañal-Bruland, & Oudejans, 2012, deciding whether to shoot or not in critical 
situations; Nieuwenhuys et al., 2008, in a climbing task; Renden, Savelsbergh, 
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& Oudejans, 2017, police officers decision making during arrest situations) and 
this interpretive bias may cause individuals to respond based on threat-related 
inferences instead of task-relevant and objective information. For example, 
Nieuwenhuys et al. (2008) found that anxious climbers visually scanned the 
same handholds as when they were not anxious, but chose to grab handholds 
that were closer to their own body position (with less threat of falling). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1.  A basic schematic representation of ACTS, including the sport trait 
anxiety, attentional control and cognitive biases relationship to be examined 
within this study (black, solid lines). Sport trait anxiety and attentional control 
are suggested to influence attentional and interpretive biases. Attentional and 
interpretive bias influence perceived probability and cost of failure, which in turn 
influences state anxiety (see grey, solid lines). Subsequently, state anxiety will 
influence performance via attentional mechanisms as outlined originally in ACT 
(see dashed, grey lines).   
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Research using dot probe tasks suggests that anxious individuals are vigilant to 
threat (see Mogg & Bradley, 1998), however, Derryberry and Reed (2002) have 
proposed that a facilitated response to threat may also arise from a difficultly to 
disengage from threat, rather than vigilance to threat (see also, Fox, Russo, 
Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Yiend & Mathews, 2001). Clinical and non-clinical 
anxiety has been associated with poor attentional control assessed using self-
report and imaging methods (e.g. Bishop, Duncan, Brett, & Lawrence, 2004; 
Derryberry & Reed, 2002). Attentional control may be the possible mechanism 
that mediates difficulties in disengaging attention from threat (Eysenck et al., 
2007). Research has shown that good attentional control allows trait anxious 
participants to modulate the dominant attentional bias (Derryberry & Reed, 
2002; Lonigan & Vasey, 2009; Peers & Lawrence, 2009). In particular, Eldar 
and Bar-Haim (2010) found that anxious participants that were trained to 
disengage their attention from threat images displayed increased N2 amplitude 
(an event related potential component that is associated with increases in 
attentional control).  
There has been less attention given to the role of attentional control in relation 
to interpretive bias and anxiety (Salemink & Wiers, 2012). A cognitive bias 
modification study for interpretive bias has indicated that modification training 
may influence highly socially anxious participants’ ability to disengage attention 
from threat (Amir, Bomyea, & Beard, 2010). Training individuals to interpret 
information in a positive fashion has also been suggested to partly contribute to 
symptom improvement and perceptions of attention control, however, the 
researchers’ state further research is still warranted to understand this 
relationship between attentional control and interpretive bias more thoroughly 
(Bowler et al., 2012). Additionally, perhaps anxious individuals are able to 
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disengage attention as effectively as non-anxious individuals in certain 
contexts. However, such disengagement may be less efficient as anxious 
individuals apply more effort in an attempt to compensate for deficits in 
attentional control (Berggren & Derakshan, 2013).  
Whilst there is support in mainstream research for cognitive biases, this 
research is focused on anxiety disorders, i.e. individuals who struggle 
consistently with most stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Eysenck, 1992; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998). The thesis is more interested in sport performers, and why 
these otherwise rational individuals who select to play sport and place 
themselves in ego-threatening situations, sometimes struggle to deal with those 
scenarios. There is overwhelming evidence in support of the notion that anxiety 
is characterised by biases towards threat related stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; 
Cisler & Koster, 2010). An important challenge is to determine the nature of 
cognitive biases, as a better understanding of these factors can inform our 
understanding of their consequences – both ensuing state anxiety and 
subsequent performance decrements (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016). 
With the intention of better understanding what pre-empts experiencing 
cognitive biases, the aim of the present study was to attempt to determine 
whether individuals’ differences in trait anxiety, specifically sport trait anxiety, 
and attentional control can be used to determine who is likely to experience 
cognitive biases in a sport-specific scenario. The extent and impact of cognitive 
biases is likely to vary for individuals, and for this study we hypothesised that 
sport trait anxiety and attentional control would predict biases in individuals. 
3.2.1. Hypotheses 
The aim of the current study was to establish whether sport trait anxiety and 
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attentional control are related to attentional bias and interpretive bias. It was 
hypothesised that sport trait anxiety would significantly predict attentional 
control. 
3.2.1.1. Attentional bias 
Research suggests that trait anxious individuals have an attentional bias to 
threat, therefore it was predicted that 1) sport trait anxiety would significantly 
predict attentional bias threat scores, 2) attentional control would add to the 
relationship and sport trait anxiety and attentional control would predict 
attentional bias threat scores, 3) attentional bias threat scores would indicate an 
attentional bias towards threat. 
3.2.1.2. Interpretive bias 
It was hypothesised that 1) sport trait anxiety would significantly predict 
negative interpretations of ambiguous sport scenarios, 2) attentional control 
would add to the relationship and sport trait anxiety and attentional control 
would predict negative interpretations, 3) attentional control scores would 
predict positive interpretations of ambiguous sport scenarios, 4) sport trait 
anxiety and attentional control would not significantly predict negative, positive 
and neutral interpretations in non-sport scenarios. 
3.2.1.3. Exploratory hypotheses  
It has been shown that anxious individuals do not significantly differ from non-
anxious individuals in orienting towards pleasant (happy) stimuli (Armstrong & 
Olatunji, 2012), therefore, the following was explored 1) sport trait anxiety would 
not predict attentional bias happy scores and 2) attentional bias happy scores 
would indicate an attentional bias towards positive stimuli.  
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3.3. Method 
3.3.1. Participants  
A total of 26 recreationally active or higher level golfers aged between 19-35 yrs 
(m= 26.6 yrs, SD ± 5.07; 4 females) participated. A required sample size of 26 
was calculated using G*power 3.1 software, setting power (1-β err prob.) at .90, 
alpha (α err prob.) at p = .05, and using the effect size (d = .47) from Koster and 
colleagues (2004) and (d = .67) from Miers and colleagues (2008). Total sample 
sizes were 32 and 20 respectively, which were averaged to give the required 
sample size. There is no research, that the author is aware of, examining both 
attention and interpretive bias, therefore the sample size was calculated using 
studies examining attention and interpretive bias separately and the mean 
sample sizes were calculated from each study’s required sample size. 
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants were 
recruited through emails and posters to local and university golf clubs. Informed 
consent was obtained from all participants prior to participation and a local 
ethics committee approved the study.  
3.3.2. Measures 
Sport-Specific Trait Anxiety. All participants completed the Sport Anxiety 
Scale-2 (SAS-2; Smith, Smoll, Cumming, & Grossbard, 2006) prior to the 
laboratory visit. The SAS-2 is a sport-specific questionnaire that measures 
individual differences in somatic and cognitive sport trait anxiety in the form of 
worry and concentration disruption. It comprises of 15 items, answered using 
four response choices (1 = not at all; 2 = a little bit, 3 = pretty much, 4 = very 
much), with higher scores indicating high trait (sport) anxiety. In a college 
sample, alpha coefficients for the somatic, worry and concentration disruption 
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scales were .89, .91 and .84 respectively and the total score alpha was .91 
(Smith et al., 2006). The SAS-2 exhibits acceptable internal consistency at both 
the total score and subscale levels and reliability is similar to that found for the 
original SAS in older samples (Smith et al., 2006; Smith, Smoll, & Schutz, 
1990).  
Attentional Control. The Attentional Control Scale (ACS; Derryberry & Reed, 
2002) is a scale used to assess overall differences in voluntary attentional 
control. It comprises of 20 items, answered using four response choices (1 = 
almost never; 2 = sometimes; 3 = often; 4 = always), with higher scores 
indicating better attentional control. Eleven items were reversed for scoring 
purposes. The ACS consists of three sub factors related to the abilities to (a) 
focus attention, (b) shift attention between tasks, and (c) flexibly control thought. 
The total score of the scale is internally consistent with reliability estimates 
ranging from α = .71 (Gyurak & Ayduk, 2007) to α = .84 (Ólafsson et al., 2011) 
and to α = .88 (Derryberry & Reed, 2001).  
Attentional Bias. The emotional face type dot probe task measured attentional 
bias and contained 36 face types, in combinations of threat-neutral, happy-
neutral and threat-happy. There were 144 trials in total (3 blocks of 48 
randomised presentations). The faces were presented in grey scale and 
positioned against a black background. A trial started with the presentation of a 
white fixation cross (“+”) for 500ms in the centre of the screen (see Figure 2.2). 
This was followed by the presentation of two emotional face types centred in 
the left half and right half of the screen for 500ms. The faces were replaced by 
a white dot, the dot probe, presented in the centre of either the left or the right 
half of the screen. Participants were instructed to respond as fast and 
accurately as possible to the location of the dot probe using the left and right 
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arrow keys once they attended to it. Reaction time data were collected in 
response to each trial. 
Attention bias scores were calculated from a standard formula used in prior 
research (e.g. Mogg et al., 2000; Roy et al., 2008). For each subject, attention 
bias scores were calculated for all threat and happy trials. Scores were 
calculated by subtracting the mean reaction time on trials where the probe 
replaced the emotional (threat/happy) face stimuli (a congruent trial; see Figure 
3.2. below) from the mean reaction time on trials where the probe appeared on 
the opposite side to the emotional face stimuli (an incongruent trial). Positive 
values reflect a bias toward the threat/happy relative to the neutral face, 
whereas negative values reflect a bias away from threat/happy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
Fixation (500 ms) 
Target (500 ms) 
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Figure 3.2. Diagram of the dot-probe task for a congruent-threat trial. 
Participants are presented with a fixation cross for 500 ms. They are then 
presented simultaneously with a pair of stimuli, one emotionally salient (e.g. 
threatening) and one neutral (e.g. non-threatening) for 500 ms. A probe then 
replaces one of the two stimuli (in this case the threatening stimulus) and the 
participant is required to respond as accurately and quickly as possible to the 
probe. An attentional bias towards emotional (threat/happy) stimuli is inferred 
when participants preferentially attend to emotional cues, resulting in decreased 
reaction times to probes replacing the emotional stimuli compared to the neutral 
stimuli.  
Gaze behaviour. Each participant was fitted with a Mobile Eye tracker during 
the dot probe task, which measured the momentary point of gaze at 30 Hz. 
A fixation was defined as a gaze maintained on an object within 1° of visual 
angle for a minimum of 100 ms (Moore et al., 2012). Attention bias scores were 
calculated from the eye movement data to create eye movement bias scores 
(e.g. proportion of fixation frequencies; Bradley et al., 2000; Gamble & Rapee, 
2010; Mogg et al., 2003). These bias scores were calculated by taking the 
number of trials in which the first fixation was on an emotional face (i.e. threat 
or happy face), and dividing them by the total number of trials with fixations 
towards an emotional (either threatening or happy) face-type. For example, an 
eye movement bias score for the threatening face-type was the number of 
trials when the first fixation was held on a threatening face-type divided by the 
total number of trials with fixations to threatening face-type and neutral face-
type pairs. This score reflects the relative frequency of looking towards the 
threatening stimuli rather than the neutral stimuli when faced with both. Scores 
greater than 0.5 indicate an attentional bias for threat or positive stimuli 
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(dependent on the trial type). Proportion of fixation frequencies were assessed 
in Waechter, Nelson, Wright, Hyatt and Oakman (2014) and they had very 
good reliability (α = .90).  
Interpretive bias. The interpretive bias task was loosely based on the 
Adolescent’s Interpretation and Belief Questionnaire (AIBQ; Miers et al., 2008; 
Stopa & Clark, 2000; Voncken, Bögels, & de Vries, 2003), however, the social 
ambiguous situations were adapted to sport ambiguous situations to be relevant 
to situations golfers may be presented with when competing. The AIBQ 
contains five social and five non-social ambiguous situations. The social 
scenarios reflect events that may commonly occur at school, such as giving a 
presentation in front of your class after which no-one asks a question. The non-
social scenarios focus on events which do not have an element of social 
evaluation and which impact upon the protagonist alone, for example, locking 
up your bike somewhere but then wondering why you cannot find it later on.  
For each item respondents are firstly presented with the situation followed by a 
specific question to address the ambiguity of the scenario. For example, 
“You’ve invited a group of classmates to your birthday party, but a few have not 
yet said if they’re coming. Why haven’t they said something yet?” Secondly, 
three interpretations of the situation, positive, negative and neutral are 
presented individually and respondents are asked to rate, for each statement 
separately, how likely it is that it would pop up in their mind. Each interpretation 
is rated on a five-point Likert scale (1 = does not pop up in my mind, 3 = might 
pop up in my mind and 5 = definitely pops up in my mind).  
The vignette for the current task contained five sport-specific and five non-sport 
specific scenarios. The sport-specific scenarios reflected events that may 
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commonly occur during a golfing competition and were relevant to the varied 
skill-set of the individuals participating in the study. The non-sport specific 
scenarios focused on events that were not relevant to sport, or sport 
performance and did not reflect a sport-specific interpretational bias. The non-
sport specific scenarios were included to account for context specificity. A 
number of studies have found that socially anxious individuals make 
significantly more negative interpretations of social situations compared to their 
non-anxious peers, but do not differ in their interpretations of non-social 
situations (Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Constans, Penn, Ihen, & Hope, 1999; 
Huppert, Foa, Furr, Filip, & Mathews, 2003; Voncken et al., 2003; Wilson & 
Rapee, 2005). 
For each item participants were firstly presented with the scenario followed by a 
question to address the situation. For example, “You have a ten foot putt to win 
a tournament. What are you thinking?” Secondly, three interpretations of the 
situation, positive, negative and neutral were presented one after the other, in a 
randomised order. Participants were asked to rate, for each statement 
separately, how likely it is that it would pop into their mind. Each interpretation 
was rated on a five-point Likert scale (1=does not pop up in my mind, 3= might 
pop up in my mind and 5= definitely pops up in my mind). See Appendix 3 for 
the sport-specific and non-sport specific scenario and their corresponding 
interpretations.  
Positive, negative and neutral interpretation scores for sport-specific and non-
sport specific scenarios were calculated by adding scores from each 
interpretation/scenario combination and dividing by the number of scenarios 
(five; Miers et al., 2008). This was the first time the AIBQ had been adapted to 
fit a sporting scenario; therefore there is little evidence to support the use within 
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the sport literature. However, alphas (α) of the negative, positive and neutral 
subscales across all 10 items were .63, .54 and .49 respectively.  
3.3.3. Apparatus 
An Applied Science Laboratories Mobile Eye tracker (ASL; Bedford, MA) was 
used to track eye movements and collect gaze data during the dot probe task. 
The point of gaze (at 30Hz) is calculated from the image of the pupil, in 
conjunction with the corneal reflection of the infrared light source. The system 
includes a recording device (a modified DVCR) and a laptop (Dell Inspiron 
6400) installed with Eyevision (ASL) recording software. A circular cursor, 
indicating the location of gaze in a video image of the scene is viewed in real 
time on the laptop. The DVCR was linked to the laptop via a 10 m cable, and 
both were situated on a table to the far right of the participant to minimise 
distraction. The video data were recorded for subsequent off-line analysis.  
The dot-probe task was programmed and presented using E-prime version 2.0 
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc.). The programme was run on an HP EliteBook 
Laptop and reaction time data was collected through E-prime software on the 
computer. 
3.3.4. Procedure 
All participants provided informed consent prior to participation. Participants 
were initially asked to complete the SAS-2 and the ACS and then invited into 
the laboratory for testing. The first task consisted of an emotional face type dot 
probe task and measured individuals’ attentional bias. Participants were asked 
to sit in front of the laptop and to make sure they were comfortable. The height 
of the laptop and the screen were arranged to be directly in front of the 
participants face. They were fitted with the eye tracker and instructed to look at 
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the screen throughout the task with as little head movement as possible. The 
eye tracker was then calibrated by asking the individual to look at the screen 
and in turn look at 4 crosses placed at each edge of the laptop screen and one 
in the centre of the screen.  
Participants were presented with instructions regarding the task on the 
computer screen and advised to ask any questions prior to the start of the task. 
Participants were instructed to press the button (left or right arrow on the laptop 
keyboard) as quickly as possible, and to be as accurate as possible. Before 
starting the dot probe task, participants completed 12 practice trials. A 
combination of emotional face types were presented to the participant and 
using the left arrow or the right arrow, participants were asked to indicate which 
side of the screen the dot probe appeared, previously occupied by an emotional 
face type. 
The task involved completion of 3 blocks of 48 trials, with a break in between 
each block. Once the participant was ready to begin, the eye-tracker calibration 
was checked and the participant started the next block by pressing enter on the 
keyboard. Participants’ reaction time and gaze data were collected during the 
task.  
Participants were then given a 5 minute break to stand up and move around 
before completing the interpretive bias task, consisting of 5 sport-specific 
scenarios and 5 non-sport specific scenarios. Participants were first presented 
with a sport-specific scenario, beginning with scenario 1 and ending with 
scenario 5. They were next presented with the positive, negative and neutral 
interpretations in a randomised order consistent across participants and rated 
each interpretation based on how likely it was to pop into their mind. This was 
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repeated for the non-sport specific scenarios. Participants were asked to 
answer as honestly as possible. 
Participants were then debriefed, thanked for their time and any questions were 
addressed. 
3.3.5. Data Analysis 
Multiple linear regression analyses were run to determine main effects between 
sport trait anxiety and attentional control and attention bias scores and 
interpretive bias  
A linear regression analysis was also run to determine the relationship between 
sport trait anxiety and attentional control and duration of fixation and number of 
fixations. Data analysis was conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics for 
Macintosh, Version 24.0. 
3.4. Results 
Dot-probe trials with incorrect responses were excluded from further analyses 
(e.g. Koster et al., 2004; Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2007). Due to 
functional issues with the eye tracker, two participants’ data was unable to be 
analysed and was therefore, not included in the attentional bias eye movement 
scores.  
3.4.1. Trait Anxiety 
Sport trait anxiety scores ranged from 19 to 42 (M = 28.65; SD = 6.57) and 
attentional control scores ranged from 43 to 64 (M = 52.73; SD = 5.56). Sport 
trait anxiety did not significantly predict attentional control scores (p = .736).  
3.4.2. Attention bias 
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The correlations between sport trait anxiety, attentional control and attention 
bias threat and attention bias happy scores (reaction times) are presented in 
Table 3.1. As can be seen, none of the correlations were statistically significant.  
Table 3.1. Correlations among the variables 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
1. Sport Trait Anxiety - - - - 
2. Attentional Control -.308 - -.018 -.222 
3.Attention Bias Threat .107 - - .011 
4. Attention Bias Happy .066 - - - 
Note: *p<. 05, **p<. 001, ***p<. 005 
Sport trait anxiety and attentional control did not significantly predict attention 
bias threat scores (reaction time), F (2, 23) = .136, p = .874. Sport trait anxiety 
and attentional control accounted for approximately 1.2% of the variance in 
attention bias threat scores (R2 = .012; f2 = .012). Neither sport trait anxiety (p = 
.612) nor attentional control (p = .940) significantly added to the prediction.  
Sport trait anxiety and attentional control did not significantly predict attention 
bias threat scores (eye movement bias), F (2, 23) = .112, p = .895. Sport trait 
anxiety and attentional control accounted for approximately 1.1% of the 
variance in attention bias threat scores (R2 = .011; f2 = .001). Neither sport trait 
anxiety (p = .827) nor attentional control (p = .787) significantly added to the 
prediction.  
Sport trait anxiety and attentional control did not significantly predict attention 
bias happy scores (reaction time), F (2, 23) = .598, p = .558. Sport trait anxiety 
and attentional control accounted for approximately 4.9% of the variance in 
attention bias happy scores (R2 = .049; f2 = .052). Neither sport trait anxiety (p = 
.991) nor attentional control (p = .307) significantly added to the prediction. 
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Sport trait anxiety and attentional control did not significantly predict attention 
bias happy scores (eye movement bias), F (2, 23) = .622, p = .546. Sport trait 
anxiety and attentional control accounted for approximately 5.6% of the 
variance in attention bias happy scores (R2 = .056; f2 = .047). Neither sport trait 
anxiety (p = .990 nor attentional control (p = .333) significantly added to the 
prediction. 
However, attention bias threat scores (reaction time) indicated a bias towards 
threat, and attention bias happy scores (reaction time) indicated a bias away 
from happy faces (see Figure 3.3.). Eye movement attentional bias scores did 
not indicate any bias (see Figure 3.4.). 
  
Figure 3.3. Mean attentional bias scores indicating a bias towards threat on the 
threat trials (positive score) and a bias away from happy faces on the happy 
trials (negative score). 
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
Threat Happy
Attention Bias 
Scores (ms) 
 88 
 
Figure 3.4. Mean eye movement attentional bias scores indicating no 
attentional bias on the threat trials or the happy trials (scores must be greater 
than 0.5 to display a bias).  
3.4.3. Interpretive bias 
Negative interpretation scores 
Sport trait anxiety and attentional control significantly predicted negative sport 
interpretation scores, F (2, 23) = 3.966, p = .033 and accounted for 
approximately 25.6% of the variance in negative interpretation scores (R2 = 
.256; f2 = .344). However, only sport trait anxiety added significantly to the 
prediction, p = .010. 
Sport trait anxiety and attentional control accounted for 15.8 % (R2 = .158; f2 = 
.188) of the variance in negative non-sport interpretation scores, however they 
did not significantly predict negative non-sport interpretation scores, F (2, 23) = 
2.164, p = .138. Similarly, sport trait anxiety (p = .079) and attentional control (p 
= .148) did not significantly add to the prediction. 
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Table 3.2. Regression results for interpretations in sport scenarios 
Model NSBeta PSBeta  NeuSBeta 
Sport trait anxiety .063* -.011 -.012 
Attentional Control .031 .043* -.014 
Note: the dependent variable was negative sport interpretations (NSBeta), positive sport 
interpretations (PSBeta) and neutral sport interpretations (NeuSBeta); * p < .05 
Positive interpretation scores 
Sport trait anxiety and attentional control significantly predicted positive sport 
interpretation scores, F (2, 23) = 4.042, p = .031 and accounted for 
approximately 26% of the variance in positive interpretation scores (R2 = .260; f2 
= .351). However, only attentional control added significantly to the prediction, p 
= .025. 
Sport trait anxiety and attentional control accounted for 9.8% (R2 = .098; f2 = 
.109) of the variance in positive non-sport interpretation scores, however they 
did not significantly predict positive non-sport interpretation scores, F (2, 23) = 
1.252, p = .305. Similarly, sport trait anxiety (p = .704) and attentional control (p 
= .128) did not significantly add to the prediction. 
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Figure 3.5. Mean number of interpretations in both sport and non-sport 
scenarios.  
 
Neutral interpretation scores 
Sport trait anxiety and attentional control accounted for 1.9% (R2 = .019; f2 = 
.019) of the variance in neutral sport interpretation scores, however they did not 
significantly predict neutral sport interpretation scores, F (2, 23) = .225, p = 
.800. Similarly, sport trait anxiety (p = .591) and attentional control (p = .594) did 
not significantly add to the prediction. 
Sport trait anxiety and attentional control significantly predicted neutral non-
sport interpretation scores, F (2, 23) = 5.099, p = .015 and accounted for 
approximately 30.7% of the variance in neutral non-sport interpretation scores 
(R2 = .307; f2 = .443). However, only sport trait anxiety added significantly to the 
prediction, p = .005. 
3.5. Discussion 
The study sought to examine the relationship between sport trait anxiety, 
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attentional control and cognitive biases with the intention of furthering our 
understanding of the reasons why individuals might interpret sporting 
pressurised situations differently. Cognitive biases are predicted to influence 
state anxiety by altering the perception of costs and probability of failure 
(Eysenck & Wilson, 2016). It is important to understand what pre-empts 
cognitive biases as the extent and impact of these biases varies among 
individuals and, as suggested by ACTS, biases are the initial variables in the 
process which instigates the anxiety response and subsequently results in 
impaired performance. As such, the aim of this study in the thesis was to 
investigate whether sport trait anxiety and attentional control were factors in 
determining whether an individual exhibits attention or interpretive biases.  
3.5.1. Attention Bias 
It was hypothesised that sport trait anxiety would significantly predict attentional 
bias threat scores. Further, it was suggested as an exploratory hypothesis that 
sport trait anxiety would not predict attentional bias happy scores. The findings 
suggest that sport trait anxiety does not predict attentional bias scores for 
threatening or happy images. It is possible that the dot-probe task is not the 
most appropriate way to explore attentional biases in sport. First, it is a 
relatively conservative test of whether or not a given stimulus is actually 
capturing attention (Driver et al., 1999). Second, the task is not situation (sport)-
specific, and while angry faces are particularly pertinent for humans (Bradley et 
al., 2000), anxious individuals have been shown to orient gaze specifically to 
symptom-related threat as opposed to more generally threatening stimuli 
(Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). 
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Third, findings in the mainstream psychology literature have also been 
equivocal. Not only do some trait anxious individuals not reveal an attentional 
bias (Kadosh et al., 2018; Mogg, Bradley, De Bono, & Painter, 1997; Mogg et 
al., 2000), but bias is sometimes only uncovered under stressful rather than 
neutral conditions (MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Mogg, Mathews, Bird, & 
Macgregor-Morris, 1990). Indeed, it has been suggested that attentional bias is 
determined interactively by trait and state anxiety (Broadbent & Broadbent, 
1988; Farrin, Hull, Unwin, Wykes, & David, 2003; Fox, 1993; Rusting, 1999) and 
it may be likely that the effects of trait anxiety on the detection of threat may be 
greater when an anxious state has been induced. Therefore, taking these 
findings into consideration, in chapter 5 of the thesis where attentional bias is 
also measured, a high pressure condition was also implemented to determine 
whether a bias to threat was present and influenced the experience of state 
anxiety.  
However, findings did support the hypothesis that attentional bias threat scores 
would indicate an attentional bias towards threat stimuli on threat trials, yet they 
did not support the exploratory hypothesis that attentional bias happy scores 
would indicate a bias towards happy stimuli. Instead, finding that attentional 
bias happy scores indicate a bias away from happy stimuli on happy trials (see 
Figure 3.3.). Research has suggested that observable characteristics of 
attentional bias include facilitated attention to threat and difficulty in 
disengagement (Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009; Fox et al., 2001; Fox, Russo, 
& Dutton, 2002; Koster et al., 2004; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De 
Houwer, 2006; Mogg, Philippot, & Bradley, 2004). Furthermore, findings from 
trials with happy stimuli supports the possibility of an attentional bias to threat 
and suggests participants could experience anxiety symptoms due to their 
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inclination to avoid positive or happy stimuli. However, a clear distinction 
between preferential attention and failure to disengage attention is difficult to 
determine in the dot probe paradigm (Fox et al., 2001).  
Additionally, the eye movement bias scores do not support the reaction time 
attentional bias scores or the hypotheses, as there was no evidence of a bias 
towards or away from threatening or positive stimuli (see Figure 3.4.). These 
findings are surprising, as it would be expected that a) trait anxiety would 
predict eye movement attention bias scores and b) there would be evidence of 
a bias towards threat as anxious individuals orient gaze towards threat more 
frequently (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012) and maintain gaze on threatening 
distractors for longer (Mogg & Bradley, 2005). There may be limitations with 
using a mobile eye tracker, capturing data at 30 Hz, as opposed to the 200Hz-
1000Hz eye trackers that are typically used in cognitive psychology 
laboratories. We were not able to measure the timing and direction of the first 
eye movement (saccade) towards the target in as sensitive a way and instead 
relied on the timing of the first fixation on the target. Additionally, the 
assessment of eye movements does not take into account covert shifts of 
attention, which may be important in the dot probe task. For example, Bradley 
et al. (2000) reported that more than half of their participants made eye 
movements on less than 10% of all trials.  
It was also hypothesised that sport trait anxiety would significantly predict 
attentional control. The findings from the present study did not support this 
hypothesis and these results are inconsistent with findings linking high trait 
anxiety to impoverished attentional control (Derryberry & Reed, 2002). 
Derryberry and Reed (2002) demonstrated that attentional biases for 
threatening locations were predicted by high levels of trait anxiety and low 
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levels of attentional control. The lack of findings is surprising considering the 
plethora of theories, as discussed in the systematic review (chapter 2), 
suggesting anxiety disrupts attentional control.  
Furthermore, the findings in this chapter contrast to basic assumptions of ACT 
(Eysenck et al., 2007) that cognitive anxiety impairs cognitive control capacity 
by eroding the efficiency of executive functions. Perhaps, because the SAS-2 is 
a measure of sport trait anxiety, as opposed to general trait anxiety (i.e. an 
anxiety disorder), there is no relationship between sport trait anxiety and 
attentional control as appears to be demonstrated here. Additionally, findings 
could simply be because participants’ sport trait anxiety scores were not high 
enough (M = 28.65; range 19-42) to find a significant relationship between sport 
trait anxiety and attentional control. Previous research has examined the 
subscales of the SAS-2, in two conditions (i.e. depletion and non-depletion of 
self-control strength, Englert & Bertrams, 2012), making comparisons between 
the present study and existing research difficult. Further, it is unclear what is 
deemed as a high sport trait anxiety level across the research. However, 
O’Rourke, Smith, Smoll and Cumming (2011) collected SAS-2 average scores 
at 3 time points (29.46, 29.23 and 29.08), while Smoll, Smith and Cumming 
(2007) found mean SAS-2 scores in a control group to be 24.12, preseason and 
27.01, late season, suggesting the average score in the present study was not 
unusual when compared to other research measuring sport trait anxiety in 
athletes. Although it is important to note that sport trait anxiety was measured 
pre- and post-interventions, unlike in the present study. 
Findings also suggest attentional control does not predict attentional bias 
scores, and does not support the hypothesis in the present study. Past research 
indicates that the combination of high trait anxiety and low attentional control is 
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associated with difficulty in ignoring threat related information (Reinholdt-Dunne, 
Mogg, & Bradley, 2009). However, similar to the sport trait anxiety findings in 
this study, it may be that emotional regulation deficiencies cause attentional 
biases (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Koster et al., 2004) yet as participants were 
not under pressure conditions we are unable to support these findings. 
Research examining attentional control and attentional bias in children has also 
found that attentional control did not moderate the relations between attentional 
biases and symptoms of anxiety, although attentional control was negatively 
associated with anxiety symptoms (Helzer, Connor-Smith, & Reed, 2009).  
In addition, the attentional control findings do not support research suggesting 
that attentional control allows trait anxious individuals to modulate attentional 
bias (Derryberry & Reed, 2002). Perhaps attentional control is a possible 
mechanism mediating difficulties in disengaging attention from threat (Eysenck 
et al., 2007) solely following an increase in state anxiety, i.e. at the anxiety-
attention-performance level as proposed in ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007 see 
Figure 3.1, grey, dashed lines), as opposed to a predictor of cognitive biases. 
This has been supported in research with children with a low capacity to 
regulate attention; attentional biases for angry faces were significantly related 
with state anxiety (Susa, Pitică, Benga, & Miclea, 2012). However, it is 
important to note the findings above are in child populations and caution should 
be taken when comparing these findings to findings in the present study. 
3.5.2. Interpretive bias 
Sport trait anxiety influenced negative interpretations, however attentional 
control did not add to the prediction. Participants were asked to indicate which 
negative, positive or neutral interpretation they were likely to think of when 
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presented with an ambiguous situation. The findings in the chapter suggest that 
sport trait anxious participants were likely to have a negative interpretive bias, 
however attentional control did not influence this bias. These findings support 
previous research suggesting no moderating role of regulatory control 
(attentional control) has been observed for the influence of trait anxiety on 
interpretive bias (Salemink & Wiers, 2012). The sport trait anxiety and negative 
interpretation findings are similar to a number of studies conducted in the social 
anxiety literature, whereby socially anxious individuals have been found to 
make significantly more negative interpretations of social situations compared to 
their non-anxious peers (Amir et al., 1998; Constans et al., 1999; Huppert et al., 
2003; Voncken et al., 2003; Wilson & Rapee, 2005). Furthermore, both clinically 
anxious and high trait anxious individuals have been found to show threat-
related interpretive biases, although in the latter case manipulations are often 
used to elevate state anxiety prior to task performance. Therefore, it is possible 
that a combination of high trait and high state anxiety might increase the 
likelihood of interpretative biases, which may explain why only a small 
percentage of variance in the negative interpretation scores could be explained 
by trait anxiety (21.4%). 
The lack of findings regarding positive and negative non-sport scenarios 
suggests that sport trait anxious individuals do not have a bias in general and 
that biases are content-specific to sport scenarios (Amir et al., 1998; Constans 
et al., 1999; Stopa & Clark, 2000; Voncken et al., 2003). Furthermore, these 
findings support the hypothesis that sport trait anxiety and attentional control 
would not significantly predict negative, positive and neutral interpretations in 
non-sport scenarios. However, while there was no relationship between neutral 
interpretations and sport trait anxiety in sporting scenarios, there was in the 
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non-sport scenarios. This relationship suggested that high sport trait anxious 
individuals are likely to make more neutral (non-sport) interpretations as sport 
trait anxiety increases. Perhaps the neutral scenarios were not in fact that 
neutral. Alphas (α) showed scale reliability of .49, suggesting the items are not 
a closely related set and may not be measuring the same underlying construct. 
However, on running a Cronbach’s alpha test on each of the scales, the values 
presented were an item be deleted from the interpretive bias questionnaire did 
not lead to a large improvement in the value. As such, it may be that the test 
length is too short, therefore reducing the value of the alpha (Streiner, 2003). All 
alphas for the scales were lower than the recommended value .90 (.63, .54 for 
the negative and positive scales respectively; Streiner, 2003). 
Attentional control scores, but not sport trait anxiety, were shown to lead to 
positive interpretation scores in sport specific scenarios and this finding 
supports the hypothesis that attentional control scores would predict positive 
interpretations of ambiguous sport scenarios. Furthermore, positive 
interpretations were made most often (see Figure 3.5). These findings may 
indicate the ability of individuals with good attentional control to control their 
attention towards positive interpretations and prevent orienting towards 
threatening stimuli in sporting scenarios. However, as there was no relationship 
between sport trait anxiety and attentional control it is difficult to suggest that 
good attentional control enables sport trait anxious individuals to control 
attention bias to threat.  
Furthermore, there is limited research examining interpretive bias and 
attentional control, with the majority examining attention bias and attentional 
control for obvious reasons (Bishop, 2007; Derryberry & Reed, 2002). An 
exception is Salemink and Wiers (2012) who demonstrated that regulatory 
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control (i.e. attentional control) moderated the degree to which state anxiety 
was associated with a threat-related interpretive bias. In particular, individuals 
with high levels of state anxiety and low levels of regulatory control had stronger 
tendencies to interpret ambiguity in a threat-related way. However, regulatory 
control did not moderate the relationship between trait anxiety and interpretive 
bias. As such, it is necessary for future research to examine the role of biases 
and state anxiety, as there appears to be a link between state anxiety and 
interpretive and attentional bias.  
Furthermore, regarding the role of interpretation bias in sport trait anxiety, do 
the findings obtained with written material generalize to more ecologically valid 
material such as videos of sport scenarios? A methodology relying on written 
material (e.g., threat-related and neutral words or sentences) has inherent 
limitations because of its restricted ecological validity in representing threat 
situations in sport (Thorpe & Salkovskis, 1997; Veljaca & Rapee, 1998). 
Although a number of our hypotheses were not supported, it is important to 
consider some of the implications from the study. Recent studies have 
illustrated that interpretation bias in social phobia is related to treatment 
changes, whereby individuals assessed following behaviour group therapy did 
not differ from normal control subjects when reporting social anxiety symptoms 
(Franklin, Huppert, Langner, Leiberg, & Foa, 2005). Wilson and Rapee (2005) 
also demonstrated treatment was associated with decreased interpretation bias 
3 months after treatment concluded. Additionally, training anxious individuals to 
interpret information in a positive fashion partly contributes to symptom 
improvement in a cognitive bias modification–interpretation training (CBM-I; 
Bowler et al., 2012). Furthermore, through modifying patterns of attention to 
threat (attention toward threat and attention away from threat), MacLeod, 
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Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy and Holker (2002) found that the two attention 
groups developed differentially biased attention responses in accordance with 
the assigned threat-target contingency. Both groups responded with an 
elevation in state anxiety, however, this elevation was greater in those 
manipulated to attend to threat. These findings suggest, although we may not 
know the exact causes behind cognitive biases, interventions to reduce and 
modify biases, may influence state anxiety and improve behavioural outcomes.  
3.6. Conclusion 
The current study is the first to examine the role of cognitive processes as a 
component of ACTS. Whilst it is clear individuals appear to be vigilant towards 
threat and there is some element of a relationship between sport trait anxiety 
and negative interpretations, and attentional control and positive interpretations, 
this does little to elucidate why individuals become anxious in the first place – 
one of the main considerations of ACTS. As such, it may be necessary for 
future research to consider the role of performance in instigating state anxiety, 
in particular performance failure as suggested by ACTS. To be more specific, 
ACTS postulates that cognitive biases alter perceived probability and perceived 
cost of failure. We are able to be more precise and sport-relevant in our 
measurement of the perception of failure, therefore, perhaps an investigation 
into these variables may shed more light on the specific predictions of ACTS.  
3.7. Future research 
The aim of this chapter was to examine the cognitive bias component of ACTS 
and determine what pre-empts cognitive biases on an individual basis. Whilst it 
appears trait characteristics play a role in the cause of biases, particularly 
interpretive biases, previous research findings appear to suggest perhaps the 
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interaction of trait and state anxiety is more relevant as a cause of cognitive 
biases. Furthermore, and as concluded above, it may be more important to 
consider the influence of interpretations of performance failure on state anxiety 
and in particular the perceptions of probability and cost of failure in the initiation 
of state anxiety. It is likely that cognitive biases may moderate the perceived 
nature and experience of the competitive environment, specifically influencing 
perceptions of failure and initiating state anxiety. Subsequently, the aim of 
chapter 4 is to examine these predictions from ACTS and build upon the 
tentative findings from chapter 3. Specifically, chapter 4 will examine the 
perception of failure, through perceived probability and perceived cost of failure 
in sportspersons, and whether these variables, as well as the interaction 
between the two, influences state anxiety. 
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Chapter 4: Antecedents of competitive state anxiety: the role of 
perceived probability and cost of failure 
4.1. Abstract 
ACTS suggests that the perceived probability and perceived cost of failure 
associated with performance leads to increased state anxiety. The present 
study aims to examine this central tenet of ACTS. A sample of 94 
undergraduate students described five undesirable outcomes they thought 
about most often when competing and indicated how likely they thought the 
outcomes were to occur and should they occur, how upset they would be by 
them. Perceived probability was significantly associated with state anxiety and 
the interaction of perceived probability and perceived cost contributed greatly to 
state anxiety levels. The importance of perceived threat for understanding 
anxiety when performing under pressure is discussed.  
4.2. Introduction 
Pressure has been linked to the ego-threatening nature of the competitive 
sporting environment (Wilson, 2012). High levels of pressure are likely to induce 
anxiety, the subjective evaluation of a situation with regard to one’s self-esteem 
(Eysenck, 1992). There is an emerging consensus that high levels of cognitive 
state anxiety induce changes in attention that make it more difficult to focus on 
task-relevant information, which in turn often causes degraded performance 
(chapter 2; Eysenck & Wilson, 2016; Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2012, 2017). 
However, despite the majority of competitive anxiety research in sport focusing 
on these negative influences of anxiety on performance (Roberts et al., 2017), 
individuals sometimes do perform better under pressure (Otten, 2009; Swann et 
al., 2017). Indeed, this may be as a result of individual differences in the 
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interpretation of pressure (Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2012), such as the 
appraisal of situational demands and the probability of success (Berenbaum, 
Thompson, & Pomerantz, 2007). 
As previously mentioned in the thesis, ACTS is more concerned with how and 
why individuals become anxious in competitive environments in the first 
instance, as this may explain why some individuals choke and others are clutch. 
In other words, if someone does not become anxious, they should not 
experience the impaired attentional control and degraded performance 
associated with this emotion. ACTS suggests that cognitive biases underpin our 
experience of pressure and determine whether we become state anxious 
(Eysenck & Wilson, 2016). Chapter 3 examined attentional and interpretive 
biases, and whether sport trait anxiety and attentional control were factors 
which could be used to determine whether an individual is likely to display 
cognitive biases in the first instance. The findings demonstrated that sport trait 
anxious individuals are more likely to experience negative interpretive biases 
and are more vigilant to threat, whilst attentional control is linked to positive 
interpretive bias.  
However, ACTS also suggests a bi-directional relationship exists between 
pressure and performance, based on feedback loops relating to current 
performance and future desired performance (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016). 
Previous performance failure can increase the pressure on subsequent 
performance attempts (see Figure 4.1) and indeed, research by Nicholls et al. 
(2005) in elite golfers revealed the most common stressor during competition 
was physical errors (29.5%). As such, whilst trait characteristics play a role in 
determining whether cognitive biases, and in turn anxiety is experienced, the 
interpretation of performance failure will also play a part. ACTS adopts 
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Berenbaum’s two-phase model of worry to explain the relationship between the 
perception of failure and state anxiety.  
Berenbaum’s two-phase model of worry suggests that anxiety (and its cognitive 
component worry) are influenced by the perceived probability and perceived 
costs of future undesirable outcomes (Berenbaum, 2010; Berenbaum, 
Thompson, & Pomerantz, 2007). In sporting contexts, perceived failure is an 
undesirable outcome, and the costs of failure are greater when the individual 
perceives that more is at stake, such as during a high-pressure moment in a 
competition. The perceived probability of losing is likely to increase as a 
function of the number of failure experiences during a match or competition and 
as a result of interpretive bias. Therefore, the occurrence of mental and physical 
performance errors are factors that can influence the perceived probability of 
failure.    
 
 
Performance 
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Attention 
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Cognitive Biases 
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Figure 4.1. A schematic representation of the pressure-performance 
relationship, as proposed in the Attentional Control Theory: Sport (ACTS). Trait 
anxiety and attentional control influence cognitive biases (as tested in chapter 
3), which in turn influence the perceived probability of failure (“How am I 
doing?”), as do errors on previous performance attempts. Biases also influence 
the perceived cost of failure (“What’s at stake?”), which is also influenced by the 
environmental pressure inherent in the situation. Together, it is predicted that 
these combine to influence anxiety (see black text for relationship explored in 
the current study), which will influence performance via attentional mechanisms 
as outlined originally in ACT (see grey, dashed lines).   
Previous research has shown that individuals who believe undesirable 
outcomes are more likely to occur, and believe the outcomes will be more 
costly, tend to have higher levels of worry than do individuals who believe that 
undesirable outcomes are less likely to occur (Berenbaum, Thompson, & 
Bredemeier, 2007; Butler & Mathews, 1983). Additionally, the interaction of 
probability and cost estimates has been found to significantly predict worry 
above and beyond the direct effects of each (Berenbaum, Thompson, & 
Pomerantz, 2007). Consequently, the aim of the present study was to examine 
the role of these perceptions on the experience of competitive anxiety in a 
sporting context, and as such provide the first test of one of the central 
predictions of ACTS.  
To examine perceived probability and cost, Berenbaum, Thompson and 
Pomerantz (2007) asked participants to generate a list of five undesirable 
outcomes they thought about most often (with reference to social anxiety). In 
contrast, Berenbaum, Thompson and Bredemeier (2007) provided the 
undesirable outcomes (39 outcomes) for participants and asked how likely the 
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undesirable outcomes were to occur and how bad it would be if they did occur. 
In the present study, individuals were asked to report (1) undesirable outcomes 
they often worry about during performance, (2) how probable these outcomes 
are to occur, and (3) how costly the outcomes would be should they occur. This 
methodology was based on the research by Berenbaum, Thompson and 
Pomerantz (2007), who asked participants to describe the five undesirable 
outcomes that they thought about most often, indicate how likely they thought 
the outcomes were, and how upset they would be by them. The researchers 
found that perceived probability and perceived cost of undesirable outcomes 
predicted worry (cognitive anxiety), and that the interaction of between 
perceived probability and perceived cost predicted worrying above and beyond 
their independent contributions. 
To summarise, the present research focused on perceptions of failure. Based 
on the predictions of ACTS and previous work by Berenbaum and colleagues it 
was hypothesised that 1) perceived probability of undesirable outcomes 
occurring would predict state anxiety scores, 2) perceived cost of undesirable 
outcomes should they occur would predict state anxiety scores and 3) the 
interaction of perceived probability and perceived cost would predict state 
anxiety above and beyond the separate probability and cost estimates.  
4.3. Methods 
4.3.1. Participants 
A minimum number sample size of 47 was calculated using G*power 3.1 
software, setting power (1-β err prob.) at .95, alpha (α err prob.) at p = .05, and 
using the effect size (f2 = .2400794) from Berenbaum, Thompson and 
Pomerantz (2007). Originally, 136 undergraduate students consented to 
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participate in the study; however, due to incomplete data sets 42 participants 
were excluded. 94 undergraduate students (37 female, 2 unknown), ranging in 
age from 18-31 years (M = 19.8; SD = 2.1), participated in the study. Increasing 
the sample size provides greater power to detect differences and therefore 
the sample size was doubled. Furthermore, for a small effect size the sample 
size needed to detect this needs to be larger (Cunningham & McCrum-Gardner, 
2007). 
Participants were involved in 29 different sports, at either a recreational or 
higher level (see Figure 4.2). Participants provided written informed consent 
and the local ethics committee approved the study before testing began.  
4.3.2. Measures 
Perceived probability and cost. Participants were asked to describe the 
content of their worries during sporting competition. Aligned with the design 
from Berenbaum, Thompson and Pomerantz (2007), participants were provided 
with the following instructions: “People often think about things they don’t want 
to happen to them during competition. Some examples of these undesirable 
outcomes are ‘this one is not going in either’ or ‘I’m not going to be able to win 
this’. 
Think about the things that generally worry you when competing in your sport. 
In the five boxes below we would like you to list the five undesirable outcomes 
you think about most often.” In addition, for each of the outcomes they listed, 
participants were asked to indicate how probable they thought it was that they 
would actually happen (1 = extremely unlikely; 7 = extremely likely). They were 
also asked to indicate how upset they would feel if the outcome actually 
happened (1 = not at all upset; 7 = extremely upset). The five likelihood scores 
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were averaged to form a single perceived probability score, and the five “upset” 
scores were averaged to form a single perceived cost score.  
The statements of worries were collated and separated into categories (see 
Table 4.3.) with the number of statements and the percentage calculated to 
determine the most frequent worries participants think about during competition. 
Participants were encouraged to consider undesirable outcomes they think 
about most often whilst competing, as opposed to in a social scenario like in 
Berenbaum, Thompson and Pomerantz (2007). The current study is the first to 
attempt to use a similar methodology in a sporting context; however, utilisation 
of this approach allows researchers to explore potential antecedents of state 
anxiety and the perception of threat when competing.   
State anxiety. The state version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; 
Spielberger et al., 1970) was used to measure state anxiety. Perceived 
probability and perceived cost are suggested to influence the experience of 
state anxiety, therefore, the SAS-2 (Smith et al., 2006), a trait measure of 
anxiety, was changed to the state version of the STAI. It consists of 20 
statements which participants respond to on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 
1 = almost never to 4 = almost always. The trait scale of the STAI was not used 
in the present study, as participants did not satisfactorily complete the trait scale 
of the STAI during their laboratory visit and the results could not be used. 
The state scale was developed as a uni-dimensional measure and scores 
increase in situations characterised by physical or psychological stress. Internal 
consistencies for the state scale scores ranged from .83 to .92 for male and 
female high school college students in the STAI manual (Spielberger et al., 
1970). As expected with a characteristic that is state dependent, stability 
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reliability was found to be lower for scores on the state scale (average r = .70; 
Barnes, Harp, & Jung, 2002). In addition, the STAI state has shown to 
differentiate between participants in highly stressful situations (e.g. military 
recruits) and control samples (e.g. student samples; Spielberger, 1983). 
 
Figure 4.2. Number of participants playing different types of sports and the level 
at which each sport was played at, e.g. 3 individuals played football (1) at 
county level.  
4.3.3. Procedure 
Participants attended a single meeting individually and completed the 
questionnaire pack under the supervision of the experimenter. The 
questionnaire pack consisted of the perceived probability and cost questions 
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and then the state scale of the STAI. Participants were asked to go through the 
booklet chronologically and to take as much time as they needed. Following 
completion of the booklet, the experimenter collected it in.  
Participants were then debriefed, any questions were answered, and they were 
thanked for their time.  
4.3.4. Data Analysis 
To examine the influence of perceived probability and perceived cost, as well as 
the interaction of the two variables, on state anxiety, multiple linear regression 
analyses were run to determine main and interaction effects between perceived 
probability, perceived cost and the interaction between perceived probability 
and cost and state anxiety, as well as to determine the relative contribution of 
each of the above predictors to the total variance explained. In order to 
determine whether the interaction of perceived probability and perceived cost 
predicted state anxiety, an interaction term was created using SPSS software. 
All assumptions relating to normality, homoscedasity, linearity, normally 
distributed errors and independent errors were met prior to each analysis. Data 
analysis was conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics for Macintosh, Version 24.0. 
4.4. Results 
Perceived probability scores ranged from 1.8 to 6 (M = 3.35; SD = .82) and 
perceived cost scores ranged from 2.4 to 7 (M = 4.89; SD = .94). The 
correlations of the variables are shown in Table 4.1. As can be seen, all 
correlations, except for the correlation between perceived probability and 
perceived cost, were statistically significant.  
Table 4.1. Correlations among the variables 
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Variable 1 2 3 4 
1. State Anxiety - - - - 
2. Perceived probability .268*** - - - 
3. Perceived cost .241* .051 - - 
4. Probability x cost .825** .737*** .196* - 
Note: *p<. 05, **p<. 001, ***p<. 005 
Perceived probability, perceived cost and the interaction significantly predicted 
state anxiety, F (3, 90) = 425.130, p < .0005, and accounted for approximately 
93% of the variance of state anxiety (R2 = .934). However, only perceived 
probability and the interaction of perceived probability and perceived cost added 
significantly to the prediction, p< .05 (see Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2. Regression results 
Model Beta sr2 
Perceived probability* -.741 0.246 
Perceived cost .010 0.0001 
Probability x Cost* 1.369 0.81 
Note: the dependent variable was state anxiety; sr2 is the squared semi-partial correlation; * p < 
.05 
Table 4.3. Number and percentage of statements obtained from the content of 
worries 
Category Number of statements Percentage 
Making mistakes/ performing badly 239 50.85 
Letting others down e.g. coaches, 
teammates 
45 9.57 
Getting Injured 33 7.02 
Losing 31 6.60 
Performing to best of ability 29 6.17 
Others judgments/expectations 25 5.32 
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Consequences of mistakes 23 4.89 
Opposition 11 2.34 
Environment/ equipment e.g. potholes, 
puncture, temperature 
7 1.49 
Embarrassing themselves 6 1.28 
Substituted too early 4 0.85 
Injuring others 4 0.85 
Team members not giving 100% 3 0.64 
Involved in play 2 0.43 
Falling ill e.g. from nerves 2 0.43 
Unchallenged/bored 2 0.43 
Letting themselves down 2 0.43 
Violence 1 0.21 
‘What if?’ 1 0.21 
Note: n = 94 
 
4.5. Discussion 
The aim of this study was to examine the impact of how perceptions of 
performance failure influenced the experience of state anxiety, a main tenet of 
ACTS (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016), in order to further our understanding of the 
cognitive response to competitive pressure. Understanding the role of 
perceptions of failure during performance has important theoretical and 
empirical implications in terms of understanding the antecedents of state 
anxiety and practical implications in terms of better-informed interventions.  
It was hypothesised that 1) perceived probability of undesirable outcomes 
occurring would predict state anxiety scores, 2) perceived cost of undesirable 
outcomes should they occur would predict state anxiety scores and 3) the 
interaction of perceived probability and perceived cost would predict state 
anxiety above and beyond the separate probability and cost estimates. The 
results provided support for hypotheses 1), perceived probability of failure 
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significantly predicted state anxiety and 3), the interaction between perceived 
probability and perceived cost significantly predicted 81% of additional variance 
in reported state anxiety. However there was no support for hypothesis 2), 
perceived cost of failure did not significantly predict state anxiety. These 
findings are some of the first to provide support for ACTS (Eysenck & Wilson, 
2016) and provide a better understanding of how competitive anxiety emerges. 
Previous research has documented the influence of perceived probability and 
cost of negative outcomes in the maintenance of social phobia (e.g. Foa, 
Franklin, Perry, & Herbert, 1996; Uren, Szabó, & Lovibond, 2004; Voncken et 
al., 2003), however, the current findings are the first in regards to competitive 
sport anxiety. Notable differences are evident in the influence of perceived 
costs between these fields; with Foa and Kozak (1986) finding that perceived 
costs was the most important contributor to state anxiety in social phobia. 
Perhaps the perceived costs are not as severe for sports performers, and the 
probability of subsequent failure (exacerbated by previous errors) may well be a 
stronger driver of anxiety. Indeed, the most common worry, and most important, 
reported by participants were statements concerning mistakes and performing 
badly (50.85%, see Table 4.3), consistent with previous research suggesting 
distracting thoughts and worries occur most frequently (Gucciardi, Longbottom, 
Jackson, & Dimmock, 2010; Oudejans et al., 2011).  
However, it is unexpected that in a sporting scenario the cost of performing 
badly is less important in creating state anxiety than the probability of 
performing badly, as is suggested by the present findings. Indeed, it is thought 
that most worries and fears are driven by faulty appraisals concerning the 
expectation of potential future harm (e.g. Beck et al., 1986). Participants were 
asked to recall worries thought about most often, therefore whilst they were 
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recurring and well known, increasing the validity and reliability of results (cf. 
Beilock & Carr, 2001; Tenenbaum, Lloyd, Pretty, & Hanin, 2002), perhaps 
because participants were removed from the event, perceived costs were not as 
high. Despite following methods adopted in previous research (Berenbaum, 
Thompson, & Pomerantz, 2007), it is likely that simply asking individuals to 
reflect on the undesirable outcomes they think of during competition is less 
meaningful. Participants may also under report the strength of feelings when 
removed from the stressful environment (Ericsson, 2006), especially since the 
recall of emotional content is shaped by current feelings and a desire to 
preserve current self-beliefs (Ochsner & Schacter, 2000). Subsequently, future 
research could attempt to adopt an experimental design where pressure (and 
perceived costs and probability of failure) could be manipulated, and as such be 
more immediate.  
Indeed, Nicholls et al. (2005) asked elite golfers to complete a daily diary. They 
reported many more stressors during an important competition than at other 
times with the most common stressors being physical errors (29.5%), mental 
errors (24%) and observing an opponent playing well (13%). The reported 
stressors are similar to those reported in the current study (see Table 4.3) with 
making a mistake being the highest worry reported. As such, it seems likely that 
the missing element could be an important competition and participants 
perceived costs of undesirable outcomes are higher during these competitions.  
Conversely, perhaps sports people learn early on that costs are not as bad as 
you think at the time. They are aware that there is always another chance to 
‘redeem yourself’ around the corner. For instance, Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy, training the way individuals think and behave, has been associated 
with significant reductions in probability and cost bias (Franklin et al., 2005; 
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Lucock & Salkovskis, 1988; Poulton & Andrews, 1996; Voncken & Bögels, 
2006). Furthermore, interventions designed to help performers develop a 
rational interpretation of the competitive environment have been shown to aid 
sporting performance (e.g. Turner & Barker, 2013; Wood, Barker, Turner, & 
Sheffield, 2018). These interventions may shift athletes’ inherent fixation on 
success and failure and irrational thinking towards constructive goal-directed 
actions (Wood, Barker, & Turner, 2017). Indeed, there is evidence Rational 
Emotive Behavioural Therapy (REBT; Ellis, 1957) reduces irrational thought and 
behaviour in the short term after only one REBT workshop (Turner, Slater, & 
Barker, 2014a). In addition, exposure to the consequences to negative 
outcomes (i.e. training under anxiety), target overestimates of the 
consequences of undesirable outcomes. Antony and Swinson (2000) support 
the use of behavioural experiments and exposure exercises used to target 
overestimates of consequences of negative social events. In sport, 
Nieuwenhuys and colleagues demonstrate that training under anxiety leads to 
successful performance when under pressure and importantly, there is early 
indication that these effects are durable over time (Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 
2010, 2011; Oudejans & Pijpers, 2009). 
Notwithstanding the unexpected finding related to perceived costs, the 
interaction between perceived probability and perceived cost did significantly 
predict state anxiety, supporting and extending earlier work by Berenbaum 
Thompson and Pomerantz (2007; see also, Carr, 1974), as well as the 
hypotheses in this chapter. However, whilst an interaction between perceived 
probability and cost was found to predict state anxiety in the present study, this 
is in contrast to findings by Berenbaum, Thompson and Bredemeier (2007). 
These authors presented participants with undesirable outcomes and found that 
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perceived probability and perceived cost, as separate variables, predicted state 
anxiety. However, there was no support for the interaction of both variables 
predicting state anxiety and it is possible that the discrepancy in the findings is 
due to methodological differences across the studies. 
In general, the findings indicate perceived threat causes heightened state 
anxiety levels as predicted by ACTS. These findings have important 
implications in regards to reducing anxiety when performing under pressure. 
Many interventions in sport tend to impact the anxiety-attention-performance 
relationship (see Figure 4.1. dashed lines) proposed by ACT (Eysenck et al., 
2007) and ACTS (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016). These interventions attempt to 
reduce the effect of cognitive anxiety on performance via improved attentional 
control (e.g. training general functions of working memory, Ducrocq et al., 2018, 
2016;  quiet eye training; Vine et al., 2011). However, the current findings 
provide some justification for interventions to target the first stages of ACTS 
(see Figure 4.1) and in particular, pressure and athletes’ perceptions of failure 
and anxiety as REBT, CBT and training under anxiety attempt to accomplish. 
Based on our findings, interventions could be targeted towards reflecting that 
(1) specific failures during a competitive event are not interpreted as increasing 
the probability of losing; (2) high-pressure conditions are not interpreted as 
meaning that losing would have high costs. 
4.6. Conclusion  
From the findings it is clear that the interaction of perceived probability of failure 
and perceived cost of failure play a large role in the experience of state anxiety. 
Future research needs to adopt an experimental approach to the question of 
how anxiety is influenced, and test the other key tenets of ACTS, especially with 
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regards to the bidirectional nature of the pressure-performance relationship. If 
probability and cost estimates do contribute to worrying, future research needs 
to determine why it is that some individuals tend to think that their concerns are 
more probable and costly. For example, does an individual’s previous 
performance, especially when it includes errors, contribute to perceived 
probability and cost, as suggested by ACTS? Consequently, it is important 
future research tests these predictions experimentally in a sporting task to 
understand how and when the biases influence in order to provide interventions 
to reduce or eliminate the negative effects on performance under pressure.  
4.7. Future research 
Chapter 3 and 4 have examined separate tenets of ACTS to uncover the 
variables suggested to initiate state anxiety. Whilst chapter 3 has demonstrated 
that trait characteristics influence cognitive biases, in particular interpretive bias, 
the present chapter has demonstrated that the perception of failure determines 
the experience of state anxiety. However, it is still necessary and important for 
theoretical and practical purposes to examine ACTS as a whole framework, 
especially with regards to the bidirectional nature of the pressure-performance 
relationship.  
Consequently, chapter 5 sought to replicate findings from chapter 4 and 
demonstrate that perceived probability and cost influence state anxiety when 
performing a sporting task under pressure. This study was proposed to extend 
the findings of chapter 3 and 4 to an experimental setting by examining 
cognitive biases and the perception of failure in a sporting context under 
pressure and further investigate the gaps in knowledge regarding the pressure-
performance relationship highlighted in chapter 2.
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Chapter 5: Cognitive biases and the perception of failure as 
antecedents of competitive state anxiety. 
5.1. Abstract 
ACTS suggests that cognitive biases, enhanced by an individual’s tendency to 
engage in performance monitoring, alter the perceived probability and 
perceived cost of failure; resulting in an increase in individuals’ levels of state 
anxiety, disrupted attention and ultimately, performance suffers. The aim of the 
current study was to collectively examine these variables proposed by ACTS, to 
determine whether they influence each other as predicted. Perceived cost of 
failure moderated the relationship between pressure and state anxiety, whilst 
perceived probability of failure moderated the relationship between pressure 
and performance errors. The findings provide some support for ACTS and 
recommendations are made for future research to extend support for ACTS in 
the literature.   
5.2 Introduction 
The thesis so far has focused separately on the components proposed by 
ACTS (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016) in an attempt to understand the antecedents of 
state anxiety. Research suggests that under pressure, not all individuals may 
get anxious and experience suboptimal performance (Otten, 2009). Indeed, 
pressure fluctuates during performance depending on how important and costly 
the situation is (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016; Chapter 4). ACTS proposes the 
importance of understanding how individuals become anxious in the first place 
and understanding these causes of state anxiety has important theoretical, 
empirical and practical implications for researchers and applied practitioners 
alike.  
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Developing theory allows researchers to better predict what might happen 
under pressure. Furthermore, by testing theoretical predictions it is possible to 
uncover the specific relationships and the most appropriate means in which to 
test these theoretical hypotheses. Practically, it is useful to understand why 
some individuals do not choke and how others, who may choke under pressure, 
can be trained to lessen the effect of pressure on performance. As such, the aim 
of this study is to examine the predictions of ACTS in their entirety to determine 
the antecedents of state anxiety under pressure.  
ACTS postulates that cognitive biases, enhanced by an individual’s tendency to 
engage in performance monitoring, alter the perceived probability and 
perceived cost of failure. Resultantly, state anxiety increases, attention is 
disrupted, and performance suffers (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016). The aim of study 
4 is to collectively examine these variables during a sporting task under 
pressure, to determine whether they influence each other, as predicted by 
ACTS, to increase state anxiety (see Figure 5.1). 
In research into social anxiety and phobia, similar to ACTS, Beck (1976) 
suggested that cognitive biases exacerbate and perpetuate fears via biased 
processing of social information. Specifically, overestimates of the probability 
and cost of negative social events result in the perception of social situations as 
dangerous. Findings from chapter 3 suggest sport trait anxiety and attentional 
control have some influence over instigating cognitive biases, specifically 
attentional and interpretive biases (see Figure 3.1.). However, although there 
was evidence of trait characteristics influencing biases, it appeared more likely 
that performance errors played a causal role in the pressure-performance 
relationship.  
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Further, chapter 4 confirmed that the perception of failure (errors), through 
examining perceived probability and perceived costs of undesirable outcomes, 
influence state anxiety (see Figure 4.1.). Collectively, these findings provide 
some support for ACTS, however it is still necessary and important to replicate 
these findings and provide further empirical evidence to support the theoretical 
predictions. Chapters 3 and 4 examined the components of ACTS separately to 
establish the proposed hypotheses prior to investigating ACTS as a whole 
framework. Therefore, it is essential for the current study to examine ACTS as a 
whole and determine the relationships proposed during a sporting task and 
under pressure.  
 
Figure 5.1. A schematic representation of the pressure-performance 
relationship, as proposed in the Attentional Control Theory: Sport. Sport trait 
anxiety and attentional control are suggested to influence cognitive biases 
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(chapter 3, grey lines, not examined in the present study). Cognitive biases 
influence the perceived probability of failure (“How am I doing?”), as do errors 
on previous performance attempts. Biases also influence the perceived cost of 
failure (“What’s at stake?”), which is also influenced by the environmental 
pressure inherent in the situation. Together, it is predicted that these combine to 
influence anxiety, which will influence performance via attentional mechanisms 
as outlined originally in ACT (see black, dashed lines).   
Maintaining the focus on the error monitoring (perception of failure) element of 
ACTS, the present study sought to examine cognitive biases, perceived 
probability and cost and state anxiety in a) conjunction with each other, b) 
conjunction with pressure and c) during performance of a sporting task. ACTS 
highlights the bi-directional nature of the pressure-performance relationship, 
whereby pressure influences performance but performance (successful or 
unsuccessful) also influences pressure. This feedback system is partly 
influenced by cognitive biases. Individuals will be more likely to take note of 
physical and mental errors due to an enhanced attentional bias, thus they will 
be more aware of thoughts related to failure, and associated arousal symptoms 
will become more noticeable and interpreted as negative for performance. 
Subsequently, this heightened error monitoring influences perceived probability 
and costs of performance failure and ultimately affects performance. 
Furthermore, the present study will also consider the anxiety, attention (through 
quiet eye duration) and performance relationship maintained from ACT 
(Eysenck et al., 2007) to ACTS (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016) and examined in 
chapter 2. The predictions of ACT have received much support in the sporting 
literature (see Eysenck & Wilson, 2016; Wilson, 2012 for reviews). Additionally, 
the present study will also examine the influence of cognitive biases and the 
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perception of failure on anxiety, attention and performance. The aim of the 
present study was to expand and replicate the findings in chapter 4 by 
examining ACTS as a whole framework, including cognitive biases and the 
perception of failure. Specifically, the study examined cognitive biases in the 
form of attention and interpretive biases and perception of failure in the context 
of perceived probability and perceived cost of failure to determine the 
relationship with state anxiety and performance in a sport context under 
pressure.  
5.2.1. Hypotheses 
The aim of this experiment was to explore the predictions from ACTS as a 
whole, to determine whether cognitive biases and perceived probability and 
cost of failure influence state anxiety and performance. The following was 
hypothesised during a competitive golf-putting task; 
It was hypothesised that 1) state anxiety would significantly increase from the 
low to high-pressure condition, 2) performance errors would significantly 
increase from the low to high-pressure condition and 3) quiet eye duration 
would be significantly shorter from the low to high pressure condition.  
Further, it was hypothesised that state anxiety would significantly predict 1) 
performance errors and 2) quiet eye duration in the high pressure condition.  
It was also hypothesised that 1) cognitive biases would moderate the 
relationship between pressure, performance errors and quiet eye duration, 2) 
perceived probability would moderate the relationship between pressure, 
performance errors and quiet eye duration, 3) perceived cost would moderate 
the relationship between pressure, performance errors and quiet eye duration 
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and 4) the interaction of perceived probability and cost would moderate the 
relationship between pressure, performance errors and quiet eye duration. 
It was also hypothesised that the perceived cost of failure would be higher in 
the high-pressure condition than the low pressure condition.  
5.3. Methods 
5.3.1. Participants 
Twenty-nine golfers (6 female) with a mean age of 22.79 years (SD = 4.03) 
agreed to take part in the study. A required sample size of 29 was calculated 
using G*power 3.1 software, setting power (1-β err prob.) at .95, alpha (α err 
prob.) at p = .05, and using the effect size (d = .61) from Bredemeier and 
colleagues (2012) as participants were asked to detail perceived probability and 
cost for a specific timeframe (i.e. the next putt).  
All participants reported playing recreational golf or at a higher level (M years of 
playing = 7.44; 12 handicapped participants), had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision and had not partaken in vigorous exercise prior to testing. Five of the 
participants in this study also took part in study 3.  
5.3.2. Measures 
State anxiety. The anxiety thermometer was used to measure state anxiety 
prior to putting. Participants are asked to indicate on a 10-point Likert-type scale 
(0 = not anxious at all, 10 = extremely anxious) what their feelings of anxiety are 
at that particular moment in time. The validity and test–retest reliability of the 
anxiety thermometer are fair, with correlation coefficients ranging between .60 
and .78 (Houtman & Bakker, 1989). Whilst the STAI (Spielberger et al., 1970) 
was used in study 3, the anxiety thermometer was used in this instance as it 
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provides a quick and reliable way of measuring state anxiety during the putting 
task with as little disruption as possible. Furthermore, as the study was 
measuring state anxiety, the trait scale of the STAI and the SAS-2 were not 
valid measures to continue to use from past experiments as they either did not 
measure state anxiety, or did not allow for quick, non-disruptive measurement.  
Attentional bias. Gaze behaviour was used to measure unstructured 
attentional bias during the testing period (see Marius ’t Hart et al., 2009, for a 
comparison between free exploration and head-fixed viewing conditions). Eye-
tracking technology has provided a new way to examine attentional biases to 
threat that measures viewing behaviour rather than response times, such as 
the location, number, and duration of overt eye movements to threatening 
relative to neutral stimuli (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Yiend & Mathews, 
2005). Whilst reaction time is an indirect measurement of attentional bias and 
findings can be inconsistent, gaze behaviour is a direct and continuous 
measurement of attention (see Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012, for a review).  
Threatening images were placed around the room and the extent to which 
these objects captured attention was the measure of attentional bias. 
Threatening images consisted of a man holding up a gun and a woman 
screaming and these posters were attached to the wall, close to where the 
individual was putting. Attentional bias was measured at the start of the task for 
a minimum of 5 minutes to allow for consistent measurement. Naturalistic free-
viewing conditions were employed with no on-going task to avoid influencing 
individuals’ attentional bias. Under free-viewing conditions, eye tracking allows 
observation of multiple components within a single trial (Armstrong and Olatunji, 
2012) and movements are suggested to closely reflect shifts in selective 
attention (Kowler, 1995). However, it is important to recognise that attentional 
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resources may be allocated covertly and are unregistered by eye tracking 
(Armstrong and Olatunji, 2012) and therefore, may not be picked up during 
analysis.     
Common indices of attention bias using eye movements include the proportion 
of fixation frequencies (Gamble & Rapee, 2010) and proportion of viewing time 
on the emotional stimuli relative to the neutral stimuli (Buckner, Maner, & 
Schmidt, 2010; Calvo & Avero, 2005; Wieser, Pauli, Weyers, Alpers, & 
Mühlberger, 2009). These indices are often averaged over a time span and/ or 
divided into time intervals to understand how attention may change over time 
(Gamble & Rapee, 2010). Attentional bias scores (e.g. proportion of fixation 
frequencies; Bradley et al., 2000; Gamble & Rapee, 2010; Mogg et al., 2003) 
were calculated by dividing the number of fixations directed to the threatening 
images by the number of total fixations on to objects throughout the 
measurement of attentional bias at the start of the task. For example, a bias 
score for threatening images was the number of fixations directed to the 
threatening images divided by the total number of fixations to neutral and 
threatening stimuli. This score reflects the relative frequency of looking 
towards the threatening stimuli rather than the neutral stimuli when faced with 
both. Scores greater than 0.5 indicate an attentional bias for threat. Proportion 
of fixation frequencies were assessed in Waechter, Nelson, Wright, Hyatt and 
Oakman (2014) and they had very good reliability (α = .90).  
Gaze was measured using an Applied Science Laboratories (ASL; Bedford, 
MA) Mobile Eye Tracker. This lightweight system utilizes two features: the pupil 
and corneal reflection (determined by the reflection of an infrared light source 
from the surface of the cornea) to calculate point of gaze (at 30 Hz) relative to 
the eye and scene cameras mounted on a pair of spectacles. A circular cursor, 
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representing 1° of visual angle with a 4.5 mm lens, indicating the location of 
gaze in a video image of the scene (spatial accuracy of ±0.5° visual angle; 0.1° 
precision), was viewed by the research assistant in real time on a laptop screen 
(Dell Inspiron 6400) installed with Eyevision (ASL) recording software. The 
DVCR was linked to the laptop via a 10 m cable, and this was placed into a bag 
so the participant could wear it whilst putting. The laptop was situated on a table 
to the far right of the participant to minimise distraction. The video data were 
recorded for subsequent off-line analysis. A fixation was defined as a gaze 
maintained on an object within 1° of visual angle for a minimum of 100 ms 
(Moore et al., 2012). Each putt was subject to frame‐ by‐ frame video analysis 
using Quiet Eye Solutions Vision-in-Action software (Quiet Eye Solutions Inc., 
Calgary, CA). 
Interpretation bias. Interpretive bias is often measured by requiring individuals 
to interpret ambiguous information in the form of sentences or situations (Calvo, 
Eysenck, & Estevez, 1994; Constans et al., 1999; Richards, Reynolds, & 
French, 1993) or through modification training (e.g. Mathews & Mackintosh, 
2000; Salemink et al., 2007). However, asking individuals to interpret an 
ambiguous scenario or sentence during a golf putting task is less relevant to the 
sport and modification training restricts the ability to determine a causal 
relationship between biases and the perception of failure specifically during the 
task. Therefore, for the purpose of the present study interpretive bias was 
measured through a perception task similar to that employed by Witt and 
colleagues (Witt, Linkenauger, Bakdash, & Proffitt, 2008; Witt, Linkenauger, & 
Proffitt, 2012; Witt & Proffitt, 2005). Participants were asked to draw their 
perceived size of the target (golf hole) as an indicator of interpretive bias. 
Research has found that performance affects the perceived size of an action’s 
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target, for example, softball players who are hitting well interpret the ball to be 
bigger than do players who have more difficulty hitting (Witt & Proffitt, 2005), 
whilst golfers playing better perceive the hole as bigger than those playing 
badly (Witt et al., 2008). Furthermore, research has found that cognitive anxiety 
may alter how visual information is interpreted, even when there is no difference 
in the availability of visual information. Consequently, this interpretive bias may 
cause individuals to respond based on threat-related inferences, instead of 
objective information (Gotardi et al., 2019; Renden et al., 2017). Indeed, it is 
expected that a negative interpretive bias will influence participants to perceive 
the hole as smaller than its actual size.  
Judgements of hole size were obtained by asking participants to draw replicas 
of each target (golf hole) projected onto the golf green using PowerPoint loaded 
onto a laptop. The laptop was placed to the left of the participant at the location 
of the putting position (i.e. at the putting distance, 2.6 m). These size estimates 
were taken at the beginning of each putt in both the low and high-pressure 
conditions. When the vertical and horizontal measurements of circle size 
differed (i.e. an ellipse was drawn) a mean perceived size was calculated 
(Wood, Vine, & Wilson, 2013). 
The size of the hole varied between large (10.16 cm) and small (5.08 cm) 
projected targets to vary task difficulty and to maintain novelty of the task. The 
projected targets also varied in size to ensure putting performance influenced 
perceived hole size and not just remembered hole size (Witt et al., 2008). The 
projected targets were also presented in a counterbalanced format for each 
participant to reduce learning during the task.  
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Probability and Cost Estimates. Perceived probability and perceived cost of 
failure were measured in a similar manner to study 3. However, the undesirable 
outcome was provided to the participant and this outcome was missing the next 
putt, as opposed to general outcomes most often worried about during 
competition, which was employed in study 3. Whilst this methodology is similar 
to Berenbaum, Thompson and Pomerantz (2007) and the methodology used in 
study 3, it has been adapted to be more efficient so it can be employed in 
between putts and also is relevant to the present task as opposed to tasks in 
the past.  
Probability of failure was measured by asking participants to indicate “how 
likely” (0 = not at all likely; 6 = almost certain) it was that they would miss their 
next putt. Cost of failure was measured by asking participants to indicate “how 
bad” (0 = not bad at all; 6 = horrific) it would be if they did miss their next putt. 
These scales were pinned to the wall to the left of the individual and they were 
asked to say their response out loud and a research assistant recorded this.  
Performance. The medial radial error (the distance in centimetres from the final 
ball position to the nearest edge of the projected hole) was recorded for each 
putt as a measure of task performance, and a mean value for each condition 
computed. A putt that landed inside or broke the projected line of the hole was 
recorded as “0” (Moore et al., 2012). 
Quiet eye duration. Gaze was measured using an Applied Science 
Laboratories (ASL; Bedford, MA) Mobile Eye Tracker. The quiet eye 
duration was operationally defined as the final fixation toward the ball prior to 
the initiation of the backswing (Vickers, 2007). Research has demonstrated that 
under conditions of heightened anxiety quiet eye durations are reduced, 
 128 
negatively impacting upon performance (Behan & Wilson, 2008; Causer et al., 
2011; Vickers & Williams, 2007; Vine et al., 2013; Wilson, Vine, et al., 2009). 
Quiet eye onset occurred before the backswing, and quiet eye offset occurred 
when the gaze deviated off the fixated object by 1° or more for more than 
100 ms. A fixation was defined as a gaze maintained on an object within 1° of 
visual angle for a minimum of 100 ms (Moore et al., 2012). Each putt was 
subject to frame‐ by‐ frame video analysis using Quiet Eye Solutions Vision-in-
Action software (Quiet Eye Solutions Inc., Calgary, CA). Quiet eye duration was 
measured throughout the putting task and as a result of the eye tracker being 
calibrated towards putting; attention bias measures were only collected at the 
start of the experiment. Therefore, it was difficult to get a clear representation of 
attention bias during the golf putting task.  
5.3.3. Procedure 
Participants attended the laboratory individually and were given a brief outline 
of the testing that would take place. Participants were fitted with an eye tracker 
and asked to sit quietly, under the pretence the equipment needed setting up, 
whilst attention bias (through gaze behaviour) measures were collected.  
Following this, participants moved to the artificial putting green and the eye 
tracker was calibrated whilst participants stood in their usual putting stance. 
During calibration participants were asked to fixate in turn on one of five golf 
balls placed in a square, with one in the middle, on the green (Vine et al., 2013; 
Walters-Symons, Wilson, & Vine, 2017). Participants were then asked to take 3 
practice putts to a projected hole (large; 10.16 cm) on the putting green to 
familiarize themselves with the surroundings and putting whilst wearing an eye 
tracker. Participants putted using a standard length 90 cm steel-shafted blade 
style putter and standard size (4.27 cm diameter) white golf balls.  
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Participants next received the pressure manipulation and were given high or 
low-pressure instructions in a counterbalanced format. At the beginning of each 
putt the participant was asked to; replicate the size of the projected target 
(small, 5.08 cm, large, 10.16 cm) and complete the anxiety thermometer and 
perceived probability and cost estimates. The research assistant verbally asked 
the questionnaires and the responses were recorded. Following each putt the 
research assistant recorded radial error. The participant was asked to prepare 
for the putt, look down at the ball and were told by the researcher when to 
proceed. The participant was asked to take 18 putts in total, 9 putts in each 
condition, to loosely represent a golf course. The procedure was completed for 
all nine putts. The projected putts varied between small and large projected 
onto the green.  
Following the completion of the first set of 9 putts, the individual was given a 5-
minute break whilst all data was saved. The participant was given the other 
pressure manipulation and the process above was repeated. Following the 
completion of the experiment, the equipment was removed from the participant 
and they were fully debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Pressure manipulation 
Several techniques were used to create high levels of state anxiety for the 
pressure condition, similar to previous research (see Vine et al., 2011; Vine & 
Wilson, 2010; Wilson, Vine, et al., 2009). Firstly, a competition was set up 
between participants whereby they were informed that they were paired with 
another participant and they were competing against other pairs to be top of the 
table. Second, they were informed their partner was currently ‘top’ of the table 
and they need to perform successfully to keep them there. Third, participants 
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were informed that their putts would be recorded and compared to others 
performance by a golf expert, so were encouraged to perform as best as they 
could.  
5.3.4. Data analysis  
A paired samples t-test was conducted on the anxiety thermometer scores, 
performance error scores and quiet eye duration between the low- and high-
pressure conditions to determine whether pressure affected state anxiety levels, 
performance and quiet eye duration.  
Furthermore, moderator analyses were conducted to determine whether 
pressure affected state anxiety, performance errors and QE duration and 
whether this was moderated by either interpretive biases or the probability and 
cost of failure. The moderator variables were centered prior to analysis.  
Interaction variables were calculated for perceived probability and perceived 
cost (PP*PC) using SPSS. A new variable was created for the interaction and 
was created by multiplying two of the variables (e.g. perceived probability x 
perceived cost) to form the new interaction variable (PP*PC).  
5.4. Results 
5.4.1. High and Low pressure conditions 
There was a significant difference between state anxiety thermometer scores 
for the low (M = 2.65, SD = 1.85) and high (M = 3.21, SD = 2.05) pressure 
conditions, t (28) = -2.695, p = .012; state anxiety increased by M = -.56 (SD = 
1.12).  
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There was also a significant difference between performance error scores for 
the low (M = 24.91, SD = 7.49) and high (M = 29.42, SD = 10.54) pressure 
conditions, t (28) = -3.763, p = .001; performance errors increased by M = -4.51 
(SD = 6.45). 
There was no significant difference between QE duration for the low (M = 
689.77, SD = 1045.73) and high (M = 587.23, SD = 1099.66) pressure 
conditions, t (25) = .495, p = .625. 
There was no significant difference between perceived cost of failure for the low 
(M = 689.77, SD = 1045.73) and high (M = 587.23, SD = 1099.66) pressure 
conditions, t (25) = .495, p = .625. 
5.4.2. State Anxiety 
State anxiety did not significantly predict performance errors, F (1, 27) = 3.696, 
p = .065, or quiet eye duration, F (1, 27) = .383, p = .541 under high pressure. 
Moderation analysis using regression was conducted to determine whether 
perceived probability of failure, perceived cost of failure and interpretive bias 
moderated the relationship between pressure and state anxiety, performance 
errors and quiet eye duration. Due to attentional bias being measured prior to 
putting, the attention bias scores were excluded from the following analysis.  
In the first step, pressure and perceived probability of failure were included. 
Pressure conditions and perceived probability of failure did not significantly 
account for the changes in state anxiety, F (2, 55) = 1.560, p = .219. An 
interaction term was created between pressure and perceived probability of 
failure and was added to the regression model. The interaction term did not 
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significantly account for the changes in state anxiety, F (3, 54) = 1.350, p = 
.268. 
In the first step, pressure and perceived cost of failure were included. Pressure 
conditions and perceived cost of failure significantly accounted for the changes 
in state anxiety, F (2, 55) = 4.666, p = .013, ΔR2 = .145. An interaction term was 
created between pressure and perceived cost of failure and was added to the 
regression model. The interaction term significantly accounted for the changes 
in state anxiety, F (3, 54) = 3.244, p = .029, ΔR2 = .008. 
In the first step, pressure and interpretive bias were included. Pressure 
conditions and interpretive bias did not significantly account for the changes in 
state anxiety, F (2, 54) = .587, p = .560. An interaction term was created 
between pressure and interpretive bias and was added to the regression model. 
The interaction term did not significantly account for the changes in state 
anxiety, F (3, 53) = .679, p = .569. 
In the first step, pressure and PP*PC were included. Pressure conditions and 
PP*PC did not significantly account for the changes in state anxiety, F (2, 55) = 
1.158, p = .322. An interaction term was created between pressure and PP*PC 
and was added to the regression model. The interaction term did not 
significantly account for the changes in state anxiety, F (3, 54) = .975, p = .411. 
5.4.3. Performance errors 
In the first step, pressure and perceived probability of failure were included. 
Pressure conditions and perceived probability of failure significantly accounted 
for the changes in performance errors, F (2, 55) = 4.800, p = .012, ΔR2 = .149. 
An interaction term was created between pressure and perceived probability of 
failure and was added to the regression model. The interaction term significantly 
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accounted for the changes in performance errors, F (3, 54) = 3.455, p = .023, 
ΔR2 = .012. 
In the first step, pressure and perceived cost of failure were included. Pressure 
conditions and perceived cost of failure significantly accounted for the changes 
in performance errors, F (2, 55) = 7.862, p = .001, ΔR2 = .222. An interaction 
term was created between pressure and perceived cost of failure and was 
added to the regression model. The interaction term significantly accounted for 
the changes in performance error, F (3, 54) = 5.166, p = .003, ΔR2 = .001. 
In the first step, pressure and interpretive bias were included. Pressure 
conditions and interpretive bias did not significantly account for the changes in 
performance errors, F (2, 54) = 1.459, p = .241. An interaction term was created 
between pressure and interpretive bias and was added to the regression model. 
The interaction term did not significantly account for the changes in 
performance errors, F (3, 53) = .971, p = .413. 
In the first step, pressure and PP*PC were included. Pressure conditions and 
PP*PC did not significantly account for the changes in performance errors, F (2, 
55) = 2.176, p = .123. An interaction term was created between pressure and 
PP*PC and was added to the regression model. The interaction term did not 
significantly account for the changes in performance errors, F (3, 54) = 1.431, p 
= .244. 
5.4.4. Quiet eye duration 
In the first step, pressure and perceived probability of failure were included. 
Pressure conditions and perceived probability of failure did not significantly 
account for the changes in quiet eye duration, F (2, 55) = .239, p = .788. An 
interaction term was created between pressure and perceived probability of 
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failure and was added to the regression model. The interaction term did not 
significantly account for the changes in quiet eye duration, F (3, 54) = .226, p = 
.878 
In the first step, pressure and perceived cost of failure were included. Pressure 
conditions and perceived cost of failure did not significantly account for the 
changes in quiet eye duration, F (2, 55) = .140, p = .870. An interaction term 
was created between pressure and perceived cost of failure and was added to 
the regression model. The interaction term did not significantly account for the 
changes in quiet eye duration, F (3, 54) = .484, p = .695 
In the first step, pressure and interpretive bias were included. Pressure 
conditions and interpretive bias did not significantly account for the changes in 
quiet eye duration, F (2, 54) = .611, p = .547. An interaction term was created 
between pressure and interpretive bias and was added to the regression model. 
The interaction term did not significantly account for the changes in quiet eye 
duration, F (3, 53) = .434, p = .729. 
In the first step, pressure and PP*PC were included. Pressure conditions and 
PP*PC did not significantly account for the changes in quiet eye duration, F (2, 
55) = .053, p = .948. An interaction term was created between pressure and 
PP*PC and was added to the regression model. The interaction term did not 
significantly account for the changes in quiet eye duration, F (3, 54) = .038, p = 
.990 
5.5. Discussion  
This is one of the first studies to examine ACTS, under pressure conditions, in a 
sport context and the results raise several important questions and implications 
for future research and application to sport. The aim of the present study was to 
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examine the predictions of ACTS in a golf putting task to determine whether 
cognitive biases and perceived probability and cost of failure influence state 
anxiety and performance under pressure.  
The findings demonstrated that state anxiety and performance errors 
significantly increased from the low to high-pressure conditions (e.g. Englert & 
Oudejans, 2014; Mullen & Hardy, 2000). These findings confirm that individual’s 
perceived anxiety under pressure and suffered drops in performance. However, 
quiet eye duration was not significantly different, opposing the hypothesis. 
Furthermore, state anxiety did not significantly predict performance errors or 
quiet eye duration in the high pressure condition. These findings are not 
supported by past results as is evident from research discussed from the 
systematic review in chapter 3. Whilst the systematic review confirmed that 
increased anxiety, in response to competitive pressure, is related to impaired 
attentional control and degraded performance, the present findings are less 
clear. However, a cause of this may be due to the methodological challenges 
with the measurements of attentional bias and quiet eye duration (attentional 
control). This is discussed further in the cognitive biases section below.  
5.5.1. Cognitive bias 
ACTS (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016) suggests that cognitive biases in the form of 
attentional and interpretive bias influence perceived probability and perceived 
cost of failure which leads to state anxiety. Therefore, it was hypothesised that 
cognitive biases would moderate the relationship between pressure, 
performance errors and quiet eye duration. The findings in this study did not 
support the hypotheses above.  
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Attentional biases are suggested to contribute to perceived threat (see Mogg & 
Bradley, 2005 for a review), however due to the nature of the study design 
employed it was difficult to accurately measure gaze behaviour between putts, 
as well as in the high-pressure condition. For example, each participant’s gaze 
was calibrated for looking down at the putting green for the purpose of the quiet 
eye measure. Therefore, when an individual looked up from the putting green, it 
was difficult to confirm exactly where they were looking as the eye tracker could 
not be calibrated for both these elements of the task. As a result of this, the 
measure of attention bias was taken prior to putting whilst the participant was 
sitting and the eye tracker could be calibrated for participants’ gaze towards the 
wall. Further, as a consequence of counterbalanced conditions, attentional bias 
measures were taken prior to the golf putting starting. The lack of findings in this 
study suggests that more precise measures need to be employed to establish 
how cognitive bias influences the perception of failure through perceived 
probability and perceived cost.  
Interpretive bias did not have a moderating effect on the relationship between 
pressure and state anxiety, performance errors and quiet eye duration. It may 
be possible that the methodology used to measure interpretive biases was not a 
sensitive enough measure and perhaps interpretive biases manifested in forms 
that were not measured, i.e. thoughts and images. Indeed, the measure of 
perception of target size has not been used in interpretive bias research before. 
However, research has found that performance success or failure affects the 
perceived size of an action’s target, for example, softball players who are hitting 
well interpret the ball to be bigger than do players who have more difficulty 
hitting (Witt & Proffitt, 2005), whilst golfers playing better perceive the hole as 
bigger than those playing badly (Witt et al., 2008). Furthermore, research has 
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also found that anxiety may alter how visual information is interpreted in 
sporting tasks even though there is no difference in the availability of 
information (e.g. Gotardi et al., 2019; Renden et al., 2017). 
Although there were no significant findings in regards to the influence of 
cognitive biases (attentional and interpretive) this study does provide 
information for researchers looking to test the predictions of ACTS and the 
influence of cognitive biases on perceived probability and cost. Especially 
considering there is little research in sport that examines the influence of 
attentional and interpretive biases and perceived probability and cost of failure 
on state anxiety. Furthermore, whilst it is important to establish a causal 
relationship between cognitive bias (attentional and interpretive) and state 
anxiety and performance errors, it may be necessary to look at mainstream 
psychology research and adopt a modification training study (Grey & Mathews, 
2000; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; Wilson et al., 2006; Yiend, Mackintosh, & 
Mathews, 2005). Evidence of a causal link between attention and interpretive 
bias and state anxiety has been provided by studies in which attentional and 
interpretive bias have been experimentally manipulated (see Bar-Haim, 2010, 
for a review). It is necessary for future research to continue to employ novel 
ways of measuring bias to clarify the relationships proposed by ACTS.   
5.5.2. Perceived probability and perceived cost of failure 
The present study hypothesised that 1) perceived probability of failure would 
moderate the relationship between pressure, performance errors and quiet eye 
duration, 2) perceived cost of failure would moderate the relationship between 
pressure, performance errors and quiet eye duration and 3) the interaction of 
perceived probability and cost would moderate the relationship between 
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pressure, performance errors and quiet eye duration. It was also hypothesised 
that the perceived cost of failure would be significantly higher in the high-
pressure condition than the low-pressure condition.  
Findings from this study suggest perceived cost of failure moderates the 
relationship between pressure and state anxiety, and pressure and 
performance errors. Further, perceived probability and perceived cost of failure 
are suggested to moderate the relationship between pressure and performance 
errors. However, there were no differences in perceived cost of failure between 
the low and high-pressure condition. The interaction of perceived probability 
and perceived cost also did not account for variance in state anxiety, under 
pressure.  
It has been suggested in research that perceived cost is the most important 
contributor to state anxiety, in social phobia (Foa & Kozak, 1986). Findings from 
chapter 4 demonstrated that state anxiety is influenced by perceived probability 
and the interaction of perceived probability and cost. The present study found 
state anxiety, when under pressure, was moderated by perceived cost of failure. 
Perhaps because the pressure manipulation asked participants to compete 
against other participants, the task provided an element of competition that was 
missing in study 3 and therefore costs were perceived as higher as participants 
perceived more was at stake should they fail.  
Whilst perceived probability did not moderate state anxiety under pressure, the 
findings suggested that performance errors, under pressure, were moderated 
by perceived probability and perceived cost of failure. Furthermore, perceived 
probability of losing is likely to increase as a function of the number of failure 
experiences during a competition, demonstrating a feedback loop between 
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probability of failure and performance errors. Indeed, these findings indicate the 
importance placed on success and failure when competing, and the influence 
that the possibility of failure (perceived probability) and the consequences of 
failure (perceived cost) can have on an individual’s ability to perform under 
pressure. 
The present study also did not replicate the finding that the interaction of 
perceived probability and cost influenced state anxiety from chapter 4; even if 
an outcome is perceived as being likely, it will not lead to a large perceived 
threat if the outcome is considered relatively unimportant. Conversely, if an 
outcome is considered unlikely, it will not lead to a large perceived threat even if 
the cost of the outcome is perceived as being quite significant (Berenbaum, 
Thompson, & Pomerantz, 2007). Berenbaum, Thompson and Bredemeier 
(2007) also failed to replicate Berenbaum, Thompson and Pomerantz’s (2007) 
interactive finding. One possible explanation for these discrepant findings is that 
different methods were employed in the studies to measure perceived 
probability and cost. These methodological differences are discussed further in 
chapter 6, the general discussion.  
The present findings have some implications for the research base and 
specifically, applied settings. The perception of failure, errors in particular, 
appear critical to understanding the pressure-performance relationship 
(Eysenck & Wilson, 2016). Indeed, findings from this study show the 
significance of associated costs with poor performance in important tasks and it 
is essential for coaches and sport psychologists to be aware of these 
perceptions as they may influence the anxiety experienced during competitions. 
Coaches are then better informed to tailor interventions for individuals based on 
these findings. Furthermore, training studies under anxiety show individuals are 
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able to perform successfully under pressure (Cassell, Beattie, & Lawrence, 
2018; Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2010; Oudejans & Pijpers, 2009). However, 
these studies are largely based on movement planning and there is less 
consideration for the training of cognitive biases and perception of failure during 
practice, therefore leaving scope for future experimental studies to inform 
applied practitioners in the pursuit of appropriate interventions to aid optimal 
performance under pressure.  
5.6 Conclusion 
In sum, the probability and costs of failure when competing have important 
effects on sportsperson’s cognitions leading to increased anxiety and negative 
performance effects. The findings provide support for the influence of perceived 
cost on state anxiety and there is some support for the bi-directional relationship 
between failure and anxiety. The findings also highlight the necessity for more 
research to be conducted on this theory, specifically to continue developing 
novel ways to examine biases and perceptions of failure. In particular through 
the use of training under anxiety and biases modification in an attempt to 
develop understanding of cognitive biases and the perception of failure and 
there precise role in the initiation of state anxiety under pressure. Overall, the 
study attempts to provide a novel insight into the relationship between cognitive 
biases, the perception of failure and state anxiety and future research should 
continue to explore these relationships, why the effects occur and most 
importantly, how they can be limited.   
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Chapter 6: General Discussion 
6.1 Summary of key findings  
Athletes are constantly seeking to thrive under the pressure of sporting 
competition. The study of performance under pressure has primarily focused on 
disrupted attentional mechanisms to explain the negative anxiety-performance 
relationship, however, there is still limited understanding regarding the 
antecedents of state anxiety and successful and unsuccessful performance, as 
well as the exact mechanisms involved in the pressure-anxiety relationship in 
sport.  
Consequently, the aim of the thesis was to examine the pressure-performance 
relationship, specifically the attentional mechanisms in the anxiety-performance 
relationship, as well as ACTS and cognitive biases and perceptions of failure as 
moderating variables postulated to influence successful or unsuccessful 
performance under pressure. First, by collating the evidence in regards to the 
anxiety-performance relationship and underlying attentional mechanisms to 
provide a sense of where the sporting literature stands in regards to this 
relationship, including the challenges in the research and areas of emergent or 
current research. Second, the thesis considered successful and unsuccessful 
performance under pressure and the contributing moderators that influence the 
pressure-performance relationship and in particular, the experience of state 
anxiety. The theoretically derived predictions of ACTS needed to be examined 
experimentally and this thesis is some of the first research to empirically 
examine the predictions proposed. The general aim of the thesis was to 
understand what initiates the anxiety response in individuals, an approach few 
researchers in sport have considered, for the purpose of informing athletes, 
 142 
coaches and support teams and providing a means to recognise and control 
anxious symptoms during competitive performance.  
The systematic review (chapter 2) was conducted initially to determine the 
current state and consensus of the literature base in regards to the anxiety-
performance relationship and underlying attentional mechanisms. The review 
examined existing research for the proposed attentional mechanisms 
responsible for motor skill decrements whilst anxious and assessed the efficacy 
of the different theoretical perspectives of the anxiety-performance relationship 
that implicate attention. From the synthesis in the systematic review, it has been 
established that there is a large amount of research examining the anxiety-
performance relationship that concludes that anxiety causes attentional 
disruptions that lead to drops in performance when under pressure. However, 
there is difficulty drawing conclusions as to which specific attentional 
mechanisms were influenced by anxiety, particularly as comparisons between 
studies and theoretical assumptions are difficult due to contrasting methods and 
study designs. Furthermore, there are limited attempts in the literature to 
provide supporting evidence for more contemporary frameworks, such as the 
three-dimensional (Cheng et al., 2009) and four-dimensional model (Carson & 
Collins, 2016) and notably, ACTS (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016), suggesting that 
performance failure does not always emerge in pressure filled contexts. 
Researchers have tried to understand more about anxiety and its related 
processes by exploring potential mechanisms influencing successful and 
unsuccessful performance under pressure conditions. The ability to perform 
successfully under pressure is a crucial aspect of sport performance (Mesagno 
& Mullane-Grant, 2010) and the majority of research considering successful 
performance under pressure examines potential moderating variables in the 
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anxiety-performance relationship (e.g. Carson & Collins, 2016; Cheng et al., 
2009; Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2012). The aims of the three empirical studies 
in the thesis were to examine the predictions of ACTS (Eysenck & Wilson, 
2016) and specifically, attention and interpretive biases and whether sport trait 
anxiety and attentional control can determine whether an individual is likely to 
experience biases; the perception of failure, specifically perceived probability 
and perceived cost of failure and whether these variables are a predictor of 
state anxiety; and finally, the predictions of ACTS as a whole, drawing from the 
findings in both chapters 3 and 4 to examine cognitive biases and the 
perception of failure as predictors of state anxiety and their influence on 
attentional control and performance.  
Chapter 3 examined attention and interpretation biases, with the aim of 
determining what influences these cognitive biases. Specifically, whether sport 
trait anxiety and attentional control influence attentional and interpretive biases. 
A better understanding of these factors will help to inform interventions 
attempting to reduce anxiety symptoms and develop techniques for protecting 
performance from the negative effects of anxiety. Findings indicated that 
although sport trait anxiety did not predict attentional bias there was evidence of 
a bias towards threatening stimuli and away from positive stimuli when 
examining attentional bias reaction times from the dot probe task. Furthermore, 
sport trait anxiety predicted negative interpretations whilst attentional control 
predicted positive interpretations.  
Chapter 4 examined the perception of failure aspect of ACTS, specifically 
perceived probability and perceived cost of failure, to determine whether the 
interpretation of the environment (through thoughts, errors or performance) 
influenced state anxiety. Cognitive biases, through error monitoring, are 
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suggested to alter the perceived probability and perceived cost of failure, which 
in turn influences the experience of state anxiety. However, there is limited 
examination of the perception of failure within sporting contexts and the 
resultant influence on state anxiety. Findings from chapter 4 indicated that 
perceived probability of failure and the interaction of perceived probability and 
cost of failure predict state anxiety in sport performance. The study was an 
important step towards developing experimental approaches to examine ACTS 
in a sporting task. This approach contributed to chapter 5 in the thesis. 
Chapter 5 aimed to build upon the aims of chapters 3 and 4 by examining the 
hypothesised relationships between cognitive biases (attentional and 
interpretive), perception of failure (perceived probability and cost) and state 
anxiety, attentional control and performance in an ecologically valid golf putting 
task, performed under conditions of artificially induced pressure. Converse to 
chapter 4, chapter 5 indicated that perceived cost of failure moderated the 
relationship between pressure and state anxiety and pressure and performance 
errors in a golf-putting task. Further, perceived probability of failure moderated 
the relationship between pressure and perceived probability of failure. However, 
cognitive biases did not have any moderating effects on state anxiety, 
performance errors or quiet eye duration. Chapters 4 and 5 provide the first 
foundations of support for ACTS (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016). Despite limited and 
contrasting conclusions in the studies, they are an important contribution to the 
literature and add to the development of experimental approaches to examine 
ACTS in a sporting task. 
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6.2. Significance and implications of findings 
6.2.1. The anxiety-attention-performance relationship 
The research examining the anxiety-performance relationship and underlying 
attentional mechanisms has been a prominent feature of the competitive 
anxiety literature. It is clear that attentional processes play a vital role in 
explaining performance disruptions when anxious in the competitive sporting 
environment. Furthermore, research findings suggest that both self-focus and 
distraction elements may play their part. It is difficult to draw exact conclusions 
as to the specific attentional mechanisms influenced by anxiety, however, the 
systematic review uncovered methodological issues with objectively measuring 
focus of attention on ‘the self’, as well as different measurement approaches 
making comparison between the self-focus and distraction accounts difficult. 
Moreover, these issues make it difficult to better understand the strengths and 
weakness of each approach in explaining the anxiety-performance relationship 
and the attentional mechanism involved, which limits researchers ability to 
advance experimental research. 
However, the findings of the first part of the thesis contribute to the anxiety-
performance relationship and provide support and clarity to the knowledge 
base. Whilst there is difficulty when it comes to providing a specific conclusion 
in regards to the exact attentional mechanisms influenced by anxiety, findings 
from the review do confirm that increased anxiety, in response to competitive 
pressure, is related to impaired attentional control and degraded performance. 
Indeed, the review also concluded that interventions designed to improve 
attentional control, such as quiet eye training (e.g. Moore et al., 2012), working 
memory training (e.g. Ducrocq et al., 2018) and mental imagery (e.g. Colin et 
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al., 2014), likely have worth, as they are designed to reduce unwanted attention 
on the self and irrelevant, likely threatening, stimuli. 
Unfortunately, findings from chapter 5 are less supportive of the conclusions 
from the systematic review. Quiet eye duration did not significantly differ 
between the low and high pressure conditions and state anxiety did not 
significantly predict performance errors or quiet eye duration; although state 
anxiety significantly increased from the low to high pressure condition. 
However, pressure was moderated by perceived probability of failure and 
perceived cost of failure in performance errors, and by perceived cost of failure 
in state anxiety suggesting it may have been an issue with the measurement of 
quiet eye duration, which causes the difference in the findings. This is 
discussed in more detail in 6.4.  
Although this is the case, it was also evident that there were elements of the 
anxiety-performance relationship that were yet to be explicitly considered in 
experimental studies. In particular, the influence of competitive pressure when 
performance improves, thus influencing the aims of the second part of the 
thesis. ACTS (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016) is one of the first theories to address 
the variables that may instigate state anxiety symptoms, determining whether 
performance is successful or unsuccessful under pressure. In particular, ACTS 
considers variations in performance under pressure and the causal individual 
differences that influence the interpretation of pressure and the initial 
experience of state anxiety. 
The research that followed the systematic review is some of the first to attempt 
to provide empirical support for the predictions in ACTS. Examining the 
hypotheses presented in ACTS is important for the advancement of the 
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pressure-performance literature, following a number of gaps highlighted 
throughout the systematic review. These findings help to determine the factors 
that lead to anxiety responses under pressure, by better understanding the 
mechanisms that are influenced and specifically how they are influenced under 
pressure. Findings addressed three possible mechanisms that determine state 
anxiety, as suggested by ACTS: cognitive biases, perception of failure and 
performance errors.  
6.2.2. Attentional Control Theory: Sport 
The findings of the second part of this thesis add to our understanding of ACTS 
and the further development of this theory. The findings provide support for 
some of the hypotheses and test the experimental methods and study designs 
which attempt to examine the proposed hypotheses. Specifically, the findings 
contribute to our understanding of ACTS by indicating that perceived 
probability, perceived cost and the interaction of perceived probability and cost 
predict state anxiety. Although these findings were not consistent across 
studies, specifically, perceived probability and the interaction of perceived 
probability and cost predicted state anxiety in chapter 4, whilst only perceived 
cost predicted state anxiety in chapter 5, the findings are some of the first to 
provide experimental evidence for one of the key hypotheses in ACTS.  
Interestingly, findings did not support a relationship between cognitive biases 
(attentional and interpretive) and state anxiety and performance errors or 
between perceived probability and state anxiety. These results were considered 
relatively surprising based on findings from chapter 3 and 4 indicating the 
presence of both when examined separately. However, as there is little other 
evidence in the pressure-performance literature and specifically within sporting 
 148 
contexts, it may be that the predictions made were wrong. Subsequently, it is 
important future research continues to investigate the role of cognitive biases 
and the perception of failure and the collective influence on state anxiety under 
pressure. Indeed, it is also necessary to focus on appropriate methodology, as 
it may be possible study designs in a clinical anxiety context struggle to transfer 
to sporting anxiety contexts. For example, many studies investigating perceived 
probability and perceived cost of undesirable outcomes (failure) examine 
generalised anxiety disorder or social phobias. Participants are presented with 
social scenarios where, should a participant have a negative bias, they will 
suggest negative outcomes are more likely and costly. It could be possible that 
worries differ between the two contexts as well as the perceptions of how 
probable and costly the feared outcomes are. For example, individuals with 
generalised anxiety disorder judge hypothetical undesirable events (e.g. a fire in 
their home) as being more likely (Butler & Mathews, 1983, 1987; MacLeod, 
Williams, & Bekerian, 1991). However, participants with sport trait anxiety are 
likely to be influenced by the pressurised situation they are currently in, and in 
turn probability and cost estimates vary depending on these situations as 
opposed to hypothetical situations.   
6.2.2.1. Role of cognitive biases 
ACTS suggests that cognitive biases have a role in determining whether 
performance is successful and a performer plays at their best under pressure, 
or unsuccessful and a performer collapses under pressure. Cognitive biases 
present in two forms: attentional bias and interpretive bias. The findings from 
chapter 3 indicate that sport trait anxious individuals are likely to make negative 
interpretations. Furthermore, individual’s with high attentional control influences 
more positive interpretations (see chapter 3, 3.3). However, findings were 
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inconclusive with regards to sport trait anxiety and the influence on attentional 
bias, although there was evidence of a bias towards threatening stimuli and 
away from positive stimuli.  
The interpretive bias findings in chapter 3 are supported by research in both 
social anxiety (Amir et al., 1998; Constans et al., 1999; Huppert et al., 2003; 
Voncken et al., 2003; Wilson & Rapee, 2005) and sport-related tasks (Gotardi et 
al., 2019; Nieuwenhuys et al., 2012, 2008; Renden et al., 2017). The findings 
provide evidence that in a benign situation, sport trait anxious individuals are 
more inclined to make threatening interpretations, as well as direct their 
attention towards potentially negative outcomes.  
Should individuals have good attentional control, attention is likely to be 
directed toward positive stimuli. Indeed, it could be possible that good 
attentional control reduces vigilance to threatening stimuli as research suggests 
that higher regulatory control reduces attentional and interpretive biases 
(Salemink & Wiers, 2012). However, there is less evidence examining the 
relationship between interpretive biases and attentional control (Salemink & 
Wiers, 2012), as well as research into cognitive biases (both attentional and 
interpretive) in a sporting context at the pressure-state anxiety level, as 
opposed to the anxiety-performance level. The attentional bias findings in the 
present thesis do not support previous findings (see Bar-Haim et al., 2007; 
Cisler & Koster, 2010 and chapter 3) and whilst these previous findings are the 
majority, past research has also been unable to replicate an attentional bias for 
trait anxious individuals (Mogg et al., 1997, 2000).  
While it is expected that sportspersons will make more negative interpretations 
in high-pressure than low-pressure situations, the extent and impact of these 
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biases will vary across individuals (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016). Furthermore, 
sportspersons who interpret pressure of competitive situations as non-
threatening experience less anxiety and are generally more successful. 
However, there was little evidence in chapter 5 that indicated the presence of 
attentional bias or interpretive bias during the putting task. Indeed, cognitive 
biases did not appear to moderate state anxiety, performance errors or quiet 
eye duration in the fourth study of the thesis, which included a pressure 
manipulation during a golf putting task, as postulated by ACTS. Whilst self-
report state anxiety thermometer measures suggested that the pressure 
manipulation was successful, it is possible the pressure manipulation was not 
strong enough to initially engage perceptions of threat in participants; therefore 
participants were unlikely to attend to threat and interpret scenarios as 
threatening, in turn experiencing less anxiety (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016).  
Based on the findings from this thesis regarding cognitive biases it appears the 
relationship between anxiety and cognitive biases is not a straightforward one, 
and attentional biases do not increase purely as a function of individual anxiety 
level (Kadosh et al., 2018). Indeed, it has been suggested that the adverse 
effects of failure on internal processes and performance (cognitive and motor) 
are greater among individuals with anxious personalities (Saltz, 1970; 
Weinberg, 1978). Therefore, it may be that in a pressurised competitive 
environment, biases may be in response to errors made by the individual. 
Whilst the studies have attempted to test the theoretical predictions in ACTS, 
there is limited clarity on the role of cognitive biases and the specific influence 
on perception of threat (perceived probability and perceived cost of failure). It is 
likely a combination of trait anxiety characteristics and a pressurised, 
competitive environment influence when individuals experience cognitive 
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biases, yet their influence subsequently on state anxiety still needs to be 
uncovered in the sporting literature.  
Furthermore, while it is suggested that cognitive biases influence perceived 
probability and perceived cost of failure in ACTS (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016), as 
far as the author is aware there is no research, specifically in a sporting context, 
which explores this relationship. Therefore, it is difficult to draw from past 
conclusions when analysing the results found in the studies. However, although 
there were limited findings in regards to the influence of cognitive biases (i.e. 
only chapter 3 found support for interpretive biases where sport trait anxiety and 
attentional control predicted negative interpretations and positive 
interpretations, respectively), the studies provide information for researchers 
looking to test the predictions of ACTS and the influence of cognitive biases on 
perceived probability and cost. In particular, it is necessary for future research 
to continue to employ novel ways of measuring bias to clarify the relationship 
between cognitive biases and the perception of failure in the cause of state 
anxiety. Particularly considering that there is little research in sport that 
specifically examines the influence of attentional and interpretive biases and 
perceived probability and cost of failure on state anxiety when performing a 
sporting task under pressure. 
However, there may be a solution to measuring cognitive biases, in particular to 
determine the influence of attentional and interpretive bias on performance. The 
attentional components that underlie attentional biases have been the most 
contested theoretical issue, with contrasting accounts of increased attention 
towards threat (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). Based on the findings in the 
current thesis and potential methodological difficulties with measuring 
attentional bias during performance highlighted in chapter 5, it may be 
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necessary for research to determine the influence of cognitive biases through 
attentional and interpretive bias modification training (Grey & Mathews, 2000; 
Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; Wilson et al., 2006; Yiend et al., 2005). 
Computerized training paradigms have been developed to experimentally 
manipulate interpretive and attentional biases. ACTS states that performers 
who display attentional biases to threat will be more likely to ‘notice’ physical 
and mental errors due to an enhanced attentional bias to threat cues. 
Furthermore, performers who display an interpretive bias will be more likely to 
interpret these errors as having an impact on how they will subsequently 
perform (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016). By training individuals towards a positive 
attentional bias and making threatening stimuli less salient, researchers can 
investigate and compare the perception of failure, state anxiety and errors 
during performance to participants who have been trained to repetitively direct 
their attention towards negative and threatening stimuli. Therefore, interventions 
can be tailored to those experiencing negative anxiety effects under pressure 
and individuals can be trained towards positive stimuli to influence perceived 
pressure and moderating variables that initiate state anxiety.  
6.2.2.2. Role of perception of failure 
The perception of failure is one of the main concepts from ACTS and probability 
of failure and cost of failure contribute to the perception. Perceived probability 
and cost of failure were examined in chapter 4 and chapter 5 by asking 
individuals to rate how likely they were to experience an undesirable outcome 
and how costly it would be should the undesirable outcome occur. The studies 
examining the perception of failure are the first to do so in the context of a 
sporting task. According to ACTS, heightened error monitoring due to 
attentional and interpretive biases influences perceptions of threat leading to 
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the experience of anxiety (e.g. Berenbaum, 2010; Berenbaum, Thompson, & 
Pomerantz, 2007). Previous research has shown that individuals who believe 
undesirable outcomes are more likely to occur, and believe the outcomes will be 
more costly, tend to have higher levels of worry than do individuals who believe 
that undesirable outcomes are less likely to occur (Berenbaum, Thompson, & 
Bredemeier, 2007; Berenbaum, Thompson, & Pomerantz, 2007; Butler & 
Mathews, 1983) Importantly, the findings in this thesis indicate that the 
perception of failure (threat), through measures of perceived probability of 
failure and perceived cost of failure, predict state anxiety and moderate 
performance drops.  
The findings provide a better understanding of how competitive anxiety 
emerges and have important implications in regards to reducing anxiety when 
performing under pressure. However, when the perception of failure was 
examined across the two studies, findings were unable to be replicated. 
Chapter 4 found that perceived probability and the interaction between 
perceived probability and cost predicted state anxiety. However, chapter 5 
found that only perceived cost, under pressure, predicted state anxiety. This 
issue is not just present in the current thesis but with research by Berenbaum 
and colleagues who failed to replicate their findings across two papers 
(Berenbaum, Thompson, & Bredemeier, 2007; Berenbaum, Thompson, & 
Pomerantz, 2007). Indeed, this raises issues with the methodology used in the 
study designs and creates questions regarding why two studies found 
interaction effects and two did not.  
The perception of failure is a critical component of ACTS in terms of 
understanding how individual’s state anxiety might be influenced under 
pressure (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016). It may be the lack of pressure manipulation 
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in all studies except chapter 5 in the thesis, which causes the discrepancy 
amongst the results. For example, individuals perceive pressure in different 
ways and this is likely to vary throughout an event (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016). 
Therefore, pressure was introduced in chapter 5 to examine cognitive biases 
and the perception of failure and explore the differences in performance across 
putting trials. Furthermore, perceived costs are likely to be higher for individuals 
when performing in the competitive environment. In sporting contexts, such as 
the competitive golf putting task in chapter 5, losing is an undesirable outcome, 
and the costs of losing are greater in high-pressure situations than low-pressure 
ones because more is at stake (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016). In contrast, in neutral 
situations, such as the laboratory conditions in chapter 4 when participants 
were asked to think back to undesirable outcomes they often think of when 
competing, participants may under report the strength of their feelings 
(Ericsson, 2006) because they are removed from the stressful environment, 
which may also account for the discrepant findings related to perceived threat.  
However, it is important to recognise that these situations described by 
participants were meaningful to the individual and were common thoughts 
participants experience when competing. Whilst laboratory induced stress 
manipulations have some strength (see chapter 2, section 2.5.1), the levels of 
anxiety are likely to be lower than when an individual is experiencing pressure 
when placed in their most stressful ‘real’ situation. Thinking back to this stressful 
situation was part of the task in chapter 4, and although in that moment they 
were not directly experiencing pressure, they were thinking back to a time when 
they were experiencing a ‘real’ stressful and pressurised experience. Therefore, 
it could be argued that pressurised conditions were present more so in chapter 
4 than chapter 5, although not directly induced.   
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In sum, the findings in the thesis have provided some of the first support for 
ACTS and add to research attempting to understand how competitive anxiety 
emerges under pressure. In particular, the findings here provide support for one 
of the main tenets of ACTS; perceived probability and cost of failure predict 
state anxiety. Additionally, it is likely that trait characteristics play a role in 
influencing attention to and interpretation of potentially threatening 
circumstances. All of these findings contribute to our understanding of the 
theoretical predictions postulated by ACTS (see Figure 6.1.). Using the 
methodology employed in the thesis is a first step to establishing determinants 
of anxiety, prior to more complex testing of ACTS. Indeed, by examining the 
hypotheses of ACTS in stages, it has been possible to establish how each 
concept may develop, specifically how thoughts about performance failure or 
errors influence perceived probability and cost, and subsequently influence 
state anxiety, in order to then build on these findings by investigating ACTS as 
a whole framework.  
6.3. Applied implications 
ACTS (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016) provides a theoretical framework in which 
psychologists and coaches are able to follow to attempt to determine why and 
how individuals become anxious when performing under pressure. As such, 
they are able to prescribe interventions best suited to the performer. The 
findings relating to perception of failure and the influence on state anxiety have 
important implications in regards to reducing anxiety under pressure. In 
particular, ACTS suggests individuals can intervene in at least two places 
(Eysenck & Wilson, 2016): either reducing the likelihood that pressure leads to 
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state anxiety, or by reducing the effect of anxiety on performance (via attention 
control). Moreover, if someone does not become anxious, they should not 
experience the impaired attentional control and degraded performance 
associated with this emotion. 
In the first instance, anxiety will not necessarily be greater under high-pressure 
than low-pressure conditions provided the individual sportsperson does not 
interpret the high-pressure condition as threatening. This can be achieved by 
considering Berenbaum’s model: (1) specific failures during a competitive event 
are not interpreted as increasing the probability of losing; (2) high-pressure 
conditions are not interpreted as meaning that losing would have high costs. 
Both of these strategies reflect the importance of maintaining a rational 
interpretation of the competitive environment, and interventions designed to 
improve this process have been shown to aid sporting performance (e.g. Wood 
et al., 2018).  
Findings from chapters 4 and 5 suggest main variables that could be targeted in 
interventions to reduce the likelihood of anxiety emerging. Perceived probability 
and perceived cost of failure were predicted to influence state anxiety and 
performance error, therefore coaches can focus on targeting irrational 
interpretations of failure to reduce negative perception of probability and cost 
when performing under pressure. Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) 
can aid individuals to distinguish between rational and irrational beliefs, and 
further assist them in responding to failure with healthy emotional and 
behavioural responses (Turner, 2016). Turner and colleagues have found that 
REBT sessions were able to significantly reduce irrational beliefs in athletes 
(mixed martial arts, Cunningham & Turner, 2016; cricket, Turner & Barker, 
2013; football, Turner et al., 2014). However, research concerning REBT in 
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sport is scant, and there is little evidence to support the use of behavior therapy 
in the interpretation of errors. Given that sport is a performance-driven industry, 
REBT and the influence on irrational and rational beliefs during performance 
should be empirically tested (Turner, 2016).   
Furthermore, studies investigating training under anxiety demonstrate that 
individuals are able to perform successfully when under pressure. For example, 
Oudejans and colleagues have demonstrated that training with anxiety can help 
to improve subsequent performance under pressure in both expert and novice 
athletes (Oudejans & Pijpers, 2010, 2009) and in police officers (Oudejans, 
2008). Importantly, there is early indication that these positive training effects 
are durable over time (Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2011). Furthermore, these 
findings from intervention studies can be applied to findings from the studies in 
the thesis examining ACTS and interventions can be tailored to re-framing 
perceptions of failure when training under pressure. Therefore, training under 
pressure will help individuals perform during important tasks, including 
acclimatising to the specific processes accompanying anxiety (Oudejans & 
Pijpers, 2009) and reappraising the perception of pressure during competitions, 
limiting the influences of cognitive biases and perceptions of failure.  
Furthermore, interventions have been developed to attempt to reduce the effect 
of state anxiety on performance via improved attentional control. These 
interventions either train individuals to maintain focus on key sources of 
information while they perform, for example, through quiet eye training (Vine et 
al., 2011) or by training general functions of working memory (Ducrocq et al., 
2018, 2016). However, training working memory can also be used as an 
intervention to reduce the likelihood that pressure leads to anxiety. Impairments 
in working memory can lead to excessive worrying (anxiety; Bredemeier & 
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Berenbaum, 2013). Indeed, a bi-directional relationship is suggested between 
working memory and worry. Deficits in working memory may make individuals 
prone to worry and conversely, working memory capacity is further 
compromised when individuals engage in worry and occupy working memory 
resources. Furthermore, recent evidence suggests that it may be possible to 
improve working memory in individuals with elevated levels of worry (trait) by 
teaching them to access more benign interpretations of ambiguous events 
(Hirsch, Hayes, & Mathews, 2009). Therefore, interventions targeted at training 
working memory have merit at both stages proposed by ACTS.  
In summary, findings from this thesis can be used to inform interventions 
targeted at reducing anxiety symptoms for individuals performing under 
pressure. As mentioned, it is likely interventions can be targeted to intervene 
either by reducing the likelihood pressure leads to anxiety or by reducing the 
effect of anxiety on performance (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016). Furthermore, these 
findings can also be used to inform training studies already conducted (e.g. 
Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2011; Oudejans, 2008; Oudejans & Pijpers, 2009) 
as well as to inform REBT to address rational thinking when faced with errors 
and failure (e.g. Cunningham & Turner, 2016; Turner & Barker, 2013, 2014; 
Turner et al., 2014a; Turner, Slater, & Barker, 2014b) 
6.4. Limitations and directions for future research 
The process of measuring attentional and interpretive biases for the studies was 
the biggest challenge of the thesis, particularly measuring attentional biases. 
The aim of chapter 3 was to solely measure attentional and interpretive bias 
following collection of sport trait anxiety scores and attentional control scores. 
Therefore, the tasks were developed based on cognitive bias literature (e.g. 
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Derakshan & Koster, 2010; Huppert et al., 2003; MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 
1986; Miers et al., 2008; Mogg & Bradley, 1999; Stopa & Clark, 2000; Voncken 
et al., 2003) and measured reaction times to threat and interpretations of 
ambiguous scenarios. However, the aim of chapter 5 was to measure these 
biases specifically during a sporting task. There is limited research measuring 
biases in actual sporting tasks, where reaction times measured using dot probe 
tasks and interpretations of specific ambiguous scenarios measured through 
vignettes and questionnaires are a less relevant measure of threat, although 
some research makes reference to attentional biases in the anxiety-
performance literature (see Eysenck et al., 2007). Therefore, experimental 
methods were explored to examine the hypotheses of ACTS in relation to 
cognitive biases, i.e. eye tracking and target perception, which were less 
commonly used within the research area but are often used in sport research. 
Eye-tracking technology has provided a new way to examine attentional 
biases to threat that measures viewing behaviour rather than response times, 
such as the location, number, and duration of overt eye movements to 
threatening relative to neutral stimuli (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Yiend & 
Mathews, 2005). Examining gaze behaviour to assess attentional bias to 
emotional stimuli is a direct and continuous measurement of attention (see 
Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012, for a review). However, an issue with assessing 
eye movements with an eye tracking system is that the system cannot account 
for peripheral or covert vision.  
Furthermore, challenges were encountered with the actual measurement of 
attentional biases when using eye tracking. Indeed, the eye tracker was 
calibrated for each participant to carry out the golf putting task. However, should 
an individual look up and attend to a threatening image, placed by the 
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researchers, it was difficult to be certain that where the eye tracker located the 
participants gaze was an accurate representation of where the individual was 
looking. Therefore, attentional bias measures were taken prior to the putting 
task and prior to the pressure manipulation as the manipulation was 
counterbalanced and not all participants began putting in the high-pressure 
condition. However, this led to collecting attention bias data out of the high-
pressure manipulation and therefore, could not demonstrate vigilance to threat 
through eye movements when under competitive pressure.  
Furthermore, the sampling rate of the eye tracker posed an issue, particularly 
when it came to measuring saccades (i.e. the timing and direction of the first 
eye movement to the target) during the dot probe task. Capturing data at 30 Hz 
as opposed to the 200 Hz-1000 Hz eye trackers that are typically used in 
cognitive psychology laboratories meant the data was not as sensitive and the 
timing of the first fixation on the target was used instead. A low sampling 
frequency of 30 Hz can result in noisier parameter estimates in the instance of 
small saccades (van der Geest & Frens, 2002). Additionally, issues arose with 
calibration of the eye tracker to participants’ eyes, as well as relying on the eye 
tracker to continuously work. In some instances of data collection, the footage 
was fragmented due to technical issues and possibly due to the changing 
positions of participants’ heads influencing the quality of data. Whilst the same 
eye tracking device was used across all the relevant studies, there were still 
issues with the specific device which influenced the collection and quality of 
data. However, whilst these issues are common throughout the thesis, there is 
little in the literature with regards to the development of methods to evaluate the 
data quality of the respective eye trackers (see Reingold, 2014). Indeed, there 
is no gold standard eye tracking system.   
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This limitation leaves scope for future research to determine the best way to 
measure attentional biases when trying to explore whether a causal link exists 
between biases and the perception of failure in individuals when performing 
under pressure. Whether this is through cognitive bias modification training, or 
eye tracking during a task under pressure following identification of threat 
during performance. Furthermore, it is important for researchers to continue to 
address the novel research designs attempting to measure cognitive biases and 
the influence of perceived probability and cost of failure and state anxiety during 
sporting tasks. In particular, the free viewing eye-tracking method as a measure 
of attentional biases is a relatively new way to measure attentional biases. 
Difficulties arise with identifying the potential threats during the sporting task 
and continuously measuring gaze behaviour during performance, particularly 
when identifying potential threats in a controlled laboratory environment. 
A limitation to the experimental research in the thesis is also the inconsistency 
in measurement of anxiety. Chapter 3 examines sport-specific trait anxiety, 
chapter 4 examines general state anxiety and chapter 5 examines competitive 
state anxiety. Whilst the SAS-2 (Smith et al., 1990) is a multidimensional 
measure of sport trait anxiety, the STAI state scale is relatively one 
dimensional, as is the anxiety thermometer used in chapter 5, which 
encompasses somatic and cognitive anxiety under the term anxiety with no 
differentiation between the two. The thesis measures anxiety specific to context 
and general anxiety, therefore, making it difficult to compare the anxiety findings 
across studies. Furthermore, it is also difficult to suggest that the measures of 
perceived probability and cost are influenced by the same anxiety components. 
Furthermore, the measures of state and trait anxiety do not account for the 
interpretation of anxiety symptoms by the participants and whether they view 
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them as harmful in relation to the upcoming events (Jones and Swain, 1992; 
Hanton et al., 2003). Future research could consider using the Immediate 
Anxiety Measurement Scale (IAMS; Thomas, Hanton and Jones, 2002) to 
measure the cognitive and somatic components of competitive anxiety, 
including the anxiety interpretations and how anxiety may influence subsequent 
performance.   
Finally, the breadth of the samples used across the studies also limits the 
findings, specifically in relation to the skill level of participants. This limitation 
may also account for the lack of findings across the thesis. The samples vary 
from recreational to elite level participants, with chapter 3 and chapter 5 
recruiting golfers with a skill level of recreational or above and chapter 4 
recruiting participants from any sport at any level. Research has suggested that 
skill level can play a key factor in how individuals interpret their anxiety 
symptoms. For example, Hanton and Connaughton (2002) interviewed elite and 
non-elite swimmers and recorded their retrospective interpretations of cognitive 
and somatic anxiety symptoms, as well as self-confidence and performance. 
Findings suggested that those with a higher skill level were able to cope with 
the competitive situation better and this then determined the interpretation of 
the cognitive and somatic anxiety symptoms experienced. Additionally, research 
examining rugby players has also demonstrated that skill level across groups 
influenced the interpretation of competitive anxiety and elite athletes 
experienced the same levels of anxiety as non-elite, but perceived them as less 
debilitating (Neil, Mellalieu and Hanton, 2006). Therefore, skill level may be a 
moderating factor which influences how anxiety is perceived under pressure, 
and may influence perceived probability and perceived cost of failure. Those 
that are less elite performers may perceive threat as more probable and costly 
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than those who are more elite, and potentially are equipped with more skills to 
interpret symptoms in a more positive fashion (Neil et al., 2006). In particular, 
this limitation highlights an avenue for future research to examine the influence 
of skill level in relation to ACTS. In the first instance, it is important to distinguish 
findings between elite and non-elite participants to determine any potential 
differences in the perception of threat and the influence on state anxiety. 
The thesis supports some of the key assumptions of ACTS (Eysenck & Wilson, 
2016), specifically those in relation to the perception of failure and the role of 
probabilities and costs in the initiation of state anxiety. Therefore, it is important 
that future research continues to examine these variables and considers not 
only the limitations to the current studies in this thesis but also to replicate the 
findings. Indeed, it is also important to consider the limitations in the present 
study when conducting future research.  
Whilst it is likely cognitive biases also play a role in the initiation of state anxiety, 
it is possible from some of the current findings that the role is less influential 
than the perception of failure. However, the current research has highlighted 
that there is a need for future research to examine potential moderating factors, 
for example skill level, which may play a role in individuals’ experience of 
perceived probabilities and costs. Furthermore, it is vital that the measurement 
of state anxiety is considered as the varied measurements in the current studies 
in this thesis result in mixed conclusions when it comes to explaining how 
anxiety is initiated by cognitive biases and the perception of failure. 
Furthermore, it is equally as important to consider practical conceptualisations 
of ACTS and how it links with current research that is applied to sport. For 
example, the catastrophe theory (Hardy, 1990) proposes that cognitive anxiety 
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and physiological arousal (somatic anxiety) interact with each other and when 
both are high, performance catastrophically drops. In relation to ACTS, 
individuals would perform until perceived probability and costs increase and 
initiate or increase state anxiety, which in turn would disrupt attention and 
performance, and the catastrophic drop occurs (see also, Hardy, 1999, for a link 
to processing efficiency theory). Additionally, once performance is lost, it is 
difficult to reinstate, demonstrating the feedback loop proposed in ACTS 
between the perception of failure and errors, and the continuation of poor 
performance (see Figure 6.1.). However, as previously mentioned, more 
experimental research is necessary. In particular, to examine the relationships 
proposed in Figure 6.1 before bringing them into an applied setting, with the 
intention to understand and attempt to help athletes manage anxiety and their 
performance.  
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Figure 6.1. The schematic of ACTS, showing all the relationships examined 
within the thesis, including the influence of sport trait anxiety and attentional 
control on cognitive biases (Chapter 3); the influence of perceived cost and 
perceived probability on state anxiety (Chapter 4); and the influence of cognitive 
biases on perceived cost and probability and the subsequent influence on state 
anxiety, alongside the influence of errors on probability of failure and pressure 
(Chapter 5).  
Based on the findings of the thesis, it is important for future research to attempt 
to replicate the results presented here. The thesis is the first to examine the 
predictions of ACTS, and while supporting some predictions (perceived 
probability and cost predict state anxiety) it is extremely necessary for research 
to continue to expand the current findings as there were inconsistencies among 
the studies. Additionally, there are few findings regarding attentional and 
interpretive bias in sport, as well as perceived probability and perceived cost of 
failure in different sporting tasks and at different skill levels. Furthermore, while 
the current research focused on golf, it is also important to determine whether 
these findings transfer to other aiming tasks and team sports.  
6.5. Conclusion 
The thesis is the first body of work examining performance under pressure from 
the perspective of the moderating variables initiating the anxiety response and 
in particular from the perspective of the predictions of ACTS (Eysenck & Wilson, 
2016). The findings demonstrate perception of failure influences state anxiety, a 
main tenet of ACTS (Eysenck & Wilson, 2016). Furthermore, it is likely cognitive 
biases are influenced by individual’s trait characteristics, however it is 
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necessary for future research to examine the specific relationship between 
cognitive biases and the perception of failure. In sum, the results lead the way 
for future research to further explore the role of moderating variables in initiating 
state anxiety under competitive pressure. In particular, the influence of cognitive 
biases on the perception of failure to establish a link between these two 
variables and their influence on state anxiety. However, the practical 
significance of the findings can be targeted towards tailoring interventions to 
reappraise perceptions of failure (i.e. the likelihood and cost of undesirable 
outcomes) during performance under pressure. Overall, the thesis makes a 
novel contribution to the literature by supporting ACTS and extending 
knowledge on how anxiety emerges under pressure. As such the work has 
implications in practical settings relevant to interventions reducing anxiety 
responses in individuals performing under pressure in sport.
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Appendix 1 
 
Name: ______________________                                           Email: _____________________ 
Sport Anxiety Scale-2 
Please read each question, and then circle the number that says how you USUALLY feel before 
or while you compete in sports. There are no right or wrong answers. Please be as truthful as 
you can.  
Before or while I compete in sports: 
  
Not at 
all 
A little 
bit 
Pretty 
much 
Very 
much 
1. It is hard to concentrate on the game 
 
1 2 3 4 
2. My body feels tense 
 
1 2 3 4 
3. I worry that I will not play well 
 
1 2 3 4 
4. It is hard for me to focus on what I am 
supposed to do 
 
1 2 3 4 
5.  I worry that I will let others down 
 
1 2 3 4 
 
Before or while I compete in sports: 
  
Not at 
all 
A little 
bit 
Pretty 
much 
Very 
much 
1. I feel tense in my stomach 
 
1 2 3 4 
2. I lose focus on the game 
 
1 2 3 4 
3. I worry that I will not play my best 
 
1 2 3 4 
4. I worry that I will play badly 
 
1 2 3 4 
5.  My muscles feel shaky 
 
1 2 3 4 
 
Before or while I compete in sports:  
  
Not at 
all 
A little 
bit 
Pretty 
much 
Very 
much 
1. I worry that I will mess up during the 
game 
 
1 2 3 4 
2. My stomach feels upset 
 
1 2 3 4 
3. I cannot think clearly during the game 
 
1 2 3 4 
4. My muscles feel tight because I am 
nervous 
 
1 2 3 4 
5.  I have a hard time focusing on what 
my coach tells me to do  
 
1 2 3 4 
Scoring key: Somatic: 2, 6, 10, 12, 14; Worry: 3, 5, 8, 9, 11; Concentration disruption: 1, 4, 7, 
13, 15 
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  Almost 
never 
Sometimes Often Always 
 When I need to concentrate and solve 
a problem, I have trouble focusing my 
attention 
 
1 2 3 4 
 When I am working hard on 
something, I still get distracted by 
events around me 
 
1 2 3 4 
It’s very hard for me to concentrate on 
a difficult task when there are noises 
around 
 
1 2 3 4 
When I am reading or studying, I am 
easily distracted if there are more 
people talking in the same room  
 
1 2 3 4 
When trying to focus my attention on 
something, I have difficulty blocking 
out distracting thoughts 
 
1 2 3 4 
I have a hard time concentrating when 
I’m excited about something 
 
1 2 3 4 
When concentrating I ignore feelings 
of hunger or thirst 
 
1 2 3 4 
After being interrupted or distracted, I 
can easily shift my attention back to 
what I was doing before 
 
1 2 3 4 
When a distracting thought comes to 
mind, it is easy for me to shift my 
attention away from it 
 
1 2 3 4 
 I can quickly switch from one task to 
another 
1 2 3 4 
 It takes me a while to get really 
involved in a new task 
 
1 2 3 4 
It is difficult for me to coordinate my 
attention between the listening and 
writing required when taking notes 
during lectures 
 
1 2 3 4 
I can become interested in a new topic 
very quickly when I need to 
1 2 3 4 
I have a hard time coming up with new 
ideas quickly 
 
1 2 3 4 
It is hard for me to break from one way 
of thinking about something and look 
at it from another point of view 
 
1 2 3 4 
 My concentration is good even if there 
is music in the room around me 
 
1 2 3 4 
 When concentrating I can focus my 1 2 3 4 
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attention so that I become aware of 
what’s going on in the room around 
me 
 
It is easy for me to read or write while 
I’m also talking on the phone 
 
1 2 3 4 
I have trouble carrying on two 
conservations at once 
 
1 2 3 4 
It is easy for me to alternate between 
two different tasks  
1 2 3 4 
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Sport Scenarios  
 
1) You have a ten-foot putt to win a tournament 
What are you thinking?  
 
I am one of the top putters in this tournament and have been putting well all day; I’m 
going to make this 
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
This putt is too difficult for me; I’m definitely going to miss it 
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Whether I make this putt or miss it, I will be happy with my performance in this 
tournament 
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
2) You are faced with a tough chip over a bunker to a tight pin 
What are you thinking?  
 
I have practiced this shot over and over, I can do this  
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
I really don’t want to chip this into the bunker  
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Just focus on your technique and trust yourself, it doesn’t matter what the outcome is  
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
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3) You’ve got a tight tee shot with water on the right and out of bounds left 
What are you thinking? 
 
 
I barely ever miss fairways; I’m going to flush this straight down the middle  
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
I’ve been hitting it left and right all day, please just try and steer it between the two 
hazards 
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Let’s just swing freely here and see what happens  
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
4) You’re going for a par 5 in two. You have to hit your best shot to get it there and 
there’s water short if you mishit it  
What are you thinking? 
 
 
I’m going to hit this on the green and make an eagle 
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
It would be horrible if I hit it in the water and made a bogey (or worse) on such an easy 
hole  
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
This is something that I’ve done many times before, let’s just do it again 
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
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5) You have a three foot putt on the 18th to break par for the first time in your life. Your 
friends are all watching from the balcony 
What are you thinking?  
 
 
I have felt so good over my putts all day, there’s no way I’m going to miss this 
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
This is so scary, everyone is going to laugh at me if I miss and I’ll never have this 
chance again 
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Miss or make, my friends will still think I’m great and I’ve had a great day on the course 
either way 
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
Non-sport scenarios 
 
1) You bought some golf balls the other day, but never picked them up. 
What are you thinking? 
 
I’m looking in the wrong place but they’re definitely around here somewhere  
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
They’ve been stolen 
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
There are just so many golf clubs here that mine is difficult to find 
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
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2) You receive a telephone call from the bank  
What are you thinking? 
 
You have other more important things to do first  
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
You completely forgot 
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
It just didn’t cross your mind 
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
3) You receive your TV and broadband bill 
What are you thinking?  
 
They ring to tell you that you are approved for the loan 
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
They ring to tell you that your credit rating is not good enough for the loan 
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
  
They ring to tell you they need more information to complete the application 
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
4) You’ve put your golf clubs somewhere and when you go back for them later on, you 
can’t find them.  
What are you thinking? 
 
The company is giving you three free channels for three months 
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
Might pop  
up in my  
Definitely 
pops up in 
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my mind 
 
mind my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
The company is charging you for sport channels that you did not ask for 
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
The company sent you your monthly bill 
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
5) You receive a telephone call from your landlord 
What are you thinking?  
 
They are refunding some of your rent back to you  
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
They are evicting you from the rented property 
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
They are calling to acknowledge your rent payment 
Doesn’t 
pop up in 
my mind 
 
Might pop  
up in my  
mind 
Definitely 
pops up in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix 4 
People often think about things they don’t want to happen to them during 
competition. Some examples of these undesirable outcomes are “this one is not 
going in either” or “I’m not going to be able to win this”. 
 
Think about the things that generally worry you when competing in your sport. 
 
In the five boxes below we would like you to list the five undesirable outcomes 
you think about most often. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
 
 
For each outcome, we would like you to indicate how probable they are to 
actually happen 
 
Outcome 
1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Extremely 
unlikely 
     Extremely 
likely 
 
Outcome 
2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Extremely 
unlikely 
     Extremely 
likely 
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Outcome 
3 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Extremely 
unlikely 
     Extremely 
likely 
 
Outcome 
4 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Extremely 
unlikely 
     Extremely 
likely 
 
Outcome 
5 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Extremely 
unlikely 
     Extremely 
likely 
 
 
For each outcome, we would like you to indicate how upset you would feel if 
the outcome actually happened. 
 
Outcome 
1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Not at all 
upset 
     Extremely 
upset 
 
Outcome 
2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Not at all 
upset 
     Extremely 
upset 
 
Outcome 
3 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Not at all 
upset 
     Extremely 
upset 
 
Outcome 
4 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Not at all 
upset 
     Extremely 
upset 
 
Outcome 
5 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Not at all 
upset 
     Extremely 
upset 
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Appendix 5 
 
The state version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 
Gorsuch & Lushene, 1970). 
 
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are 
given below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number to 
the right of the statement to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this 
moment.  
 
There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one 
statement but give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings 
best.  
 
 
Not at 
all 
Somewhat 
Moderately 
so 
Very 
much 
so 
I feel calm 1 2 3 4 
I feel secure 1 2 3 4 
I feel tense 1 2 3 4 
I feel strained 1 2 3 4 
I feel at ease 1 2 3 4 
I feel upset 1 2 3 4 
I am presently worrying over possible 
misfortunes 
1 2 3 4 
I feel satisfied 1 2 3 4 
I feel frightened 1 2 3 4 
I feel comfortable 1 2 3 4 
I feel self-confident 1 2 3 4 
I feel nervous 1 2 3 4 
I am jittery 1 2 3 4 
I feel indecisive 1 2 3 4 
I am relaxed 1 2 3 4 
I feel content 1 2 3 4 
I am worried 1 2 3 4 
I feel confused 1 2 3 4 
I feel steady 1 2 3 4 
I feel pleasant 1 2 3 4 
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Appendix 6 
 
  
10 – extremely anxious 
0 – not at all anxious 
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Appendix 7 
Low Pressure instructions  
We will shortly ask you to perform a golf putting task consisting of nine putts. 
The aim of this task is to get the ball in the hole or finish the ball as close to the 
hole as you possibly can with each putt. We will instruct you when you may 
begin each putt, and then you can hit each putt in your own time. After each 
putt, we will record the distance the ball finishes from the hole. Please just try 
your best.  
High pressure instructions 
We will shortly ask you to perform a golf putting task consisting of nine putts. 
This is the most important part of the experiment and it is very important that 
you try to get the ball in the hole or finish the ball as close to the hole as you 
possibly can with each putt. We will instruct you when you may begin each putt, 
and then you can hit the putt in your own time. After each putt we will record the 
distance the ball finishes from the hole and ask you a few questions.  
You are being paired with another participant for this part of the study and your 
previous performance was actually your first set of results. You are competing 
against other pairs and based on your partners’ results you are top of the leader 
board. You need to maintain your partners lead in order to win. At the end of the 
study the leader board will be emailed to all participants. We will also be 
videoing your performance attempts and golf experts will be looking at them to 
evaluate your technique. You must improve your performance in order to bring 
yourself and your partner up the table.  
 
 
